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A NOTE FROM THE EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

As two graduating seniors, we wanted to use this space to reflect upon our time at the *Brown Journal of History*. Too often, we as Brown students are isolated in our roles as historians. We write papers without help or input from other students, instead conferring only with a professor. Consequently, we rarely see the work other students are producing, unless tapped to proofread a paper.

That is the beauty of the *Brown Journal of History* — and that is the reason we have both returned to the Journal in our final year at Brown. It is inspiring to read students' submissions. They are uniformly informative, well written and thoroughly researched; even papers that don't ultimately appear in the Journal share these characteristics. By editing for the Journal, we have been able to access the outstanding historical scholarship of our fellow students.

Yet Brown's undergraduate historical community should not be confined to the pages of the Journal. We have had the immense privilege to read a diverse body of undergraduates' original research, but many others have not. With so many students doing such excellent work, it is unfortunate that we often neglect to share our findings with our classmates and friends.

We hope, then, that this journal will inspire readers to be more proactive about engaging with peers on historical topics. The Journal is merely the compilation of a small sampling of papers; it is a taste of the enormous volume of research that Brown students perform inside and outside the classroom. Nonetheless, as undergraduate historians, we have so many other opportunities to read what our fellow Brunonians have written. We invite our readers to seize these opportunities — to take what is included in the following pages as a beginning rather than a finite publication. For the Journal to serve its purpose of fostering a closer-knit undergraduate historical community, it should inspire us to reach out to our classmates to ask about their projects and their research. It has certainly made both of us eager to learn more about the work of our peers and we hope that it will have the same effect on you.

Samantha Sanders and Alexandra Macfarlane

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

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Images on the cover from left to right:

Latin America Calls!, United States Catholic Conference, 4 June 1969.

Illuminations from the Codex Manesse in Hidelberg, c.1305-1340.


Walter McClintock, *Many White Horses and Son*, 1904.

Louis Dalrymple, "School Begins," *Puck*, 1899.

An Efficient Occupation:

Schooling and Efficiency in the US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934

Brian Kunderer



In order to fully understand the logics motivating the occupation of Haiti by the United States (1915-1934), the occupation must be thought of in the context of ideological developments occurring within the United States. “School Begins” was published in *Puck* magazine in 1899, and it visually captured the way that the United States imagined itself in relation to the rest of the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the 20th century.¹ It takes place in Uncle Sam’s “class in Civilization,” and uses the metaphorical place of the classroom and language of education to illustrate Uncle Sam civilizing the territories that the United States had claimed under its sphere of influence — he teaches them with a book entitled “First Lessons in Self-Government.” Such uncivilized nations were thought to not know how to govern themselves. This metaphor is particularly apt because the United States actually used schools often in the early 20th century imperial strategies employed in Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States had not yet set its sights on Haiti, and it is therefore not depicted here, but several other island nations such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines are seated in the front row of the classroom. The representations of these nations fulfill US-held stereotypes of “primitive” people. Puerto Rico has not groomed

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its hair, Hawaii is wearing ankle bracelets instead of shoes and both hold confrontational postures, like immature children not wanting to go to school.

Uncle Sam is an educator and disciplinarian capable of and allowed to use force as an educational tool. He waves his teaching baton treacherously above the heads of the island nations who sit either in stubborn indignation or absolute fear of corporeal punishment. This use of force is derivative of a political belief espoused on the blackboard in the back of the room:

The consent of the governed is a good thing in theory but very rare in fact — England has governed her colonies whether they consented or not. By not waiting for their consent she has greatly advanced the world's civilization. The U.S. must govern her new territories with or without their consent until they can govern themselves.²

At the turn of the century and after prospering under the industrialization of the preceding decades, the United States had assumed the responsibility to spread civilization throughout the world. The United States routinely intervened without consent in the internal affairs of the territories in its sphere of influence because such countries were thought to be too immature and underdeveloped to properly govern themselves, just as the children in the cartoon are too young to understand the value of Uncle Sam's classroom lessons. This goal of promoting civilization fueled a body of imperial practice throughout the early 20th century that would eventually be dubbed the civilizing mission.³

Five years later, President Theodore Roosevelt's State of the Union address made explicit what these "lessons in Civilization" were, and what characteristics constituted a civilized nation as defined by the US:

Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States.⁴

The continued sovereignty of a nation was contingent upon U.S. approval of these criteria: (1) an "efficient" way of life, (2) the maintenance of social and political stability and (3) the ability to pay debt and otherwise contribute to the world economy. Countries that did not meet these criteria enough to meet US approval would "require intervention by some civilized nation."⁵ Implicit here is that efficiency, stability and material wealth marked certain nations as civilized, and such civilized nations had the responsibility to impart these values on nations marked as uncivilized. Unconditional sovereignty was a privilege afforded only to the civilized. Particularly in the Western Hemisphere where the United States had previously pronounced its paternal authority with the Monroe Doctrine, the United States specifically might be

forced to the “the exercise of international police power” in the service of this civilizing mission.⁶ This particular strategy of foreign policy would come to be remembered as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and would legitimate US imperial aggression through the early 20th century.

Numerous historians in the past have explained that the United States launched the 1915 occupation of Haiti because the country had failed to meet the “decency in social and political matters” stipulation in Roosevelt’s Corollary.⁷ In 1914, Haitian President Guillaume Sam had just been assassinated marking the seventh governmental overthrow in five years. The particular violence of his murder legitimated the US proposed goal of “promoting law and order;” President Sam’s army was found responsible for the massacre of 167 political prisoners and enraged mobs took vengeance by dismembering his body and dragging the parts around the capital city in Port-au-Prince.⁸ Amidst the global tension the accompanied World War I and the looming threat of German invasion, the United States blamed this uprising on the Haitian government’s “inability or unwillingness to do justice” that could potentially invite “foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.”⁹ Under Roosevelt’s permutation of the Monroe Doctrine, a weakened Haiti was a liability to U.S. national defense that therefore necessitated forced military intervention.

Through a more Marxist reading of history, some scholars have emphasized how the occupation was motivated by Haiti’s failure to “pay its obligations” as stipulated in the Corollary.¹⁰ Although Haiti had in fact been remarkably consistent in making the loan payments on its massive \$21.5 billion dollar debt, the fact of Haitian debt nonetheless provided a justification for numerous acts of US aggression. For example, in December 1914 US marines landed in Port-au-Prince and robbed the Banque Nationale d’Haiti of \$500,000 under the pretense of covering Haitian debts to US bankers. Furthermore, historian Laurent Dubois has written about the ways that US banks intentionally exacerbated Haiti’s financial crisis, consequentially facilitating political instability, and ultimately creating the conditions that would later justify occupation.¹¹

In exploring Roosevelt’s conception of “reasonable efficiency” and the ways that the efficiency craze of the early 20th century influenced the civilizing mission, I look specifically to schools. Cameroun Forbes, the American governor of the colonized Philippines in 1903 said, “almost the first thing to which the Americans turned their attention in the Philippine Islands was education.”¹² He imagined American teachers in the Philippines as “the apostle[s] of progress” who could teach the local children “the dignity of labor,” and other qualities deemed essential to civilized life.¹³ Therefore these teachers and these classrooms were crucial to the American narrative of

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spreading civilization abroad, and they were viewed with similar esteem in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.

While historians have documented that schools were used as tools of empires, they have not properly situated those schools established in regions of U.S. intervention in the context of changing educational philosophy within the United States.¹⁴ The early 1900s saw an increase in vocational education meant to prepare children specifically for employment after graduation. Such schools were motivated by the ideas of Frederick Winslow Taylor, who stressed the importance of efficiency as a cure to several of the nation's problems, and entrepreneurs like Andrew Carnegie, who eschewed more classical education as impractical and wasteful. Historian Samuel Haber writes this of the Progressive Era of 1890-1920: "the progressive era gave rise to an efficiency craze... Efficient and good came closer to meaning the same thing in these years than in any other period of American history."¹⁵ Raymond Callahan went as far as to call this period the "Age of Efficiency."¹⁶

This project seeks to understand how vocational education and the ideological preoccupation with efficiency shaped US occupational strategies in Haiti. As shown in the political cartoon "School Begins," schools were believed to be one site through which the U.S. could teach the Haitian people how to properly govern themselves. This paper will first outline what the occupational forces saw as the faults in the Haitian education system, and it will explain how US perceptions of those problems were shaped by educational developments within the United States. Next, it will detail the disputes American officials had with Haitian officials and in particular emphasize the cultural clashes between the two. It will then explain how and why vocational education was imagined as the most effective method of uplifting the Haitian population by explaining vocational education's proposed effect on the Haitian elite and on agricultural production.

+ + +

With the precedent already set for using schools as an instrument of empire, the United States quickly looked towards Haitian education as a means of promoting democratic principles, maintaining political stability and increasing agricultural efficiency. Even though public education had been gratuitous for all Haitians since 1816 and declared mandatory in 1889, schools were so underfunded and legislation so unenforced that at the turn of the century, only 3 percent of school-age children were actually enrolled. Because the government had only enough money to provide meager stipends for teachers, it was unable to attract qualified citizens to the profession. For this reason, the country faced a 90-95 percent illiteracy rate, with most of

literate citizens pursuing their education in prestigious private secondary schools or at universities in France.¹⁷

Haitian and US officials alike recognized the maladies of the Haitian education system, but they differed in their diagnosis and treatment of the problem. In the midst of its Age of Efficiency, the United States had been using methods known as scientific management to make their schools as streamlined as possible. “Educational engineers” and “practical educators” were proposing all-day schools, shortened recesses, lengthened recesses and redesigned campus layouts all in pursuit of heightened educational productivity, measured by numerical, empirical methods.¹⁸ These scientific educational methods are most clearly articulated in the writings of John Franklin Bobbitt, a US educationist who just a decade earlier had been sent to the US-occupied Philippines to administer elementary schools. In his revered “The Elimination of Waste in Education,” he outlined these four principals of scientific management as especially applicable to education reform:

The first principle of scientific management is to use the entire plant all the available time. A second principle of scientific management is to reduce the number of workers to a minimum by keeping each at the maximum of his working efficiency. A third principal of scientific management is to eliminate waste. A fourth principle of general scientific management is: Work up the raw material into that finished product for which it is best adapted. Applied to education this means: Educate the individual according to his capabilities. This requires that the materials of the curriculum be sufficiently various to meet the needs of every class of individuals in the community; and that the course of training and study be sufficiently flexible that the individual can be given just the things he needs.¹⁹

Although Haitian education was most often regarded simply as uncivilized or backwards, these were the specific criteria that together culminated in such labels.

Because educational management strategies designed to match scientific management were only a recent invention of an efficiency model situated uniquely within the United States, Haitian educational officials did not share these strategies. When military authority Colonel A. S. Williams commented on the state of education in Haiti, he attributed its failings to teacher quality, as did Haitian officials, but also to educational management styles of the superintendants. While conceding that superintendants were well educated, he nonetheless held that they were “incompetent to teach” and that they knew “nothing about scientific educational methods” that were needed to run a school efficiently.²⁰

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In 1917, Williams recommended that Lionel Bourgeois, then a superintendant of public schools in Louisiana, become the Minister of Public Instruction in Haiti to implement the strategies that Haiti was lacking. Bourgeois' management strategies throughout his appointment in Haiti were undoubtedly informed by the educational development in the United States and his home state of Louisiana. Throughout the nation, educational engineers were reducing the number of school employees on account of Taylor's condemnation of workers who "soldiered," or worked deliberately slow because they did not have the incentive to work efficiently, and Bobbitt's recommendation that schools should operate with the minimum number of teachers working to with the utmost efficiency.²¹ Louisiana Tech University in fact listed the "consolidation of schools" as one Louisiana's greatest accomplishments at the turn of the 20th century.²²

By focusing on educational efficiency rather than overall educational achievement, Bourgeois recommended reducing the teaching force in the already grossly understaffed Haitian schools from 1300 to 400.²³ When the Haitian government rejected this recommendation, Bourgeois reduced their protest to Haitian stubbornness and backwardness, and expressed his discontent through the language of efficiency. To him, it seemed to only want to "retain as many Haitians as possible in [their] employ regardless of the necessity of them, their efficiency, or, the interests of Haiti."²⁴ He used incidents such as this to claim the "incontrovertible fact that the Haitians are unfitted to the proper administration of the school system" and recommend that the U.S. government take full control of Haitian education.²⁵

To more convincingly relate principles of business and educational management, educational reformers in the early 20th century increasingly likened schools to factories. For example, Bobbitt's essay relies on a metaphor of the educational facility as a "plant" where many of his strategies would seem logical and advantageous.²⁶ A 1910-1923 superintendent in Bourgeois' home state of Louisiana, Joseph Marr Gwinn likened the New Orleans schools with high dropout rates to factories with low yield when he vowed to make such schools more "efficient" by increasing retention.²⁷ Likewise in Haiti, Roger McIlhney, Financial Advisor to the U.S. occupational government, described Haitian schools primarily as failed business investments that did not "render adequate return for the money expended."²⁸

The curriculum to be taught in Haitian schools was similarly a topic of contestation between the efficiency-minded American government and classically educated Haitian elites. In the United States, educational policymakers denigrated subjects that we today classify under a liberal arts curriculum. For example, William Bagley asserted that the subjects of history, literature and foreign language (to name a few) had "slight direct

utilitarian [or] economic” value, and therefore did not need to be taught in primary and secondary schools.²⁹ Haitians however, had great pride in the classical education and intellectual culture they had inherited from the French and which they believed connected them with the civilized world. Dantes Bellegard, as the Minister of Public Instruction in Haiti, took it upon himself to defend the existing curriculum.³⁰ In direct opposition to US pressures, he declared:

Haiti does not beg for help from any foreign expert to organize her public education system. The system which she adopts — because it is consistent with her language, her traditions and her aspirations — is entirely based on the French School System, which the Americans will be most unwelcome to despise.³¹

Bellegarde makes it abundantly clear that American occupation constituted not only a battle over Haitian sovereignty or Haitian resources, but also over Haitian culture as well.

With Haitian schools imagined as factories, U.S. officials focused their energies on making such schools more efficient and ultimately created animosity between them and Haitian educational advisors. According to the United States’ diagnosis, Haitian schools were failing not because they were underfunded, but rather because they were managed inefficiently. The 1915 treaty that officially inaugurated the military occupation of Haiti made no provisions as to who would administer education, so both governments competed for influence in educational reform. Although the Haitian government officially had the license to institute their own reforms, the United States held the purse strings to the Haitian treasury, effectively giving the occupational government control. Mr. Roger Farnham, Vice President of the National City Bank of New York and business agent in Haiti, attributed the resulting stagnation to the dual government structure of the occupation and the animosity between U.S. and Haitian officials. Farnham noted:

The representatives of the United States, the financial, adviser, the military commanders, and the American minister can do nothing without the consent of the Haitians, which they do not get, and the Haitians on their part can do nothing without the approval of the financial advisor, and it is a deadlock, and has been so so ever since the treaty was put into effect.³²

Farnham’s telling of occupation politics, alongside the complaints of Lionel Bourgeois, later provided the impetus for the United States to ignore the initial principals of occupation and take full control of education in Haiti.

Soon after World War I ended, the American press for the first time began critically investigating the Haitian occupation, and reported a lack of educational progress and mounting violence in Haiti. Concurrent with

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the educational disputes mentioned, a brutal military regime operated in occupied Haiti. In order to organize the labor needed for the massive public works and renovations that would legitimate the occupation, U.S. officials reenacted a Haitian forced labor law known as the *corvée*. Through this legislation, thousands of Haitians were kidnapped from their homes and forced to engage in hard manual labor with no financial compensation for up to six days a week. Those who resisted were executed. Additionally, more and more Haitians were participating in what were called the Caco Rebellions that attempted to expel the US military presence from Haiti, launching parts of the island into a state of guerilla warfare.³³

Despite evidence to the contrary, World War I veteran officers maintained that the occupation had led to positive change in Haiti. Major General George Barnett, a revered commandant, espoused that the Marines were providing “the best government and the best administration it had in 100 years,” and counted advances in education among their accomplishments.³⁴ Clifford Albion Tinker, a former Lieutenant, wrote in the January 1922 edition of *The American Review of Reviews* that the U.S. occupational government had been judged too harshly, and asserted that left to their own devices, the Marines would be able to institute lasting educational reforms.³⁵ He cited American intervention work in the Dominican Republic and used images of Dominican schools as evidence of the potential of US military assistance. Neither Barnett nor Tinker were actually in Haiti at the time of their comments, which gave them access to U.S. media outlets that spread their interpretations of the occupation much more quickly than information coming from Haiti itself. Furthermore, their status as national heroes in the world post-World War I gave particular salience to their opinions on military concerns.

The American public, however, was not convinced and the government was forced to respond to growing unrest. A Senate Committee of Inquiry on American Activity in Haiti and Santo Domingo was dispatched to Haiti to dispel all myths of wrongdoing in the country. In response to this escalating discord, the Committee in 1922 recommended “schools and agricultural instruction” as the panacea for the myriad of social, economic, and political problems in occupied Haiti.³⁶ Such a recommendation was fitting of a United States that at the time was itself fiercely advocating the spread of vocational education. In 1917, the United States Congress passed the Smith-Hughes National Vocational Education Act, which allocated federal funds for the development of vocational and agricultural education.³⁷ Several states took it upon themselves to augment financial support for vocational education programs with their own legislation; Louisiana passed legislation in 1921 that provided additional state funds to agricultural and trade schools.³⁸ This type

of education was proposed as a way to both encourage the white working class to send their children to school for a longer time and to make schooling relevant to their predestined futures as industrial workers.³⁹

Although vocational education came to prominence on the national level only after the ideas of Frederick Taylor, John H. Bobbitt, and others began to circulate, it had been implemented with African-Americans in the American South since the years after the Civil War. As James D. Anderson recounted in his *"The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935 (1988),"* manual labor was utilized in the Hampton School to teach African-Americans the intertwined values of work ethic and Christian morals and to accustom them to subordinate social roles in the Reconstruction South.⁴⁰ Northern philanthropists such as William H. Baldwin, who thought that African-Americans were "best fitted to perform the heavy labor in the Southern States," and would "willingly fill the more menial positions," were inclined to financially support such models of education.⁴¹ Furthermore, they removed African-Americans from effective roles in politics and government and progressed Reconstruction along the political interests of the white elite who had dominated the antebellum South.⁴²

Vocational education for African-Americans was also imagined as an institution that distinguished the US South from the barbarism that was thought to be in places like Haiti. Edgar Gardner Murphey of the Southern Education Board, for example, praised black vocational education for keeping African-Americans subservient and maintaining a "race antipathy" that constituted "social purity" and "public good."⁴³ In his *"The Problems of the Present South,"* he noted:

The total abandonment of the dogma of racial integrity in the South would mean a land — not white, nor part white and part black — but a land all black; with perhaps many of those reversions of the standards of political and social life which have been exhibited in Haiti and Santo Domingo.⁴⁴

Racially divided vocational schools were to Murphey a cornerstone of U.S. civilization. In Rayford Logan's comparison of U.S. southern schools and Haitian schools, Logan similarly positions the vocational schools funded by white philanthropists as the distinguishing factor between the civilized United States and uncivilized Haiti. He writes:

Take away the five thousand schools that are the result of the intelligent munificence of America's greatest practical educator and the counties of our Southern States would resemble the communes of Haiti. The writer has seen both and feels safe in asserting that the pre-Rosenwald South was hardly superior to pre-Occupation Haiti in education facilities.⁴⁵

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According to Logan, it was only with the help of a “practical educator” applying the tenets of Taylorism to educational reform that the American South had escaped the barbarism imagined to be in Haiti. Both Murphy and Logan held that vocational education was a defining element of US civilization and that its influence was what distinguished the American South from Haiti.

In Haiti, vocational education was proposed as a way to enervate the Haitian elite who were seen by the United States to be at the root of much of the social and political discord in Haiti. Lieutenant Adolph Miller, for example, identified the Haitian elite as “the sole source of [occupied Haiti’s] problems to date,” because they would “harass and coerce peasants” who in turn would revolt against them.⁴⁶ Therefore, plans to vanquish this elite constitute a large share of his personal log. Furthermore, many American troops in Haiti found the nature of Haitian class stratification to be innately undemocratic, and elite Haitians themselves to be impediments to full democracy. Because the Haitian elite’s identity was largely defined by its distance from labor, compulsory vocational education posed a crisis to elite culture; in preparing all children, regardless of class, for lives of manual labor, vocational education would blur the class division of Haitian society and diminish the influence of the elite.

American officials also believed that the advanced education of the Haitian elite was the cause for social unrest. General John H. Russell, appointed American High Commissioner to Haiti in 1922, wrote that classical studies were preparing Haitians for jobs in law, medicine, commerce and governmental office. He said that these Haitians “do not know how to use their hands, and have no idea of the dignity of labor. As a result, there is a regrettable shortage of agriculturalists and skilled workers. It is among such a class that revolutions are bred.”⁴⁷ With the assumption that Haiti was essentially an agricultural nation, vocational education was proposed as an alternative that was more fitting to the needs of Haiti. Many U.S. officials ridiculed the Haitian education system because they believed it was preparing its students for sophisticated jobs that did not exist in the agricultural country. When Carl Kelsey, a professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, made his recommendations to the Senate Committee, he cited a number of Haitians who themselves saw a link between classical education and social unrest.⁴⁸ In particular, he cited Mr. L.J. Marcelin, who in his own writings had written of the dangers he saw in a classically educated class of Haitian state employees. According to Marcelin:

Three-fourths of them, disappointed, become scattered in the bosom of society. There, what becomes of them? Without means of honest existence, vexed by their own perceptions, furious with those who

failed to recognize their genius, always ready to revolt, they become conspirators, and throw themselves into every sedition in order to upset the existing government and to cause to rise in its place a new power that will give them justice by rewarding the zeal they have displayed in killing, burning, destroying, devastating.⁴⁹

Although the occupation proposed to aim to make Haiti fit for self-governance, its administrators operated under the same logic as the white philanthropists who in the American South aimed to cement African-American subordination and remove Black people from politics.

Instead, the Senate committee correlated the lack of manual labor with savage behavior, just as Cameroun Forbes had when he claimed that teaching “the dignity of labor” was central to the civilizing mission in the colonized Philippines. With such an image of those educated by classical Haitian schools, vocational education was positioned as a solution to both Haiti’s economic and social problems.

This image of the violent, revolutionary Haitian elite starkly differed from refined and elegant Haitians portrayed in the anti-occupation journalism that emerged after 1920. Journalists like Herbert Seligmann were sure to recount incidents in which drunken American troops barged in on groups of Haitian men discussing poetry or in which troops threw rocks at Haitian classical pianists.⁵⁰ Partially because US troops held a notion of civilization that was defined more by efficient production than by literary or musical accomplishments, dominant narratives of Haitian backwardness remained salient. With the emphasis placed on agricultural production and the anti-intellectual logic espoused by William Bagley, such cultural capital was construed as inefficient and unbefitting of Black agricultural people, thereby positioning the Haitian elite as counterproductive to the mission of uplifting Haiti. By imposing vocational education on these Haitians, American troops would force them to conform to U.S. stereotypes about people with African ancestry, thereby eliminating some of the apparent contradictions in occupation.

The Senate Committee Report identified agricultural inefficiency as another problem with systemic implications in Haiti, and again positioned vocational education as the solution to that problem. On the assertion that Haiti depended “upon agriculture as its sole source of wealth,” the report evaluated the wellbeing of Haiti by comparing its agriculture to the agriculture of Cuba, which was at the time also being partially governed by the United States.⁵¹ It claimed that Cuba boasted 20 to 25 times the agricultural yield as Haiti, and attributed Cuba’s relative stability to this increased revenue. The Senate Committee report further extrapolated that through the techniques learned under vocational education, Haitians would

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be “able to earn something regularly from the sale of [their] little crop,” and therefore “the danger of revolution and banditry [would] diminish.”⁵² Although many island nations were seen as politically unstable, Haiti, with the specter of the Haitian Revolution always looming overhead, had been construed as particularly prone to revolution.

By attributing Haiti’s financial and political predicament to agricultural inefficiency, the Senate Report also disguised the financial restraints that the occupation itself placed on Haiti. As columnist James Johnson pointed out in a scathing critique of the Haitian occupation, “Haiti for over one hundred years scrupulously paid its external and internal debt — a fact worth remembering when one hears of ‘anarchy and disorder’ in that land — until five years ago when under the financial guardianship of the United States interest on both the internal and ... external debt was defaulted.”⁵³ The idea that Haiti was financially unsound had been invoked to legitimate U.S. intervention even prior to the occupation, when in 1914 the USS *Machias* ransacked the National Bank of Haiti for \$500,000 on the premise that it was needed to cover debts to American bankers. Throughout this entire time period, Haiti had a much stronger track record for making debt payments compared to the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean.⁵⁴ The plan to establish vocational education obscured this history and again disguised the contradictions of occupation.

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This study hopes to link existing scholarship on the rise of the American empire and the rise of U.S. industry. Although many histories have noted the fact that industrialization gave the United States the capital necessary for its early 20th century endeavors, few writers have explored how that industrialization shaped U.S. culture and ideology and in turn also shaped the modes of American imperialism at the time. This historical analysis of the history of efficiency and its effects on the occupation of Haiti also links the work done on efficiency as an ideology and civilization as an ideology. In “Culture and Ideology,” Naoko Shibusawa explains how race, gender, and age serve as metalanguages that the U.S. has used to think about its place as a civilized power in a largely uncivilized world.⁵⁵ My work hopes to expand hers and works like hers by adding the ideology of efficiency as one of the constitutive ideologies of civilization.

Secondly, I hope this paper denaturalizes the logic of efficiency that it traced in its application to the Haitian school system. In his 1966 *Education and The Cult of Efficiency*, Raymond Callahan identified “efficiency” as a buzzword, and my paper attempted to show the enormous impact that such

Brian Kunderling

a buzzword can have when left unexamined. In the new world order, in which multinational corporations hold unprecedented power, and particularly as Haiti emerges from its post-earthquake hardships, it is important to examine the rhetoric used by such corporations who clamor to give it aid.

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From “Red is Red” to “We Cannot be Silent:”

An Analysis of the Evolution of *Latin America Calls!*, 1963-1970

William Janover

An article in the January-February 1963 edition of the United States Catholic Conference’s (USCC) publication *Latin America Calls!* declared in its headline, “Line may twist but Red is Red.”¹ The newspaper, along with its secular counterparts, such as *The New York Times*, as well as the United States as a whole, was in the throes of Kennedy-era, post-Cuban Missile Crisis anti-communist fervor. According to its pages, it seemed as if the Catholic Church’s very mission to promote social justice in Latin America was linked inextricably to the extermination of communism: “Unless the Church and other willing groups can teach [in this case, Bolivian miners] to read, the people will be ‘sitting ducks’ for Communism.”² By 1970, however, the very same publication that originally had been tasked with rousing the faithful to volunteer in Latin America was campaigning aggressively to raise awareness of and denounce pervasive torture in Brazil under that country’s civilian-military dictatorship.

What could have caused so drastic a shift in language in just eight years? Could this ideological transformation simply be the expression of other developments in the larger American political sphere and the changes it underwent during the turbulent 1960s? The Vietnam War and the rise of the New Left in the United States surely had softened formerly unwavering opposition to any political movement remotely associated with communism, and the civil rights movement had helped create a somewhat more open, tolerant American society.

Perhaps, however, there in fact was something exceptional about the circumstances surrounding the progression of *Latin America Calls!*’s language. Could either local or global events in the evolution of the Catholic Church more directly account for the change in *Latin America Calls!*’s rhetoric? The Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), which met from October 1962 to December 1965, created a dramatically more liberal church that was newly dedicated to social justice for all Christians. The phrase “the spirit of

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Vatican II” became a malleable rallying cry for all manner of liberal social justice movements, and Pope Paul VI was instrumental in perpetuating this “spirit.” More locally, the murder of Father Antonio Henrique Pereira Neto in Recife in May of 1969 set off a firestorm both in the streets of that city and on the pages of *Latin America Calls!*. Many who labored to expose the repressive apparatus of the Brazilian dictatorship during the 1960s and 1970s were first galvanized to act by the passage of Institutional Act No. 5, the December 13, 1968 decree that ushered in the most brutal era of the dictatorship, but the act’s introduction is barely mentioned in *Latin America Calls!*’s early 1969 issues. Father Henrique’s murder, on the other hand, receives pages of coverage across months of issues of the publication. In particular, Father Louis M. Colonnese, member and later director of the Latin American Bureau of the United States Catholic Conference, seems to have been instrumental in shining a light on the tortures of Catholics that the Brazilian government had committed. By framing the campaign against the dictatorship in that country as an effort to protect the lives of his Catholic brothers, Colonnese was able to effectively synthesize his fairly radical political views into a productive weapon in the international campaign against torture. Though these efforts often placed him in conflict with his more traditional superiors at the USCC and eventually cost him his job, Colonnese’s voice was still a decisive factor in the shift in politics in *Latin America Calls!*. It is clear from USCC records that without Colonnese and those who assisted him, the Latin American Bureau would not have become so important a leader in the battle to expose the crimes of the Brazilian civilian-military dictatorship.

This essay intends to explain in depth the shift from 1963 through 1970 in political opinion espoused through the articles of *Latin America Calls!*. It will pay particularly keen attention to the evolving context in which the newspaper was published, including an assessment of both religious and non-religious factors that influenced the evolution of its language. It will argue that the evolution of *Latin America Calls!* was more than just an accidental consequence of the social upheavals of the late 1960s. Rather, specific tensions within the American Catholic Church fueled the publication’s response to the Brazilian civilian-military dictatorship.

THE CONTEXT FOR CHANGE: THE COLD WAR AND VATICAN II

In the same month that Vatican II opened in St. Peter’s Basilica, President John F. Kennedy ordered the United States military to DEFCON-2 readiness for nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Never was the specter of nuclear annihilation so very real as during those thirteen days

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in October. In 1959, radical nationalists in Cuba had ousted President Fulgencio Batista and established a government there under Fidel Castro. To contain communism, President Kennedy sent military advisers to aid the government of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. Even after the disgrace of Senator Joseph McCarthy, attitudes toward communism in the United States were extraordinarily hostile. In this context, the lack of support from American policymakers for Brazilian President João Goulart’s policy of “basic reforms,” including land reform, should not be a surprise. None of the language about communism in *Latin America Calls* was outside the political norm for 1963; “Red is Red” was an accepted truth.³

The attitudinal change of *Latin America Calls!* concerning communism did not occur in a vacuum. The 1960s were the catalyst for landmark social change in both secular and religious respects. It was the decade of not only the American civil rights movement but also the single most radical modernization of a major religion ever conceived. If one were to select a Catholic clergyman from 1862 and transport him a century into the future, he would likely find the church he encountered more recognizable than would a priest plucked from 1962 and placed a mere decade later. The Second Vatican Council transformed just about every facet of Catholic worship, from the format of Mass to the very aesthetic of many churches.⁴ In the three years it was open, Vatican II produced about 1,000 pages of documents in an attempt to answer the question, “What is the Church?”⁵ The Council, among dozens of other major reforms, authorized communal prayer at ecumenical gatherings, renounced the goal of making Catholicism the official religion of all nations and redefined the church as “the People of God.”⁶ The Council rejected the Tridentine Mass, the standard structure of weekly worship since 1570, instead favoring the performance of much of services “in the vernacular.”⁷ In accepting the church as a “Pilgrim Church” in November 1964, the Council understood “the institution was traveling toward perfection, but it was not yet perfected.”⁸ Though not a complete rejection of the infallibility of church teachings, the concept of the Pilgrim Church certainly provided liberal Catholics with a launch pad for further reform, particularly in the realm of social justice. That the church was traveling toward its highest form — that it had not yet arrived there — could serve as a source of inspiration to those looking to further its development and modernization. Progressive teachings, not tradition, would drive the church forward toward perfection.

Perhaps the most important document promulgated by Vatican II was *Gaudium et Spes*, *The Church in the Modern World*. Released on December 7, 1965, it committed the Catholic Church to conducting itself as Christ did in his life. To this end, “the Church must not have any earthly ambitions... Like

yeast in bread, the Church must work as a leavening agent to make the whole of society rise.”⁹ There would be no more grand cathedrals that would take centuries to construct. This dedication of the church to charity and justice above all else was a direct source of inspiration for those who, in the words of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, “believe in the dignity of man” and sought “to help other people help themselves.”¹⁰ Furthermore, and perhaps even more surprisingly, *Gaudium et Spes*’s indictment of atheism did not, as many conservatives had hoped, directly attack communism. It instead reprimanded “those political systems... which hamper civic or religious freedom, victimize large numbers through avarice and political crimes and divert the exercise of authority from the service of the common good to the interests of one or another faction or of the rulers themselves,” whether capitalist or not.¹¹

The rhetoric of Vatican II, of course, did not appear from thin air. Years before the release of *Gaudium et Spes*, Cardinal Richard Cushing was already urging his Boston congregation to volunteer in Latin America. Papal Volunteers in Latin America (PAVLA) was a USCC program well before December 1965. Perhaps, then, this program was a product of Kennedy-era cries for service through the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps. There obviously were deep reform currents behind the various constitutions of Vatican II. Conversely, the Council’s decisions would not be implemented overnight. Indeed, particularly in the United States, local clergy had become used to a modicum of autonomy from the Vatican.¹² This fairly unique, independent streak in the American Catholic Church would later account for the “uneven” implementation of Vatican II’s reforms and lead to future tensions between more liberal and conservative aspects of organizations such as the USCC.¹³ Younger, more liberal priests such as Father Louis M. Colonnese were obviously more inclined to embrace this modernizing effort than were their more traditional counterparts. It is certainly plausible that a man such as Colonnese, swept up in the post-Vatican II reform fervor, could have butted heads with his superiors while trying to leverage the rapid implementation of the declarations of Vatican II in order to increase focus on human rights in Latin America.

LATIN AMERICA CALLS!: A POLITICAL INVERSION, 1963-1969

As mentioned earlier, the 1963 and 1964 issues of *Latin America Calls!* were permeated with the standard anti-communist rhetoric of the day. The January-February, 1963 edition of the periodical noted – under the headline “Who wins in Brazil?” – “One of the world’s most desperate struggles continues in Northeast Brazil, where Roman Catholics and communists

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are locked in combat over the fate of 23 million peasants threatened by starvation.”¹⁴ The enemy in this case was not simply starvation; social justice seemed secondary to overcoming “communists well practiced in antireligiousness” and directly connected to sinister foreign governments like China.¹⁵ The church was determined to link Catholic social justice with the defeat of communism, creating a zero-sum game for the faithful. A communist could not be a good Catholic. The Latin American Bureau’s 1962 “Statement of Purpose” may have focused on the dispersion of the Catholic message to the “priestless millions,” but its fundraising campaign was strictly political.¹⁶ Cardinal Cushing even went so far as to advertise his “Latin America Victory Fund” with the tagline, “Wanted: Workers for the victory of Christian justice over the Reds in Latin America!”¹⁷ *Latin America Calls!* harshly branded those who attempted to organize farmers for land reform as communists,¹⁸ and it was also quick to point out the sinister nature of attempts to create progressive student groups.¹⁹ Though it is unlikely any members of the future Brazilian civilian-military dictatorship subscribed to *Latin America Calls!* in 1963, the military certainly used peculiarly similar paranoid language to denounce all reformers in Brazil as subversives just a few years later. Some headlines in the periodical bordered on propaganda in their nature and punctuation. The May-June, 1964 issue included the headline, “Where Communists are Strongest, So is the Church!” adding a shrill tone to the already militaristic rhetoric of *Latin America Calls!*.

Peculiarly, the 1964 coup that brought the dictatorship to power almost escaped mention in the publication. The same power grab that inspired *Reader’s Digest* to print a rather hyperbolic special edition titled “The Country that Saved Itself”²⁰ about Brazil was, according to *Latin America Calls!*, merely the third in a series of four “victories” for 1964 described in a brief front-page article; the coup was not even the foremost success for the year.²¹ Indeed, the anti-communist rhetoric of the publication was not necessarily political in nature. It instead was concerned with defending Catholicism against what it alleged to be a godless, monolithic Marxism. Though Brazil was safe from a possible communist take-over, the “Reds” still supposedly had “name[d]” seven countries “their targets in lands to conquer” in May of 1965.²² The article instead identified “Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Haiti, and Panama” as more susceptible to communism than Brazil.²³ Perhaps the editors of *Latin America Calls!* genuinely believed the government of Humberto Castelo Branco had extinguished any legitimate leftist threat in its 1964 coup. Nevertheless, the publication still brusquely referred to communists as “a threat to all” as late as 1965’s October-November issue.²⁴ Though the periodical’s language would become less hostile toward communism over time, it still ran the

advertisement “A hungry kid makes a hardy rebel” in a full-page spread each issue from March, 1965 to September, 1969.

Eventually, however, *Latin America Calls!*’s paranoia softened, and the publication was able to divorce fervent anti-communism from a desire for social justice. As the Second Vatican Council wound down, the USCC seems to have made a conscious effort to more clearly focus its primary news publication’s articles on antipoverty measures in Latin America. Stories about the imminent communist threat throughout the region, though not completely absent, largely disappeared, replaced instead with, for example, tales of the Archbishop of São Paulo’s trip to a new macaroni factory, the goods from which would be used to combat hunger.²⁵ When *Latin America Calls!* did publish alarmist articles about the Northeast, it instead took on tragic stories designed to pull on readers’ heartstrings to inspire donations: an entire set of quintuplets died just after birth, and “it is believed that the four who were born alive might have survived if medical attention had been available.”²⁶ The publication’s anti-communist bent, to the extent it still existed, instead focused on the philosophy of revolutionaries and their followers’ propensity for violence in spreading their own gospel. Pope Paul VI remarked that “[communism] proposes and fosters violent revolution as the only means of solving the problems” the poor face.²⁷ The publication even covered multiple church land redistribution campaigns during 1966 – the same sort of programs that were anathema to *Latin America Calls!* three years earlier – and published an editorial by Archbishop Dom Helder Câmara that provided a rather balanced criticism of communism: “Let us not be afraid of sound ideas merely because they have been exploited by the communists or distorted by non-communists. It would be disastrous to let the fear of communism carry us to a falsification of values.”²⁸ That *Latin America Calls!* would carry the analysis of a man that the American ambassador to Brazil John W. Tuthill would later describe as part of the group of “radicalists” that made up 10-15 percent of the Brazilian Church surely demonstrates that the publication had gained a surprising degree of nuance in its views of communism just a few years after the use of its most virulent, conservative language.²⁹

As word of the repressive nature of the Brazilian civilian-military dictatorship and others like it spread to the United States, *Latin America Calls!*’s language became ever more liberal and anti-authoritarian. Just as anti-communism had given way to more apolitical appeals for help in Brazil, reports of torture and oppression slowly replaced these appeals. In the same March 1967 article in which Dom Helder Câmara denounced guerrilla warfare as a means to create social justice, the paper acknowledged the existence of a report signed by 15 bishops from the Northeast “accusing

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the government of having submitted the people of Brazil to misery and injustice.”³⁰ The dictatorship immediately branded the signatories “as subversives and troublemakers.”³¹ That same issue of *Latin America Calls!* included an editorial by Marina Bandeira, director of Brazil’s Movement for Basic Education, who cautioned, “hysterical fear of Communism has no less disastrous consequences [than communism itself]. The unthinking species of anti-Communism confuses the legitimate aspirations of the people with Communism itself.”³² Clearly the editorial board of *Latin America Calls!* either had recently drastically changed in composition or was suffering from collective amnesia, for it would seem that many articles from the publication in 1963 could be considered symptomatic of the same “unthinking species of anti-communism”; in a rather short time, the publication had moved significantly to the left on the political spectrum. Dom Helder further defended his social justice campaign of “conscientization” – the “opening of the eyes” of the people – in an April 1967 editorial, which claimed, “He who dares to conscientize the masses is accused of being a communist” in Brazil.³³ That *Latin America Calls!* would publish the editorial of a man considered a *persona non grata* by the Brazilian dictatorship further corroborates the publication’s increasingly anti-authoritarian stance.

The December-January 1967-1968 issue covered the pledge by 17 bishops from throughout Latin America to support “revolutions for the common good” and did not in any way denounce it.³⁴ In at least tacitly acknowledging that many communists in fact held similar motives to Catholics — “reforms of the social and economic structures... for the common good” — *Latin America Calls!* was able to rid itself of the shrillness of its earlier issues and at the very least humanize Christianity’s former sworn enemies.³⁵ The next issue of the publication even gave exposure to Dom Helder’s praise of radical guerrilla priest Camilo Torres and the archbishop’s calls for “dialogue and cooperation between Catholics and Marxists.”³⁶ The paper marked Che Guevara’s death not with a celebration, but with a caution that “revolution is” still “unavoidable in [Bolivia] unless there are bold and effective social reforms.”³⁷ In 1969, the paper would even eliminate its ubiquitous “A hungry kid makes a hardy rebel” advertisement, replacing it with a now more relevant appeal, claiming, “We’ve stopped building cathedrals and started rebuilding the Church.”³⁸

Although anti-communist articles were now largely absent from the pages of *Latin America Calls!*, it would take another year or so for the paper to become a proper standard-bearer in the international campaign against torture. Though the USCC had already declared human rights the theme of the 1969 Catholic Inter-American Cooperation Program (CICOP) conference, the passage of Institutional Act No. 5 (IA-5) on December 13, 1968 received

minimal attention in the pages of *Latin America Calls!*⁶⁹ The December-January, 1968-1969 issue, possibly already sent to print by the time the act was passed, did not mention its existence at all. The March 1969 issue only briefly noted that the Brazilian Bishops' Conference had written a letter to President Arturo da Costa e Silva imploring a return to democracy "as soon as possible."⁴⁰

Did the aforementioned change in the language of *Latin America Calls!* articles represent anything more than a reflection of the softening of anti-communism throughout the American political landscape? Tad Szulc may have whipped up fear of "leftist agitators" in the "Red stronghold"⁴¹ of Northeast Brazil and *Look* magazine may have asked "How Red is Brazil?"⁴² in the early 1960s, but these articles were certainly much rarer — though they certainly still found an audience in the United States — by 1970. Instead, by that year, many saw horrors such as the Kent State shootings as the dark side of such anti-communist alarmism. Both internal documents of the USCC and the very text of *Latin America Calls!* in 1969 and 1970, however, would seem to indicate that circumstances specific to the Catholic Church, beyond any shift in prevailing political thought, had a direct influence on that publication's rhetoric.

FATHER COLONNESE AND PADRE HENRIQUE: GALVANIZING FORCES FOR CHANGE IN LIFE AND DEATH, 1969-1970

By June of 1969, the pages of *Latin America Calls!* had become permeated with articles covering the campaign against the Brazilian dictatorship. That month's issue included editorials by Darrell Rupiper, an American priest arrested two days after the passage of IA-5, and Márcio Moreira Alves, whose very presence in the Brazilian Congress was part of the motivation for IA-5's creation in the first place. Rupiper's letter is an excellent lens into the alienation many felt while trying to assist friends in Brazil: "What good does it do to talk? The American people are victims of a social order that is systematically selfish and profoundly irrational."⁴³ Such radical anti-establishment rhetoric surely had no place in *Latin America Calls!* in past years. The alienation Rupiper felt upon returning to the United States likely contributed to the angry nature of his letter. Indeed, upon their return home, many Peace Corps volunteers and PAVLA participants felt a similar degree of disgust with American materialism and prosperity in comparison to the horrific poverty of Latin America.⁴⁴ Another event, however, proved to have much farther-reaching consequences for *Latin America Calls!* than IA-5 would.

On the night of May 26, 1969, Father Henrique Antonio Pereira Neto,

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an aide to Archbishop Dom Helder Câmara, was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered. Though his death garnered no immediate mainstream English-language press coverage of note, *Latin America Calls!*, perhaps attempting to compensate for the lack of exposure the priest’s murder had received, exploded with fury and seemed bent on bringing Father Henrique’s story to the faithful. The same issue of the publication that included Rupiper’s and Alves’s editorials dedicated over an entire page to the coverage of Father Henrique’s murder. The obvious culprit was the Communist Hunt Command (CCC), which reportedly had sent death threats to Father Henrique for his social justice work in Recife in the weeks leading up to his murder.⁴⁵ According to one article, Father Henrique was allegedly “one of a list of 32 persons marked down to die.”⁴⁶ In another, Dom Helder complained that “this brutal killing emerges from a pre-established plan, well announced through threats and warnings;” the government had allegedly mandated a “news blackout” of coverage of Father Henrique’s murder.⁴⁷ The third article discussing the gruesome murder included a statement signed by the 575 priests of the archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro: “We feel that we must condemn the neurosis of anti-communism taking grip of the country.”⁴⁸ *Latin America Calls!* was campaigning against the faults of an older version of itself.

Though it was the passage of Institutional Act No. 5 that led the United States State Department to place its foreign aid to Brazil under review on December 15, 1968, that event elicited nowhere near the same rage from the pages of *Latin America Calls!*⁴⁹ It took an event clearly relevant to the Catholic Church’s work in Brazil for the publication to fully dedicate itself to the campaign against the civilian-military dictatorship. Why, then, is the only coverage of the arrest of Father Rupiper a March, 1969 article in which he requests the United States cut off foreign aid to Brazil?⁵⁰ Perhaps the sheer gruesomeness of Father Henrique’s murder – the CCC had rendered his face “almost unrecognizable” – spurred the USCC to act.⁵¹ His murder brought to the Church’s doorstep the sort of violence Brazilians had been victims of since the introduction of IA-5. The possibility also exists that many more USCC clergymen had become activists in the roughly half a year between the promulgation of IA-5 and Father Henrique’s murder. Indeed, anti-war protests gained steam daily during that period, and the movement’s liberal ideology undoubtedly influenced more members of the younger cohort of priests working in Washington, D.C to embrace human rights as a guiding doctrine in foreign policy. In any event, from June, 1969 on, *Latin America Calls!* had a new mission: to expose the atrocities the Brazilian government was committing against Catholics both American and foreign.

The August-September, 1969 issue of the publication detailed the expulsion of Belgian priest Father Jan Honore Talpe, “the 11th foreign

priest to be expelled from Brazil in the last year.”⁵² The ultimate goal of the article seemed to be to illuminate the pathological paranoia of the oppressive apparatus in that country. “At the least suspicion,” Talpe complained, “you are arrested and taken to the torture chamber. The simple fact that we were living in a worker’s section was enough for police to justify their suspicion.”⁵³ The December-January, 1969-1970 issue of *Latin America Calls!* covered the Brazilian Bishops’ Conference’s completion of a dossier of the torture of prisoners in Brazil, including “signed and sworn statements describing tortures, naming persons who allegedly inflicted torture, and identifying political prisoners currently being held incommunicado.”⁵⁴ The same issue also reported on conscientization efforts in Paraguay and noted two priests had been expelled from the country for alleged Marxist ties. *Latin America Calls!’s* focus on Brazil did not mean it spared other nations who committed similar crimes against humanity.

The following month, the paper noted that an editor of a prominent Brazilian Catholic magazine held for the past five months had managed to send out a message detailing his tortures.⁵⁵ The March 1970 edition of *Latin America Calls!* covered the murder of 64-year-old Dutch priest Father Pedro van Zanten in Belo Horizonte. The article noted that “both [this murder and that of Henrique Pereira Neto] were described by police as ‘crimes of passion’ involving homosexuals. This is a widely used smear technique.”⁵⁶ As the spring went on, *Latin America Calls!* also exposed the attempted suicide of Father Tito de Alencar after he was tortured for more than 12 hours,⁵⁷ the Brazilian Army recommendation to indict four priests and two bishops for subversion,⁵⁸ and the USCC’s official denunciation of torture on the first anniversary of Father Henrique’s murder.⁵⁹

The May 1970 issue of *Latin America Calls!* marks yet another critical turning point for the publication. Its pages contain not only a two-page spread commemorating the murder of Father Henrique a year prior, but also the USCC’s request for an immediate international investigation into tortures in Brazil and a cessation of foreign aid to that country. The Division for International Affairs statement read in part: “As Christians we cannot be silent... because we believe that injustices anywhere diminish freedom everywhere.”⁶⁰ That DIA’s statement shared such similar language with the Protestant National Council of Churches’ pamphlet *Terror in Brazil: A Dossier* is no accident. Louis M. Colonnese had in fact signed that pamphlet’s opening statement, “We Cannot Remain Silent.”⁶¹ That Colonnese would represent the Catholic bishops in an otherwise largely Protestant pamphlet like *Terror in Brazil* confirms his embrace of ecumenism, a key tenet of the resolutions of Vatican II. The USCC clearly could have delivered this statement on December 13th, 1969 — the first anniversary of the introduction

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of IA-5 — but it did not do so; the Conference’s flagship publication was already aggressively campaigning against the pervasive use of torture in Brazil on that date. The choice of May 26th, 1970 as the date for the release of such a landmark denunciation that carried the entire weight of the American Catholic Church behind it clearly indicates that the murder of Father Henrique, more than the introduction of IA-5, served as the catalyst for *Latin America Calls!*’s crusade against torture. The release of this denunciation was the culmination of years of gradual change in the politics of its articles; *Latin America Calls!* was now unrecognizable from its form in 1963.

Who, then, made the decisions that so drastically altered the language of *Latin America Calls!*? Father Louis M. Colonnese, Director for Latin America for the USCC, clearly was instrumental in this evolution. Colonnese had replaced Father John J. Considine, a much more traditional clergyman, as Director for Latin America in the months before the introduction of IA-5. Steeped in the ideals of liberation theology he emphatically embraced the campaign for “conscientization” in his extensive 48-page statement of goals and purposes for the Latin America Bureau of the USCC. That report, from the summer of 1969, declared unequivocally: “the Church must assume the role of advocate-intermediator between the disinherited and the privileged in society.”⁶² He encouraged an “activist laity and clergy” to help exhort those who had campaigned against the Vietnam War to shift their focus to Latin America and even wondered, “Will the Church speak out about military and intelligence agencies of the American government[‘s]... effort to deflate the Churches’ [sic] legitimate power of moral suasion?”⁶³ The paper was in fact so incendiary and radical that the Department of International Affairs (DIA) for the USCC rejected it on September 24th, requesting instead that Father Colonnese submit “a four or five page proposal which would be more positive in its orientation.”⁶⁴ Cardinal John Krol was rather wary of the prospect of a member of the USCC using the Church’s records to attack its political stance “without giving [it] the benefit of the right of defense and of ‘due process.’”⁶⁵

After the frenzied response to the murder of Father Antonio Henrique Pereira Neto, Colonnese wrote an editorial under the headline “The way I see it” in the October 1969 edition of *Latin America Calls!*, explaining, “We felt the responsibility to share with Catholics in the United States the knowledge that the Church in Latin America is producing martyrs capable of responding to this challenge.”⁶⁶ He then, however, seemed to backtrack on his earlier statement:

We have decided to devote ‘Latin America Calls!’ to an exposition of the progress being accomplished through the active implementation of the Church’s missionary role in those countries. We do not deny

the existence of grave socio-economic issues which are precipitating confrontations between advocates of change and defenders of reactionary conservatism. When time and our limited budget permits we plan to publish a separate opinion journal aimed at stimulating an increased awareness of the theology, sociology, and economics of underdevelopment.⁶⁷

This ambiguously-worded statement seems to indicate that the Latin American Bureau's publication would neither publish such strong indictments of the Brazilian civilian-military dictatorship nor report on the crimes of that government anymore. Future issues obviously would not hew to this vague promise; the publication covered multiple cases of torture in gruesome detail throughout 1969 and 1970, including the personal testimony of Father José Antonio de Magalhães that was smuggled out of his prison cell.⁶⁸ One cannot help but wonder if Colonnese's superiors had attempted to silence his activism after the submission of his declaration of the goals and purposes for the Church in Latin America. Perhaps the continued reports of torture coming from Brazil made Colonnese feel as if he had no choice but to expose the repeated crimes of that government in spite of any attempts his superiors had made to muzzle him.

Colonnese would continue to act in what might seem an insubordinate manner. On March 24, 1970, he wrote to USCC General Secretary Joseph L. Bernadin essentially recommending ways the latter could execute his job more effectively, including creating a more "fraternal relationship" instead of a "paternalistic attitude" and giving divisions of the USCC the ability "to act and speak as specialized units of the USCC."⁶⁹ Clearly Colonnese's attempts at reform could be taken as rather grating. Father Colonnese was not alone in his attempts to push the DIA to act decisively on reports of torture in Brazil — among others, Thomas Quigley and Father Frederick McGuire actively did so, though to a less aggressive extent⁷⁰ — but he had been working tirelessly to improve CICOP and *Latin America Calls!* since the publication was based in Davenport, Iowa.⁷¹ Colonnese had earlier locked horns with other clergymen when helping select speakers for the 1969 human rights-themed CICOP conference. He neglected to seek approval for all speakers from the episcopal moderator who had to endorse a list of all those suggested to appear at the conference.⁷² As a part of the generation of priests steeped in the language of Vatican II, he had his own vision; the wishes of his superiors were secondary. Colonnese even proposed including the international peace symbol in the January 1970 appeal for the National Annual Collection for Latin America.⁷³ It may not be a coincidence, then, that two months later Bishop Bernadin suggested the Collection for Latin America be moved from USCC jurisdiction to that of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops

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(NCCB).⁷⁴

In a statement attached to the release of the May 26, 1970 DIA denunciation of torture in Brazil, Father Colonnese remarked somewhat pessimistically, “My deep love for the people of Brazil compels me to ask whether such Church statements could become meaningless rituals with almost no pragmatic potential... unless there is an affirmative response from U.S. Catholics.”⁷⁵ This seemingly innocuous statement provides a rare window into Colonnese’s fears that his efforts may fail, and his frustration echoed Darrell Rupiper’s earlier remarks in his letter from the June 1969 edition of *Latin America Calls!*. Indeed, though Colonnese had been the “driving force behind the pronouncement,” he had already encountered stiff opposition to his attempts to more overtly politicize the Latin America Bureau and may have felt he had few allies in his efforts.⁷⁶ The “deep” emotion Colonnese felt for his efforts to conscientize demonstrates the exceptional nature of his commitment to Latin America and to Brazil in particular.

In the summer of 1970, Colonnese submitted his comments on the USCC Goals Statement for the following year. The fingerprints of liberation theology are clearly visible in his overall dissatisfaction with the current condition of the document: “The terminology expressed in these statements is hardly in keeping with the definition of the Church as the People of God” as it had been in the Second Vatican Council⁷⁷ “Nowhere,” Colonnese complains, does the Goals Statement discuss “‘transcendent’ goals.”⁷⁸ The Latin American Bureau had become part of the vanguard for the implementation of Vatican II and liberation theology, with which many of Colonnese’s superiors were clearly unfamiliar or uncomfortable, given the statement’s original language.

Conflict between Colonnese and the rest of the USCC again flared over the response to the murder of American operative Daniel Mitrione in Uruguay in August, 1970. In an interview, Father Colonnese rather obliquely accused Mitrione of “complicity” in the torture of political prisoners in both that country and in Brazil.⁷⁹ A Uruguayan congressional investigation implicated the police force that Mitrione was counseling in gruesome tortures that included electric shocks.⁸⁰ Perhaps Colonnese’s quotation of *The Constitution of the Church in the Modern World*, a key publication from Vatican II, sheds light on his motives: “Whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on body and mind, attempts to coerce the will itself... They poison human society... They are a supreme dishonor to the Creator.”⁸¹ Vatican II had clearly been a beacon of inspiration in Colonnese’s attempts to influence the USCC and stop human rights abuses throughout Latin America. Incensed, Bernardin wrote a letter to Mitrione’s wife apologizing for Colonnese’s comments and

penned a memo to his subordinate, excoriating him for speaking on behalf of the entire Conference.⁸² Not only had Colonnese not gotten the proper clearance to make such a statement, alleged Bernardin, but he also had utilized poor timing in soiling Mitrione's "integrity and good name unfairly and without sufficient evidence."⁸³ That Father Colonnese had been chided once before for his missteps in speaking too candidly in public about New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller's 1969 fact-finding visit to Brazil likely further angered his superiors.⁸⁴ In his response to Bishop Bernardin, Father Colonnese accused him of ignoring the doctrine of subsidiarity — the belief that a central authority should only perform those tasks that a local authority cannot perform more effectively and a cornerstone of post-Vatican II Catholic policy — in condemning his public comments.⁸⁵ In addressing this indictment that December, Bernardin instead critiqued the Latin American Bureau's increasingly political stance: "Some concern has been expressed by the episcopal members of the Committee on International Affairs regarding the program and the general stance of the Division for Latin America... More specifically they are concerned that you... may commit the Conference to positions with which many others would not agree."⁸⁶ Bishop Bernardin had grown tired of years of trying to rein in Colonnese's attempts to transform the Latin American Bureau into a hotbed for activism, particularly against the Brazilian civilian-military dictatorship.

CONCLUSION

Given his rebellious history, it should be come as no surprise that Louis Colonnese's activist tactics eventually became too irksome for his superiors at the USCC to bear. He was removed from his post in 1973. During his years at the DIA, however, it is clear that he worked tirelessly to direct USCC policy toward a more liberal stance in the international campaign against torture. Perhaps Bishop Bernardin, likely an older clergyman, and his colleagues simply were not as receptive to the spirit of Vatican II as presumably younger priests such as Father Colonnese or laymen such as Thomas Quigley were. In this way, the infamous generation gap between baby boomers and their parents that was at the root of many of the tensions of the 1960s seems to have replicated itself within the power structure of the American Catholic Church. In this case, however, the catalyst was not Rock and Roll, sexual liberation, or marijuana; it was, instead, the legacy of Vatican II. One can see a clear parallel between the despair of the idealistic young Americans who placed their hopes in organizations such as Students for a Democratic Society and the alienation expressed in communications from both Colonnese and Father Darrell Rupiper. Young activists in both cases attempted to effect

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massive change, but they ran headlong into a well-entrenched establishment whose members had no appetite for the rapid reform on which the new generation insisted.

On one hand, the evolutions in the Catholic Church through Vatican II and in the USCC the activism of Father Colonnese seem at first glance to be products of a larger age of liberalism and revolution, making the evolution political language in *Latin America Calls!* through the 1960s a seemingly unexceptional event. On the other hand, it is clear that tremendous individual effort on the part of Father Colonnese was instrumental in undoing the conservatism and anti-communism of his predecessor John J. Considine and his other superiors. A true test of whether the fuel for the transformation of *Latin America Calls!* was simply the turbulent nature of the 1960s would be, of course, to replace Louis Colonnese with a more traditional clergyman and to observe the outcome. It seems unlikely that the Latin American Bureau and its main publication would have dedicated such enormous resources to the coverage of the murder of Father Antonio Henrique Pereira Neto had Father Colonnese been absent. There is indeed something exceptional about the way in which *Latin America Calls!* developed; Louis M. Colonnese was not simply a man who found himself in the right place at the right time.

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Between Shades of Grey:

Writing and Remembering the First Soviet Occupation of Lithuania

Hilary Lynd

In the early stages of the World War II, the small states of Europe had few options for preserving their independence. Some were able to secure the promises of larger powers to come to their aid, while others struggled to find international support. Lithuania fell into the second category. Wedged between Germany and the Soviet Union, squarely in the way of a potential German attack on Leningrad and perched on the strategically important Baltic Sea, Lithuania never had a chance at sitting out the conflict. Beginning with the Soviet stationing of troops on Lithuanian soil in October 1939, Lithuania was gradually brought under Soviet control and incorporated as a Soviet Socialist Republic. As narrated by Lithuanians, the Baltic country was occupied three successive times by its powerful neighbors to the east and west: the Soviet Union from 1940 to 1941, Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1944, and the Soviets again from 1944 until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Historians of the first Soviet occupation of Lithuania have never been mere chroniclers. They were and are actors in an ongoing struggle to own the past. As such, they have a history of their own. I will attempt to tell that story. The experience of occupation became essential to Lithuanian national memory and has maintained a central position in Lithuanian historical scholarship. The story of the first Soviet occupation has traditionally been told by those with a strong stake in the situation, which has limited the focus and interpretative range of existing scholarship. Soviet historians focused on the period from June to August 1940 in order to prove that Lithuania had been legally annexed to the Soviet Union after a democratic people's revolution. Émigré historians granted extensive attention to the gradual Soviet takeover from October 1939 to August 1940 and to the mass deportations that preceded the German invasion of June 1941. These accounts used the first period to demonstrate the illegality of Soviet rule and the second to prove its brutality. Discussion of the period in between was less politically relevant and therefore less extensive. The polarized accounts of the occupation leave some interesting questions addressed at best incompletely.

This paper will refocus discussion of the period around the following question: what was the nature and what were the consequences of the Soviet

regime's effort to cultivate support and eliminate opposition? I will argue that Soviet attempts to neutralize Lithuanian nationalism backfired. In one year, Soviet rule squandered what good will might have been available, strengthening Lithuanian national feeling and causing lasting bitterness and resentment. The memory of Soviet cruelty had interrelated personal, social and political aspects. Magnified and instrumentalized, Lithuanians channeled this memory into action along two main axes. First, some Lithuanians, disenchanted with Soviet socialism, welcomed the invading Germans in June 1941. The conditions of the Soviet occupation were used to motivate and justify popular violence unleashed against Lithuania's Jews. Second, Lithuanian émigrés used their story to motivate action against Soviet imperialism and to assert a Lithuanian right to national sovereignty. In the West, both results have often been treated rather uncritically. Western historians have been tempted to see Lithuanian cooperation with the German occupiers as proof of the inherently militant and anti-Semitic qualities of Lithuanian nationalism, as they have seen the Soviet invasion as proof of the inherently expansionist nature of either Soviet socialism or Russian statehood more generally. Such deterministic cultural arguments have limited explanatory power. The simplistic views cannot reconcile the mixed experience of Lithuanians as perpetrators and victims. From a Lithuanian vantage point, the triple occupation stretched from 1940 to 1991. This view obscures much, but it reveals the extent to which, in Lithuania, the Holocaust and the Cold War are related. This paper will argue that the experiences of perpetration and victimhood are not contradictory; they are instead closely intertwined.

It is necessary to present a brief timeline. Lithuania gained independence from the Russian Empire in the disintegration following the October Revolution. The country's first democratic elections, held in April 1920, inaugurated an unstable and short-lived period of democracy. In 1926, nationalist leader Antanas Smetona staged a coup and established an authoritarian regime. In the gathering storm of the 1930s, Smetona found few international allies. The Soviet Union and Germany divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence in a secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, negotiated in August 1939. Initially, Lithuania was granted to the Germans but the area was later transferred to the Soviet sphere of influence. On October 11, 1939, the Soviet Union concluded a Mutual Assistance Treaty with Smetona's government. Stalin transferred to Lithuania the historic capital of Vilnius, incorporated into Poland since 1919, in exchange for the stationing of Soviet troops throughout the country. Through the winter of 1939-40, the Soviet Union was kept busy by conflict with Finland and the Western Front was largely quiet. In the spring of 1940,

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a rush of German victories in the West culminated in the capture of Paris on June 14. On the same day, the Soviet Union delivered an ultimatum to Lithuania, accusing the small country of mistreating Red Army soldiers and demanding a change in government, as well as an unlimited right to bring in more troops. Smetona's government submitted to the ultimatum and Smetona fled the country. A month later, the newly formed People's Government held elections. The returns showed that 92 percent of the population had voted, and that 99 percent had chosen Communist candidates. Within a week, the elected Seimas passed a petition asking the Soviet Union to allow Lithuania to join; on August 3, Lithuania became a Soviet Socialist Republic.¹

The bulk of scholarship on the Soviet annexation of Lithuania has focused on the period leading up to August 1940. Soviet historians sought to prove the legitimacy of incorporation, presenting the Soviet Union as the champion of the Lithuanian nation.² "Every time the Lithuanian people found itself in a critical situation, the USSR would invariably extend it a helping hand, warn the aggressors and prevent them from achieving their aims."³ Vytautas Kancevicius emphasized German subversive activity in the coastal Klaipeda region and Poland's intransigence on its claim to Vilnius, suggesting that with hostile neighbors on two sides, Lithuania's only friend lay to the East. He was careful, however, to endorse the cause of the Lithuanian nation while condemning the Lithuanian state. "The bourgeois statehood of Lithuania emerged after the achievements of the working people had been drowned in blood; it resulted from the efforts of the privileged classes to take the dominant position in the country."⁴ Kancevicius's narrative exalted the Lithuanian Communist Party as the voice of the people:

Guiding the workers' and peasants' struggle against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the Communist Party rejected uprisings and plots as adventurous forms of struggle, devoid of any social perspective. The Communists were seeking liquidation of the Nationalist regime, social and political liberation of the working people through a revolutionary struggle. They did their best to draw into it the broad masses.⁵

Kancevicius especially emphasized the constitutionality of the transition, writing, "The People's Government carried out changes in the political and economic life of the country by constitutional means in strict conformity with the laws which were valid before its formation."⁶ The events of 1940, he argued, were a "peaceful socialist revolution," the Lithuanian people's democratic struggle against a pro-fascist government.

In opposition to the Soviet account of democratic revolution and legal incorporation, Lithuanian émigrés reported bitterly the theft of their

country's independence.⁷ "Since the eighteenth century, alliances between Russian and German empires had spelled the doom of countries in between ... in 1939, Stalin and Hitler repeated history. They concluded a pact that divided Poland, destroyed the Baltic States, and unleashed World War Two."⁸ For most Lithuanian historians in the West during the Cold War, August 1939 was the decisive moment in which Lithuania's fate was sealed; Soviet actions from then on were merely the slow realization of a meticulously planned process.⁹ According to this interpretation, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact offered Stalin the opportunity to realize his long-held aspiration to reclaim lands that had once belonged to the Russian empire.¹⁰ The spring of 1940 was an ideal time to act, argued Vardys, because the Germans were busy invading France and the West was focused on its own defense. "Russia's timing was perfect."¹¹ The Soviet plan was managed from the background by the grand "director" Vladimir Dekanozov, Molotov's representative from Moscow.¹² The Lithuanian state was "deliberately annihilated" through "devious processes."¹³

In émigré accounts, those devious processes were recounted over and over in great detail. The Soviets justified their June 14 ultimatum by claiming that Lithuanians had kidnapped Red Army soldiers. Hans Rychener dismissed the claim as ludicrous, writing instead that the soldiers in question had deserted out of cowardice and had gone to an orgy in a dingy Vilnius bar.¹⁴ He viewed the garrisons as a Trojan horse and the spurious accusation as a signal that the Soviet soldiers were finally going to set aside pretense and attack.¹⁵ Vardys focused on the manipulation surrounding the July elections. On June 25, the Lithuanian Communist Party was unbanned.¹⁶ As all other organizations had been banned under Smetona's authoritarian rule, this meant that the LCP was the only legal political party. A new election law passed on July 6 required that candidates be nominated at mass meetings; given that the LCP was the only legal organization, all the candidates were guaranteed to be Communist. In the three days leading up to the July 14 elections, 2000 prominent national figures were arrested. On the first day of voting, Vardys reported, too few Lithuanians showed up to the polls, and the Soviets decided to hold another day of voting. Intimidation and fraud produced the spectacular results the Soviets quoted as the expression of the will of the people. According to Vardys, the returns were published by the Soviet news agency in London before polls closed.¹⁷ Since the elections had been a sham, the émigrés argued the Seimas that resulted from them could make no legitimate decisions on behalf of the Lithuanian people. The vote to join the Soviet Union, therefore, was illegal.

For the duration of Soviet rule, the debate over the meaning of 1940 was a proxy debate for the larger question of Lithuanian independence.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of an independent Lithuania, the scholarly community has vindicated the Lithuanian position: Soviet actions in 1939 and 1940 are now commonly seen as underhanded and illegal. The Secret Protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is the thread that unravels the entire Soviet argument, when tugged. It establishes from 1939 a Soviet claim to Lithuania that renders hollow Kancevicius's discussion of a democratic socialist revolution.¹⁸ Additionally, the perfect coordination of 'democratic revolution' in Lithuania alongside simultaneous 'revolutions' in Latvia and Estonia seems implausible.¹⁹ Even after 1991, the legality of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania has dominated Lithuanian historiography. Many historians have delved energetically into minute matters of constitutional interpretation to make their case. After the opening of Soviet archives, the available evidence has become more convincing.

The question of legality is no longer the most important one to ask, however. In the midst of great power conflict, it did not take an especially remarkable dose of cynicism for Molotov to make his oft-quoted statement about the inability of small states to survive. "The recent war events [the occupation of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg by the Germans] once more proved that the neutrality of small states, which do not have the power to support it, is a mere fantasy."²⁰ The German route to Leningrad in the First World War had cut through Lithuania; the Soviet desire to protect one of its premier cities by establishing control over Lithuania is not particularly shocking. Lithuanian interpretations seem to miss the obvious: perhaps rather than providing cover for the Soviets to enact their long-standing and diabolical plan, the capture of Paris could be seen as proof that the German war machine had impressive capability to match its ravenous ambitions. It could have been defensive security concerns and not a suddenly rekindled desire to ignite worldwide revolution that motivated the Soviets. Though Stalin was surprised by the German attack when it came, many of his subordinates were not. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact can more easily be seen as the postponement of conflict with Nazi Germany than the establishment of a true harmony of interests. Signing an unpalatable treaty and creating a buffer zone to the West was likely an attempt by the Soviet state to contain a very real German threat. What remains to be explained is that, while realpolitik may have driven Soviet actions in the Baltic, the Soviets acted in the language and form of liberal democracy. At home, the Bolshevik state did not abide by the outcome of free and fair elections; why should it have cloaked the version it exported to Lithuania in democratic trappings?

Alfred Erich Senn is the only historian who has yet addressed this question. He argued that the elections served an important role of

“participation theater.”²¹ Senn did not specify who was the intended consumer of the spectacle: the Lithuanians, an international audience, or the Soviets themselves. Senn described the populist campaign of meetings and marches as a vehicle for the “Sovietizing juggernaut.”²² “The campaign called itself democratic, but its declaration that democracy cannot tolerate opposition, backed up by arrests of possible opponents, ‘enemies of the people,’ points out the perils of presuming that certain international words mean the same in every society.”²³ For Senn, Dekanozov was the dominant player. The outward signs of democracy, Senn argued, were the puppet-master’s means of precluding resistance. “Dekanozov had created the illusion of mass participation while playing his ‘shell game,’ encouraging people to watch the government while he used other channels to arrange Lithuania’s incorporation into the Soviet Union.”²⁴ This reading suggests that seemingly ‘democratic’ elections were little more than a distraction from the real shift in power.

There is a bolder argument to be made that gives weight to the Soviet emphasis on legality and constitutionality as more than just a diversion tactic. Lenin in particular had been sensitive to the potential for the newly constituted Soviet Union to replicate the imperialist attitude of its tsarist predecessor. Socialism, he believed, could not be spread at gunpoint. It had to be chosen by people who felt they had a choice.

In those remote places the name ‘Great Russian’ stands for ‘oppressor and cheat.’ We should take this into account. We should fight against this. But it is a long-term thing. It cannot be abolished by decree. We should be very careful here. And a nation like the Great Russians should be particularly careful because they have provoked such bitter hatred in all other nations.²⁵

Lenin and Stalin both wrote on the problem of nationality. Nations had rights, they agreed. “to organize its life on the basis of autonomy,” Stalin wrote. “It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.”²⁶ Introducing Soviet rule to Lithuania through democratic elections, even in the context of brewing war, was consistent with Stalin’s support of some form of national self-determination and his understanding of the Soviet Union as an opponent of imperialism. Lenin and Stalin, Terry Martin wrote, “were not indifferent to the word ‘empire.’ They rejected it explicitly.”²⁷ The task of avoiding the appearance of Russian chauvinism made engineering consent an ideologically important project.

The Soviets had concluded from their prior attempts at “incubating revolution” that building socialism without sufficient attention to national character was impossible.²⁸ In particular, Soviet leaders believed the

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Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic had failed in 1918 because they had not sufficiently recognized the strength of Lithuanian nationalism.²⁹ In his article “The USSR as a Communal Apartment,” Yuri Slezkine documented the Bolshevik policy of ethnoparticularism: beginning in the 1920s and into the 1930s, the Soviet regime actively promoted national cultures, local languages and nationality-based political units.³⁰ David Crowe recorded that in 1939, Molotov spoke of Lithuania in the language of ethnoparticularism, arguing that Soviet rule would help realize the “national aspirations of the Lithuanian people.”³¹ Terry Martin built on Slezkine’s argument to demonstrate that the ethnoparticularism of the 1920s and the ethnic cleansing of the 1930s were inverse manifestations of a “belief in the political salience of cross-border ethnic ties.”³² Over time, Soviet xenophobia, an exaggerated fear of foreign influence, came to dominate what Martin called the Piedmont Principle, the promotion of national cultures to strengthen the cross-border appeal of the Soviet Union.³³ Deportations of borderland ethnicities became the favored solution. By removing potentially disloyal nationalities from the frontier and replacing them with Russians, the Soviet Union could minimize the influence of insidious foreign elements.³⁴

The process of invasion and annexation revealed the inflexibility of the Soviet approach to nationality to function in newly acquired borderland territories. Neither ethnoparticularism nor xenophobia would operate in Lithuania as it had elsewhere. After twenty years of self-rule, Lithuanian nationalism was too fiercely independent to permit ethnoparticularism. And save a social engineering project of truly stunning magnitude, in which the entire Lithuanian population would be removed and the territory repopulated with Russians, xenophobia in its totalized form could not succeed. The Soviet toolbox, however, did not include anything more useful. The alternate use of ethnoparticularist and xenophobic approaches, combined with an ongoing insistence on pursuing class warfare, had messy results.

Persecution of enemies defined by class and nationality, while related and overlapping, happened roughly sequentially in the Soviet Union. In Lithuania, both categories were pursued simultaneously, with a desperate, wild, speed. In the Soviet identification of ‘anti-Soviet elements’ to be removed, it was unclear whether the anti-Soviet enemy was primarily nationally or class-based. In an October 1939 memo detailing Baltic ‘undesirables,’ the list of enemy categories was expansive: members of Lithuanian political parties, military officers, police, civil servants, members of non-Bolshevik communist parties, citizens of foreign states, locals with foreign contacts, religious figures, aristocrats, wealthy landowners, bankers, industrialists.³⁵ Upon taking power, the Soviets embarked on ambitious

projects of industrialization, land reform, ideological purification, class warfare, dekulakization and the neutralization of nationalism.³⁶ It was as if the Soviet regime was trying to replicate two decades of Bolshevik history in mere months.

Soviet historians wavered on the character of Smetona's government: legitimate bargaining partner, representative of the Lithuanian nation, or illegitimate, foreign-influenced, 'dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.'³⁷ Up to June 1940, Soviet claims to legality rested on the legitimacy of Smetona's diplomatic agreements; after the ultimatum that removed him from government, the Soviet-engineered 'revolution' drew legitimacy from the anti-democratic character of Smetona's rule. Alternately, Soviet historians portrayed the Lithuanian public as either worrisomely pro-German or enthusiastically pro-Soviet.³⁸ The pro-German characterization was most evident in narration of the period before the June 14 ultimatum and the pro-Soviet depiction became prominent after—the first offered preemptive justification for invasion; the second, retroactive legitimization. Kancevicius, writing in Soviet Lithuania in the 1970s, was careful to claim the support of a "broad swath of Lithuanian society," including "the working class, peasantry, democratic intelligentsia."³⁹ Dekanozov's first appointments to the People's Government were non-Communist Lithuanians; Senn argued that Dekanozov's aim was to use the nationalists as a medium to legitimate Sovietization.⁴⁰ The Soviets presented the support of the intelligentsia and the nationalized bourgeoisie as incontrovertible evidence of Lithuania's desire to join the Soviet system. But it was exactly this group that was most rapidly marginalized; the first deportees before the July 14 elections were public representatives of the Lithuanian nation.⁴¹

Soviet ethnoparticularist policy created a distinction between progressive, socialist, good nationalism and "bourgeois nationalism." Wrote Slezkine, "To engage in bourgeois nationalism was to sabotage a nation, not to build it."⁴² This theoretical distinction was difficult to translate into coherent policy. It was unclear whether the Lithuanian public and their nationalist leaders were to be treated with a greater part suspicion or attempted charm, whether they were to be won over or controlled. The results were confusing. Was the Soviet Union trying to manipulate nationalism or extinguish it? Was the revolution a national democratic moment or a workers' uprising led by the vanguard of the Lithuanian Communist Party? Was the intelligentsia an enemy or an ally? Dekanozov's strategy was a balancing act; he sought to co-opt some of the old elites while exercising brutal repression for those who did not buy in. His first round of appointments was demonstrative of this carrot and stick method. While the new posts in the cabinet were filled with non-Communist Lithuanians,

the key positions overseeing the repressive apparatus — the police and the military — were reserved for loyal communists.⁴³ Preeminent Lithuanian figures like professor V. Kreve-Mickevicius were brought into the system with promises of reinvigorated democracy and alienated by the realpolitik they witnessed behind closed doors.⁴⁴ Many of them, Kiaupa argued, “did not realize that it would be their task to kill off the Lithuanian state.”⁴⁵ Aleksandras Shtromas, a former Marxist, asserted that even those who had Marxist or Bolshevik sympathies became anti-Soviet eventually due to the conditions of the occupation. “The enforced situation of total outward compliance had been complemented by an equally total inward dissent.”⁴⁶

Even if we question the black-and-white certainty of Shtromas’s dichotomy, it is clear that the Soviet attempt to neutralize Lithuanian nationalism in the period of the first occupation failed. “National rights were matters of cultural ‘form’ as distinct from political and economic ‘content’” wrote Slezkine, “but ultimately all form was derived from content and it was up to party leaders in Moscow to decide where the line should be drawn in each case.”⁴⁷ In Lithuania, pursuing the ideal of ‘national in form, socialist in content’ meant attempting to eliminate a great deal of national content. This was a violent project, and was perceived as such. Dividing loyal, “good,” nationalists who could be incorporated into Soviet rule from resistant, “bad” nationalists who would be removed to the depths of the Soviet Union did not suppress Lithuanian nationalism. Instead, Lithuanian historians unanimously argued, the polarizing tactic fuelled the Lithuanian desire for independence in accordance with the international norm of national self-determination. Under the Soviets, wrote Shtromas, repressive measures “demonstrated the brutality and deviousness of the Soviet regime to many unsuspecting and, in the beginning phase of Soviet rule, entirely neutral, people.”⁴⁸ He believed that widespread rebellions preceding the German invasion of June 1941 were an expression of popular will, an “explicit and total rejection of Soviet rule.”⁴⁹ In 1944, as the Red Army pushed back the German invasion, Lithuania came again under the Soviet thumb; this time, rather than choosing passive acquiescence, nationalist groups launched a guerrilla war that lasted nearly a decade.⁵⁰

No event was more important in turning the Lithuanian population against Soviet rule than the mass deportations of June 14-18, 1941. Arrests and deportations had been a common feature of Soviet rule from the initial removals of July 1940, but never before on this scale.⁵¹ Baltic historians agree that they were not a random, impromptu action, but the result of long planning. This interpretation depends on two crucial documents, referenced over and over throughout the historiography. Already in the 1950s, émigré historians were aware of the October 1939 memo on ‘Undesirables’ and

the June 14, 1941 “Strictly Secret Instructions Regarding the Manner of Conducting the Deportation of the Anti-Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.”⁵² The first specified the categories of people to be deported; the second detailed the manner in which they were to be deported. The instructions stressed the importance of professionalism and efficiency. Operative groups were to arrive at the home of a family slated for deportation, check for weapons, verify the identity of the individuals, instruct them to gather basic necessities and then deliver the family to the collection station. Nobody was to be informed that the men were to be split up from the women and children.⁵³ The speed and scope of the deportations shocked Lithuanians. The brutality with which entire families were removed seemed to dwarf previous Soviet offenses.⁵⁴

The mass deportations of June 1941 were a focal point of the Lithuanian émigré narrative as well as work produced in the newly independent Lithuania after 1991. The findings of the *International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupations*, published in 2006, reported that the Soviets had drawn up plans to remove about half the population.⁵⁵ It is a common perception that the deportations were planned to be much greater in scale, but were interrupted by the war.⁵⁶ Zenonas Ivinskis was the first to estimate the number of deportees at 34,000; because historians lacked the ability to assemble firm evidence, they accepted his figure until the opening of Soviet archives in the 1990s.⁵⁷ Meticulous efforts to track the fate of every deported man, woman and child have led to a revised figure of 17,501.⁵⁸ The primary aim of Lithuanian historians after 1991 has been to document, in as much detail as possible, the suffering of 1941. In her novel *Between Shades of Grey*, Ruta Sepetys’s fictionalized version of her family’s story makes the horror of deportation and exile in Siberia accessible to a children’s audience. “Have you ever wondered what a human life is worth?” asks the protagonist. “That morning, my brother’s was worth a pocket watch.”⁵⁹ The reality of the deportations was appalling. The experience of shared suffering has become a central component of Lithuanian national myth.

Many Lithuanians considered the deportations an attempt to destroy the Lithuanian nation. In 1966, the Stockholm-based Estonian National Fund published a report that referred to the Baltic deportations as an act of genocide. “There can be no doubt that the Soviet Union in the Baltic and elsewhere has carried out deportations that fall under the name genocide, and that these crimes cannot be justified or excused by any political, moral, or legal point of view.”⁶⁰ The Commission referred to Soviet plans for the “mass annihilation of the Lithuanian nation.”⁶¹ A report on the deportations produced in 2004 by the Genocide and Resistance Center of Lithuania

concluded, “Lithuanians are considering the Soviet terror corresponded to genocide. Most of those deported were doomed—a third of them to a speedy death and the rest to a life of misery in Siberia. One only had to be an honest Lithuanian to face deportation.”⁶² The specific targets of deportation were seen as support for this interpretation; not only had the Soviets annihilated the Lithuanian cultural and political elite, they had removed entire families.⁶³ The deportations could not be explained only in terms of eliminating dissent or even of class warfare—they appeared to be an attack on Lithuanian nationhood.

These arguments must be tempered by two objections. First, to my knowledge, no Lithuanian historian has yet been able to recover official documents supporting the common assumption that the Soviets had plans for the decimation of the Lithuanian nation. Second, within the hell of mass killing that was the Second World War in the East, the forced removal of some 17,000 Lithuanians seems relatively modest. The post-war deportations were much larger in scale, but it was the prewar deportations that gripped the Lithuanian national imagination with lasting ferocity.⁶⁴ One reason is the shocking visibility. By June 1941, deportations were common, but the scale of mass terror of the four days so often recalled in Lithuanian national memory was unprecedented. Another is related to the available evidence. As the German war machine rolled back the Soviet army, sources came to light for which there is no equivalent in the postwar period. Further, most of the émigrés who eventually wrote history in the West had direct experience with the first round of mass deportations but left Lithuania before the second. Finally, we should remember that the relativizing comparison was not available to Lithuanians at the time—they could have had no expectation of the violent conflagration to come.

There is yet another, less innocuous, reason for the lasting focus on the deportations. Emigré historians often cited the trauma of the deportations as a primary explanatory factor for initial Lithuanian cooperation with the German occupiers. Kiaupa insisted that Lithuanian independence had always been the sole desire of the nationalists, and that a turn towards Germany was forced by circumstances.⁶⁵ Ivinskis wrote, “Whatever happened now could not be worse than what had occurred under the Soviets . . . fresh memory of Soviet cruelties disposed the people and its leaders to attempt to find a way for a peaceful coexistence with the Germans.”⁶⁶ Rychener specifically mentioned the deportations, writing, “the hatred against the Stalinist regime was so enormous after the mass deportations in the Baltic that any power that opposed the Soviet Union would have been welcome.”⁶⁷ Parsing these insinuations to discover the motivations of their promoters is challenging. On one hand, they reflect accurately Lithuania’s struggle to attract international

support in an insecure environment. Turning towards Germany for aid, even welcoming the incoming Germans as liberators, reflected a hatred of Soviet rule and a naïve hope that German rule might be better. It would be a mistake to read the present back into the past: we cannot expect Lithuanians to have known just how futile these hopes might have been. Timothy Snyder is inclined to take a charitable view towards such hopes. “A single occupation can fracture a society for generations,” he writes, but “double occupation is even more painful and divisive. It created risks and temptations that were unknown in the West.”⁶⁸ Interpreted less charitably, these statements can be read as Lithuanian historians’ attempt to erase collective guilt for collaboration with the German occupiers. Here, we encounter the most challenging part of this history. A study of the first Soviet occupation cannot ignore what happened under the German occupation that followed when those who have previously studied it have so explicitly bound the two.

In the uncertain days of June 1941, some Lithuanian nationalist groups carried out pogroms in many parts of the country, blaming the Jewish population for the suffering they had experienced under Soviet rule. In a matter of weeks, 2500 Jews were killed.⁶⁹ The near-total annihilation of Lithuania’s Jewish population was carried out with incredible speed. With local help, the Nazi occupiers eliminated over 80,000 of the country’s Jews between July and December 1941.⁷⁰ German propaganda spread the idea that Jews had collaborated in the destruction of the Lithuanian nation. Historians agree that anti-Semitic feeling spiked after the deportations due to a popular perception that Jews had benefited disproportionately from Soviet rule, but historians disagree violently about the correctness of that perception. Vardys, the preeminent émigré author, provided statistical evidence of the high percentage of Jews in the tiny LCP, the improvement in their living conditions under Soviet rule, and their overrepresentation in the Soviet administration.⁷¹ While he insisted that his intention was “to illuminate but not condone” the origins of the Holocaust in Lithuania, Vardys’s narrative was primarily exculpatory. He suggested that Jews had indeed been collaborators with the evil Bolsheviks; perhaps the reaction was unseemly, but the perception was accurate. Karen Sutton claimed the opposite end of the spectrum, asserting that the Lithuanian perception of Jewish privilege under the Soviets was a “figment of the national imagination” and that the June pogroms were evidence of a dormant Lithuanian “rabid anti-Semitism” that only needed German encouragement to be unleashed.⁷²

In between the extreme positions staked out by Vardys and Sutton we find a group of contemporary historians who have rejected both varieties of absolutist understanding. Kiaupa wrote that Jews had been overrepresented

in the LCP not because of any special relationship with Communism but because they belonged disproportionately to the urban and working-class sectors of the population, traditionally the strongest bases of LCP support.⁷³ Alfonsas Eidintas noted that Jews had hardly been exempted from the deportations. As a larger portion of the merchant class, Jews had been in fact overrepresented among the deportees.⁷⁴ The *International Commission* estimated the number of Jewish deportees at over 2000.⁷⁵ The same was true of Russians; many White émigrés had settled in Lithuania after the Civil War, and they were targeted for deportation.⁷⁶ The Russians and Jews who had helped execute the deportations, Alexander Statiev found, had been evacuated with the retreating Red Army. The members of those groups who remained were made to suffer for crimes they did not commit.⁷⁷ Evidence presented by these authors reframes Vardys's insistence on Jewish privilege as a holdover from Nazi propaganda.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuanian mourning over deportation victims collided with a Western, Holocaust-oriented historiography that was inclined to see such mourning as cheap apology. The results of this collision could be bitter and acrimonious or creative and productive. Unable to mourn publicly what many saw as a national tragedy for the duration of Soviet rule, Lithuanians were determined to make the world know of the suffering they had endured. "Virtually no one has been called to account for what was done. The West has chosen to forget these horrors. Nothing of these horrors is taught at schools there. There is no grand museum in Washington D.C. dedicated to those whose lives were destroyed by the Communists."⁷⁸ The bitter reference to the Holocaust Museum communicates the common judgment that the Western fixation on Jewish suffering is unjust. Accused by historians like Sutton of fabricating a great national lie only to erase Lithuanian guilt, one response was to redouble efforts to document Lithuanian victimhood. The principal argument of the émigrés throughout the Cold War was that Lithuania was victim to its hungry neighbors, the lamb to the Soviet and German wolves, anything but the master of its own fate.⁷⁹ Those who engaged in the debate of comparative suffering believed that it diminished Lithuanian suffering to accept that Lithuanians could be perpetrators. In its defiant and sometimes anti-Semitic forms, this impulse looks indeed a great deal like apology. Not all expressions of mourning, however, carry the bitter taste of anti-Semitism. Finding space for the recognition of Lithuanian suffering without diminishing Jewish suffering is challenging. Distinguishing 'legitimate' mourning from political posturing is simply impossible. The act of remembering interweaves the personal and the political so tightly that there is no separating the two.

Some Lithuanian historians were stimulated to question the victim

trope and to engage the story of Soviet takeover in a new way. Kiaupa is the most important example. He flatly condemned the actions of collaborators. “Participation in implementing Nazi policy is completely unjustifiable, criminal.” Still, Kiaupa was sure to emphasize that only a small number had taken part: “[collaboration] was supported in neither word nor action by any representative Lithuanian institution and just as many risked their lives for Jews and saved Jews.” The last statement is of course difficult to prove, but Kiaupa’s attention to scale is new and significant. Why must Lithuanians, as a unified national body, be judged either anti-Semitic and bad or patriotic and good? We could accept the much more reasonable proposition, that some individuals acted cruelly and others courageously, but that the Lithuanian nation is defined by exclusive reference to neither. Kiaupa’s final judgment was that Lithuanian collaboration had to be recognized and vehemently, publicly, denounced: “There is no basis for complacency or self-justification for the sin was too great.”⁸⁰

In addition to his recognition that Lithuanians shared guilt for the annihilation of the Jews, Kiaupa revised several key parts of the émigré narrative. Without approaching the Soviet characterization of Smetona’s rule as a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, Kiaupa suggested that, rather than being a great patriot enjoying his country’s adoring support, Smetona had a substantial legitimacy problem. Following the 1926 coup, Kiaupa wrote, “The norms of political culture changed and force came to be used to solve political problems.”⁸¹ Smetona held puppet elections in 1936 for the same reason the Soviets did in 1940—he wished to create an air of popular support without actually having to relinquish any power.⁸² Kiaupa allowed for an unprecedented degree of enthusiasm for the Soviet regime. “Soviet propaganda was effective in its praise for the ‘democratic’ nature of Soviet society, depicting equality and common wealth.”⁸³ Particularly in the summer of 1940, he suggested, many did indeed support the idea of Soviet rule. Kiaupa made clear that the Lithuanian population was represented neither by the Smetona regime nor by the Soviets, but, as some had bought in and benefited from Smetona’s authoritarian rule, he suggested that some Lithuanians also cooperated enthusiastically with Soviet rule.⁸⁴ Kiaupa’s work may open the door for further exploration of the mixed experience of Lithuanians as objects and agents, victims and perpetrators.

Lithuanian historiography is in the midst of a sea change. For the duration of the Cold War, historiographical debates about the period of the first Soviet occupation of Lithuania focused primarily on the question of Lithuanian sovereignty. Soviet writers argued that Lithuania had experienced a socialist revolution, while nationalists insisted that Lithuania had been conquered and forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. Soviet

historians fought to preserve the image of the Soviet Union as the champion of oppressed peoples, while Lithuanians who settled in the West sought to portray the Soviet Union as aggressively and brutally expansionist. Against Soviet silence on the issue, émigré historians commemorated the deportations of June 1941 as the primary example of Soviet cruelty. The years of independence under Smetona were so idealized by émigrés that his authoritarian style was recast as patriotic nationalism. German rule was presented either as an interruption of Soviet dominance or as the continuation of the experience of occupation. Either way, Lithuanian victimhood was presumed. Jewish suffering was contextualized and minimized. Since 1991, the old debate over legality and its accompanying assumptions has become less important. The political imperative to prove that Lithuania's right to independent statehood had been violated lost immediacy after Lithuania broke off from the Soviet Union and again began to rule itself.

Historians in independent Lithuania found themselves in the middle of an entirely different debate. The sudden change in the terms of the argument was disorienting. Western historians had no problem accepting the premise of Soviet aggression, but they were less willing to accept the Lithuanian notion of a "nation of resisters."⁸⁵ Some historians were ready to paint Lithuanian nationalists as pro-fascist anti-Semites who carried out the Holocaust without German help. There were two primary Lithuanian responses. One was entrenchment. This impulse lashed out against revisionism, accusing Western scholars of trying to tarnish Lithuanian national heroes and to diminish Lithuanian suffering because of their fixation on Jewish victimhood.⁸⁶ The other response chose engagement. This reaction attempted to consider the extent of collaboration and resistance, incorporating Lithuanians as actors and not only as victims. In the midst of a pan-European discussion of the Second World War that has loosened from a stark victims-perpetrators binary, it seems possible the second response might be nurtured as the way forward.

As a part of the bloody story of Eastern Europe during the Second World War, the Lithuanian story is a challenge to historians: do we seek to understand or to stand in judgment? Is it enough to acknowledge our sympathies openly and honestly, or must we challenge ourselves to transcend them? I argue for the second. The desired end result is not history that can be considered 'objective' or 'balanced' but history that grapples with the messy variety of human experience. Understanding follows empathy. If our supply of empathy is limited to the Jewish community, our understanding will be limited to the Jewish experience. If we withhold empathy because we believe that the Soviets were naturally expansionist or brutal, then we can

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never make sense of the motivations or methods of Soviet incorporation. If we curtail our empathy because we perceive Lithuanian nationalists as inherently anti-Semitic or pro-fascist, we will marginalize their suffering as we miss an opportunity to understand the processes that enable violence. Perhaps the story of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania has been left untouched by non-Lithuanians because it is such a minefield. Meaningful understanding of what happened in this place and why requires us to be generous with empathy to an extent that tests the limits of comfort. It is for precisely this reason, however, that the Lithuanian story is a story that should be told.

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2. Even if we acknowledge that the Lithuanian nation is an ‘imagined community’ without a concrete existence or a primordial essence, it is appropriate to discuss it as a meaningful entity. In this period, it was an entity filled with meaning by the Soviets as well as Lithuanians themselves. Throughout the process of incorporation, the Soviets treated Lithuania as a distinct geopolitical entity, and after annexation, the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic preserved and possibly even strengthened the idea of a Lithuanian nationality. See Timothy Snyder. *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
3. Vytautas Kancevicius, *Lithuania in 1939-40: The Historic Turn to Socialism*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1976. 13 There is a well-developed Soviet historiography on the period 1939-41, but little of it is available in English. The translated work of Kancevicius, a Lithuanian historian writing in Soviet-ruled Lithuania in the 1970s, will be used here to represent a larger body of Soviet scholarship.

4. Ibid 12
5. Ibid 90
6. Ibid 153
7. The English and German-language bibliography is dominated by the works of scholars who fled the returning Soviets in 1944 and settled in the West. Émigré groups in Sweden, West Germany, and the United States published non-scholarly accounts of the occupation that provided similar narratives of Soviet occupation and repression.
8. Vardys *Rebel Nation* 46
9. Ibid 90
10. *Die Deportationen im Baltikum: 25 Jahre sowjetische Verschleppungen in den baltischen Staaten*, Stockholm, Estnischer Nationalfond, 1966. 5
11. Stanley Vardys, ed *Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 49
12. *Deportationen*, 5
13. Vardys, *Lithuania Under the Soviets* 58
14. Hans Rychener, ... *Und Estland, Lettland, Litauen?* Frankfurt: Herbert Lang, 1975. 42
15. Ibid 41
16. Vardys, *Lithuania Under the Soviets*, 55
17. Vardys, *Rebel Nation* 52
18. "Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Non-Aggression. August 23, 1939," *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, 7 Feb. 2013. <<http://www.soviethistory.org/index.php?page=article&ArticleID=1939secret1&SubjectID=1939annex&Year=1939>> Émigré works from the 1960s (Vardys, Rychener, *Die Deportationen*) already are aware of the Secret Protocol. *Die Deportationen* contains an appendix that includes a translated version of the document.
19. Senn, *Lithuania 1940: Revolution From Above* 82
20. *Izvestiia* May 16, 1940, quoted in Vardys, *Lithuania Under the Soviets* 49
21. Senn, *Revolution From Above* 207
22. Ibid 243
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28. Ibid 71
29. Senn, *Revolution From Above* 136
30. Slezkine, "Communal Apartment"
- 31 David Crowe, *The Baltic States and the Great Powers: Foreign Relations 1938-40*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. 135
32. Terry Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (December 1998): 813-861. 832
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No Present Authority of Law:

Criminal Justice and Sovereignty in the Blackfoot Confederacy, 1877-1889

Alvina Pillai & Jeffrey Velez

In the late 19th century, the United States and Canada held different views on policymaking with respect to the Blackfoot tribe in the Great Plains. Canada's consistent policies and the North West Mounted Police's consistent reluctance to enforce them afforded the Blackfoot a level of independence, although, during this period, their American counterparts arguably had more jurisdiction over intra-Indian crimes. U.S. policy in 1877 allowed the Blackfeet on the Montana reservation the freedom to judge their internal affairs. This freedom was especially alive during John Young's tenure as Indian agent; his continued use of the Code of Laws and tendency to defer to tribal leaders set him apart from his successors. As time passed, policy changes and decisive U.S. Supreme Court cases slowly eroded sovereignty from tribes across the nation. By 1889, they were left in a situation that closely resembled that of Canadian Blackfoot—one in which the laws of the dominant society stripped the tribe of their sovereignty. What both nations failed to realize was that poorly devised, broad policies failed to address the needs of local Indian communities. As a consequence, the administrative changes that took place in 1885 did more damage than good to the Blackfoot. The more important resolution is not which tribe had more sovereignty by 1889, but rather, that neither nation's course of action was more beneficial than the other. Nevertheless, an overwhelming sentiment spread in this time proclaiming the superiority of Canadian Indian policy.

During this time, policymakers and the general public began envisioning Canadian and American Indian policies as opposites. Commissioners of Indian Affairs in the time period routinely cited Canadian policies and practices as ones they wished to mimic. This perception continued to gain support over time with U.S. government sanctioned reports on Indian affairs, such as Abbott's 1914 "The Administration of Indian Affairs," and the Meriam Report in 1928. These reports further branded this view in the American public, vilifying American policies in a way that ignored the faults

of Canadian Indian policy. This notion continues to be highly regarded and prevents a clear understanding of the differences between the two sets of policies. Given these sentiments, understanding the ways in which both nations undermined native sovereignty becomes increasingly relevant.

In *Indians in the United States and Canada: a Comparative History*, Roger L. Nichols, supports the conclusion that Canadian Indian policy had different outcomes than American Indian policy. Nichols goes one step further to assert that First Nations had better outcomes than American Indians. Conversely, Hana Samek disagrees with this view and asserts that outcomes were relatively constant in both nations. In *The Blackfoot Confederacy 1880-1920: A Comparative Study of Canadian and U.S. Indian Policy*, Hana Samek presents an analysis of the impact of these two sets of policies on the Blackfoot people. The Blackfoot Confederacy, which spans present-day Montana and Alberta, is subject to both American and Canadian policy, and thus serves as an effective unit of analysis for a case study. Samek argues that, despite the different sets of policies, both were implemented such that the outcomes on both sides of the border were similar, implying that the differences in policies had minimal impact. Despite her comprehensiveness, Samek's analysis fails to address the implications of each nation's legal system for the Blackfoot. Other scholars, MacLeod and Rollason, in their study of criminal justice on the North-West Territories, found that native populations were treated more leniently than whites; however, they did not look at this question comparatively. Our research fills in this gap in current scholarship on comparative Canadian and American Indian policy of the late 19th century. Our findings add further support to Samek's conclusion that the different sets of policies resulted in similar outcomes on both sides of the border.

Between 1877 and 1889, in the Blackfoot Confederacy, several legal systems existed in conjunction with one another — U.S., Canadian, and tribal. The existence of several legal systems in the same geographic area makes the concept of legal pluralism especially relevant to our argument. For example, on the Blackfoot Agency in Montana, disputes could be settled either in territorial courts or in tribal courts. From a policy perspective, the hegemonic legal system attempted to stifle the sovereignty of the Blackfoot people, whereas in practice, they retained the ability to self-litigate. The ability to enforce traditional and culturally relative forms of justice is an important aspect of maintaining sovereignty. While criminal justice is not the only manifestation of sovereignty, this aspect is arguably the most important. Justice is a culturally relative concept that directly influences the ways in which members of a group relate to each other. Modifying a group's idea of justice can completely change the ways members

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perceive situations and can transform the social structure of a group. Because of the profound impacts changing a conception of justice can have on a society, allowing the Blackfoot to retain these integral values was key to allowing space for them to maintain their sovereignty.

During the period in the history of the Blackfoot Confederacy from 1877, when the Blackfoot in Canada signed Treaty Seven, to 1889, when Montana Territory became a state, both nations either introduced or attempted to enforce policies that stripped the Blackfoot of their ability to enact their forms of justice. Often these policies were not consistently enforced, which allowed the Blackfoot to continue practicing their forms of law enforcement. Despite an initial difference in specific policies relating to Indian-on-Indian crimes, both sets of policies, in practice, inadvertently gave the Blackfoot nations the authority to carry out their definitions of justice. However, sovereignty was not considered an undeniable right but was instead achieved through negotiation with governments and by default because later policies that would have otherwise limited tribal sovereignty were not enforced. Examination of official government reports, newspaper accounts, personal correspondences of government officials, and police reports illuminates the impact of both nations' policies on one group of indigenous people and reveals that Canada's Indian policies were not superior in terms of allowing the Blackfoot sovereignty in the jurisdiction of their own crimes.

GENERAL HISTORY OF THE BLACKFOOT CONFEDERACY UNTIL THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY

The Blackfoot Confederacy initially consisted of three bands: the Kainai, or Bloods; the Siksika, or Blackfoot; and the Piegiens. The Piegiens divided into the North and South Piegiens at an unknown time, with the South Piegiens being the only band living in present-day Montana.¹ In Montana, the people of the Blackfoot Confederacy are referred to as the Blackfeet. In spite of these naming issues, the three bands of the Blackfoot Confederacy all share a common language and culture.² They are strong allies, hunt together, and intermarry frequently.

After the Blackfoot acquired horses from the Spanish settlers in the American Southwest during the 1730s, horses became an integral part of the bison hunt and replaced dogs as the primary pack animals. Since horses became an integral aspect of Plains Indian survival, it was a common practice and an act of warfare for plains Indians to steal horses from enemy tribes.³ The Blackfoot frequently stole horses from their enemies: the Cree, the Crow, and the Sioux. These tribes often retaliated, and the cycle of horse theft and retaliation continued.

Criminal justice in these early days centered around the chiefs. Members of the band elected chiefs based on their bravery, skill at warfare, and generosity.⁴ Chiefs were responsible for directing the movement of each band, leading council and representing the band among other communities.⁵ These heads were considered the “guardians of social order” and were responsible for serving as arbitrators if disputes were to arise.⁶ Typically, transfers of horses and other property were used to settle most cases, even cases of murder.⁷ In one exception to this rule, women faced having their noses sliced off for adulterous behavior. Although this punishment was eventually outlawed, for the most part, the Blackfoot were able to retain a criminal justice system in which chiefs were still a main authority until 1889.

THE LATE 19TH CENTURY IN THE U.S. AND CANADA: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

Before the 1700s, the Blackfoot people relied heavily on the bison hunt for sustenance. The decimation of North America’s bison population in the late nineteenth century greatly impacted all of the plains nations. Increased settling and hunting annihilated the bison. On both sides of the border, resources from the government were largely insufficient to sustain the Blackfoot population; thus, a combination of hunting, attempts at farming, and reliance on government rations were necessary to ensure survival. The Blackfoot were unaccustomed to farming and government rations were paltry. These factors, combined with the disappearance of the bison, caused massive starvation from 1881 until 1884 and during this time, the Blackfoot population decreased by about a quarter.⁸

In Canada, the Dominion government used the Numbered Treaties to divide and settle the North-West Territories. Negotiating these eleven treaties gave the Dominion government jurisdiction over the prairie. In 1877, the Blackfoot participated in the Treaty Seven negotiations; however, oral histories illustrate that unclear translations clouded the exact details and implications of the treaty. This created a situation in which the Blackfoot were unknowingly stripped of their land.⁹

In the United States, the Blackfeet clashed with white settlers. As a result of a particular feud, the U.S. Army planned and carried out an attack on a band of innocent Blackfeet. This event came to be known as Baker’s Massacre. John Young, the Indian Agent on the Blackfeet Agency from 1877-1884, hypothesized that the Baker Massacre helped curb crime; he believed that the vivid memories of that day, kept alive through oral histories, prevented many on the Blackfeet reservation from engaging in criminal activity, for fear of another U.S. strike. While his hypothesis used a valid

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interpretation of his observations, our analysis will focus on the procedures regarding the crimes that did occur.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON THE BLACKFEET AGENCY, MONTANA TERRITORY, 1877-1885

Before 1885, the United States lacked a consistent policy for governing its territories, which enabled Indian agents to administer their own policies on Reservation lands. Three forms of law enforcement existed on territories: the United States Military, the territorial courts, and the reservation law enforcement.¹⁰ The military and the territorial courts were responsible for trying all cases involving whites or involving Indians and whites. The agency law enforcement had jurisdiction over all Indian-on-Indian disputes; however, not all reservations were governed by the same set of guidelines. Reservation laws depended solely on the Indian agent, which led to inconsistent policies and corruption over time across most reservations. This accounts for the high turnover rate of Indian agents, which meant that reservations could be governed by vastly different policies from one year to the next.¹¹

In 1875, Blackfeet Agent John Wood created a system of law enforcement that aimed to fuse European and Blackfeet law. He assembled the various chiefs of the Blackfeet and worked together with them to create a Code of Laws that abolished what Wood considered to be “brutal conduct” and traditional punishments for crimes.¹² Practices such as cutting off the nose or the ears of an adulterous woman were no longer allowed on the reservation. In addition, marriages to multiple women were now prohibited.¹³ Although this Code seemingly removed indigenous agency by abolishing certain traditional punishments and criminalizing cultural practices, the Code also established a court system that consisted of the Indian agent and the chiefs as judges and jury, allowing Native opinion to influence the outcome of criminal proceedings.¹⁴ For almost every offence occurring between Blackfeet, including polygyny, rape, prostitution, theft, attempted murder, and assault, this Code of Laws dictated that each criminal should be charged with a “fine or imprisonment as the tribunal may determine and impose.”¹⁵ Using a tribunal composed of the agent and “the head chief and two subordinate chiefs” and empowering the tribunal to decide a punishment enabled the Blackfeet to maintain jurisdiction over crimes committed within the community.¹⁶ In one exception, murder, the Code of Laws stated that a convicted murderer was to be hanged, with no further input allowed from the tribunal.¹⁷ Stealing horses from white men and buying liquor were two cases in which the Code dictated that the case be turned over to civil authorities, presumably because of the involvement of whites. Furthermore, the Code

gave the chiefs and the agent authority to make arrests or to appoint those to make arrests. This model, which was very similar to the Blackfeet's traditional criminal justice system, afforded the tribe sovereignty.

After John Wood resigned his position, John Young took over in 1876. Young continued to use the system that Wood established, trying a Blackfeet man for murder in December of that year and punishing him with hanging in accordance with the Code of Laws.¹⁸ Young continued this trend throughout his time as Blackfeet agent, either convicting Indian-on-Indian disputes using the Code of Laws and input from the chiefs, or by allowing the Piegiens to enact their own forms of justice outside of the Code. In addition, Young created a police force in 1878 that was entirely composed of Blackfeet in a weak attempt to assimilate the Indians into a European-style criminal justice system. Young complained that the officers failed to carry out their assigned tasks, showcasing their ineffectiveness at maintaining control over the reservation. Despite his endeavors, the Blackfeet largely retained their notions of justice and worked through Young's system to affect their own punishments.

Even when cases were tried in court, because of the provision in the Code of Laws that enabled the tribunal to decide punishment, court cases still resulted in punishments that reflected Blackfeet notions of justice. In one case, a man cut his wife in the forehead with a knife and Young scolded the police for allowing the man to escape. After bringing the man into custody, "the jury verdict of the Court was that the prisoner give the squaw a blanket and shake hands with her in token of peace and final divorce."¹⁹ Even though agency court proceedings, the chiefs were closely involved, and the Blackfeet were still able to administer justice on their own terms. After John Young's resignation in mid-1884, he wrote an essay detailing his idea of native justice. He stated that the Blackfeet "are only answerable to their tribal usages" of law and justice.²⁰ Every time he tried a case, Young says he made sure that he "was careful to inform [the culprit] that he was not tried by white mens laws but by the laws of his own people."²¹ In practice, Young followed his beliefs and often deferred to tribal authority. During Young's time as Indian agent, the Supreme Court upheld Indian jurisdiction over intra-Indian offenses that occurred on reservations in *Ex parte Crow Dog*.²² This decision in 1883 reinforced Young's prior actions that allowed intra-Indian offenses to be tried by native forms of justice.

Although provisions in the Code of Laws enabled the Blackfeet to enforce their own conceptions of justice, Young's hands-off approach was a factor as well. In 1882, two men named Black Weasel and Duck Child had a fight that resulted in Duck Child having a wounded head. Although Young attempted to try Black Weasel for the assault, Duck Child refused to press

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charges because he believed that Black Weasel “deserved all that he got.”²³ Furthermore, Black Weasel “was penitent and said his heart was good toward his punished friend” as a result of their brawl.²⁴ Black Weasel even “backed up his profession of penitence by transferring his belt and knife blanket to the sufferer.”²⁵ Instead of pressing charges and trying their dispute in the agency court, these two men settled their dispute themselves, in accordance with traditional punishment.

In February of 1878, upon learning about a war party of Piegians who had stolen several horses from the Crow, Young “at once called in the highest Chief [he] could depend on” to question the alleged thieves, illustrating a system in which Chiefs were fully involved with decisions regarding criminal proceedings on the reservation.²⁶ In this instance, the Chiefs informed Young that the Piegians were innocent and that a band of Sioux were responsible. In most cases of horse theft between the Piegians and the Sioux, Young would try to return all of the horses to their rightful owners, but was largely unable to do so. In these instances of larceny, instead of trying all parties in a European-style court of law, Young would largely, by default, allow the Blackfeet to self-regulate and to enforce their own definitions of justice. In 1880, after a herd of horses were stolen from the Piegians, Young “told the Indian who brought the word to go back and gather all the force he could” in order to “recover the ponies.”²⁷ Eventually, the group of young men who went to recover the horses threatened the thieves with guns. Instead of expressing outrage, Young applauded these young men for their actions. Although these cases differ from others in our analysis because of their intra-tribal nature, Young still supported the Blackfeet by refusing to try them for their lawless actions and by allowing them to carry out tribal justice.

Such was often the case with horse theft: in one case, upon discovering stolen horses, “the police [were] lukewarm with their efforts [...] to have the thieves punished.”²⁸ The police officers’ inaction indicates that Young’s system failed to enforce American justice. Furthermore, Young acknowledges that “this thieving is considered Indian justice,” and by allowing the Blackfeet to steal horses while facing little to no Agency consequences, Young enabled the Blackfeet to enforce their own notions of justice.²⁹ In 1883, when a group of Crees stole sixty-six horses from the reservation, Young “at once got the police within reach, mounted, and gave arms and ammunition” to the other Blackfeet joining him and rode off to recover the horses.³⁰ In the process of their retaliation, the party recovered ten horses and killed four Cree. Despite these murders of several Cree, Young failed to prosecute the murderers under the Code of Laws and allowed the Piegians to enact their own form of justice by carrying out a retaliatory horse raid.³¹ Although the Code of Laws was used to prosecute criminals, in cases of horse theft, Young

often left room for the Piegans to carry out their own notions of justice.

After Young left his post in 1884, agent R.A. Allen took over his position. In Allen's first annual report, he stated that he saw no functioning criminal justice system at the Agency and that he "deferred the organization of such court until [he] should become sufficiently acquainted with the leading members of the tribe to act intelligently in the premises."³² During the period of time after Young left and before Allen would create his own court system, all disputes were to be settled by arbitrators. It is unclear if the arbitrators were members of the Blackfeet nation, or if they were Agency officials, or if they were hired from the surrounding territories; nevertheless, their purpose was to settle disputes out of court. Even though Allen no longer followed Wood's and Young's model of criminal justice, the Blackfeet were essentially still able to settle all of their cases in accordance with their definitions of justice and to retain their de facto sovereignty during this period because they were in direct negotiation with the arbitrator and with each other. After the Major Crimes Act was passed in 1885, the United States consolidated its policies on how intra-Indian crimes were to be tried on reservations, placing more crimes under the jurisdiction of federal courts. Although before 1885, the Blackfeet enjoyed complete jurisdiction over prosecuting crimes, the Major Crimes Act changed this.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON TREATY SEVEN LANDS, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, CANADA, 1877-1885

Unlike the United States, pre-1885 Canada had a consolidated set of policies regarding intra-Indian violence. In 1876, the Indian Act consolidated all of Canada's policies relating to indigenous people and stated that Dominion law would apply to all people, including First Nations living in the Northwest Territories.³³ In addition to this consistent policy, the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) was established in 1873 to administer justice on the western frontier. This police force was composed exclusively of Canadian men at its outset and by 1877, there were 300 North West Mounted Police officers and a fully functioning criminal justice system on the North West Territories. The NWMP set up an integrated system of policemen, civil government, judges, and military officials in the Territories.³⁴ By regulating the laws, arresting criminals, and trying them, the NWMP represented an extremely consolidated system of law enforcement. Indian Agents also had jurisdiction over crimes, however, they consulted chiefs on these matters. After signing Treaty Seven in 1877, the Blackfoot were placed under the jurisdiction of the NWMP, although initially, this had relatively little impact on the Blackfoot's ability to enforce their own definition of justice.

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Although, nominally, the NWMP had full authority to try intra-Indian crimes, in practice the officers usually deferred to the chiefs of each band.³⁵ Consequently, NWMP reports until the early 1880s recorded few instances of Blackfoot being prosecuted for Indian-on-Indian crimes.³⁶ NWMP officers deferred to chiefs because of their adherence to what has now been labeled the law of necessity, a concept that “ensured that local practice and discretion remained an integral aspect of the region’s legal culture.”³⁷ According to the law of necessity, the NWMP accepted an Indian breaking Dominion law in the name of following his cultural forms of justice is valid. Because of this practice, intra-Indian offenses largely went unregulated, allowing the Blackfoot to retain their own notions of justice despite being subjected to a strict set of policies.

Throughout 1879, several settlers reported to the Indian Agent that the Blackfoot had slaughtered anywhere between 200 and 300 of their cattle over the course of that year. The Agent, assuming that the policemen would have been involved, approached Colonel James Macleod, an NWMP officer, to inquire about the thefts, only to find that “no formal complaint had been made.”³⁸ Colonel Macleod’s complete unawareness of these multiple instances of cattle killing illustrate the extent to which the NWMP officials failed to effectively administer Canadian justice in relation to crimes committed by Indians. Furthermore, the Agent suggested convening the chiefs and giving them the authority to “find out and bring to justice any Indians who had been killing cattle.”³⁹ The Agent’s deference and the NWMP’s unawareness of these accounts of cattle killing demonstrate that Canadian authorities in the North-West Territories had little involvement in prosecuting Indians.⁴⁰ In wanting to gather the chiefs and advise them, the Agent and the NWMP both showed deference to chiefs. This demonstrated that, despite Dominion law, the system in place afforded the Blackfoot a sense of sovereignty over their administration of criminal justice. In addition to this case of cattle killing involving settlers, intra-Indian offenses were largely unregulated as well and reports of NWMP intervening in Indian-on-Indian crimes are nearly non-existent. Despite being legally vested with the authority to try Indians for intra-Indian crimes, the NWMP rarely did so until the early 1880s, granting *de facto* authority to tribal forms of justice.

In 1880, three chiefs, Beardy, Cut Nose, and One Arrow, slaughtered several Dominion cattle. When Captain Herchmer of the NWMP arrived to make arrests, a group of 150 Blackfoot rallied together in protest of the arrests of the alleged cattle killers.⁴¹ The alleged criminals were eventually brought into custody and tried in Prince Albert. They were found not guilty of killing the cattle because their farming instructor ordered them to slaughter the animals. Even though they were found not guilty, the Indian

Agent referred to this instance of trial as “a lesson which they will not soon forget.”⁴² This shows that the NWMP used trials to intimidate the Blackfoot into following Dominion law, although instances of Blackfoot actually being convicted of crimes are very few. That the trial served as a threat instead of as a method of bringing Canadian justice to the territory, reveals that the NWMP did not try Indians in court very often. This case likely elicited more NWMP involvement than most other cases of cattle killing because the cattle in this case had just been delivered to the Blackfoot as part of the Government’s rations. An abuse of rations may well have been seen as a direct challenge to Dominion authority, and so led the government to try these three chiefs more stringently than other cattle killers at the time.

Similarly to the United States, horse stealing was a common offense in this region, and the NWMP responded to it by capturing and returning the stolen horses to their previous owners. Despite this, the thieves were not prosecuted in any way before 1880. In his annual report for 1880, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs suggests that horse thieves be captured and tried, which would greatly reduce the number of offenses committed.⁴³ At this time, while Indians were rarely being convicted for horse theft, white men who stole horses were regularly tried and convicted, some being sent to jail for several months, but the same punishment was rarely administered to Indians.⁴⁴ After 1880, the NWMP increased arrests on Indians for horse stealing. In 1881, Macleod writes about Little Fisher, a horse thief who was sent to prison for five years, and about trying Star Child for stealing horses.⁴⁵ In 1882, a Blackfoot named Bull Elk was going to be arrested when a group of Blackfoot actively rallied to resist his arrest. In response, the NWMP met with Crowfoot, the chief, and told him that Bull Elk would have to be taken into custody. Crowfoot willingly cooperated with the NWMP and, the next day, Bull Elk was taken to trial and imprisoned. In 1883, Star Child was arrested again for stealing horses, illuminating another trend in Dominion law enforcement. While stolen horses were usually returned, and the NWMP increased arrests on the thieves after 1880, the NWMP cracked down primarily on repeat offenders. Repeat offenders such as Star Child were arrested several times for their horse stealing, but, the majority of horse raiders did not face such punishment. Despite the increase in arrests, most Indian-on-Indian crimes were still dealt with amongst the Indians themselves.

Beginning in 1885, the NWMP began arresting all horse thieves more consistently, sentencing The Crow, Iron Shirt, and Yellow Horse for larceny and theft. Despite these arrests, all three received relatively light sentences: Iron Shirt and The Crow both received a punishment of two months of hard labor while Yellow Horse’s case was dismissed.⁴⁶ Contrastingly, white

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men tried for the same offense in the same year were routinely sentenced to six years imprisonment. This disparity in sentencing illustrates that the Canadian government was more lenient with enforcing Dominion law with respect to the Blackfoot. Despite the government's consistent policies and presence of a fully functioning criminal justice system in the Northwest Territories, the Blackfoot were rarely tried under NWMP courts for horse stealing and when they were, they were typically given lighter sentences than whites who committed the same crimes.⁴⁷ Through this system, the overwhelming majority of all other Indian-on-Indian crimes and disputes were tried and dealt with internally. This internal justice reveals why NWMP Reports and Annual Reports from the time period between 1877-1885 contain few accounts of Indians being arrested for crimes committed against other Indians. After the Riel Rebellions in 1885, the NWMP prosecuted more intra-Indian offenses, and the situation in Canada changed again.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE BLACKFOOT CONFEDERACY: A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA PRE-1885

Although the United States and Canada had different policies before 1885, they both had similar outcomes. The inconsistencies in U.S. policy allowed Agents Wood and Young to create and enforce their own system of laws pertaining to Indian-on-Indian crimes occurring on the reservation. Since their law enforcement system included heavy input from the chiefs, chiefs and tribal notions of justice significantly influenced all cases tried in the Agency court. Furthermore, some cases, especially those involving horse theft, were not tried by the Agency court, but were handled by members of the tribe in accordance with tribal law. Canadian policies were almost exactly the opposite: Dominion law presided over the entire nation and stated that all people in the Dominion, including Indians, were to be tried in accordance with the same laws. Despite these policies, in practice, chiefs retained control over the Blackfoot. Despite having conflicting policies and views on the border, the outcome for Canadian Blackfoot and American Blackfeet were overwhelmingly similar, with both groups retaining sovereignty.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 1885

In 1885, Blackfoot on both sides of the border underwent major changes in their relationship with government. After John Young resigned, new legislation was passed in 1885, and legal processes on the Montana reservation were modified.⁴⁸ Government officials had been pleading with Congress to enact legislation that would allow federal law to apply to Native

Americans: the Commissioner of Indian Affairs reported in 1885 that a “step in the right direction” had been taken with the passage of the Major Crimes Act.⁴⁹ The Major Crimes Act was approved on March 3rd, 1885, and stipulated that all instances of murder, rape, manslaughter, burglary, larceny, arson, and assault with intent to murder that occurred between two Indians on a reservations were to be tried as if the infraction occurred between two white men. For Montana Territory at this time, this law meant that all crimes fitting this description were to be tried by federal courts.

On the other side of the border, the Riel Rebellions led to increased enforcement of Dominion law. The Rebellions were a series of battles that occurred in present-day Saskatchewan and Manitoba, where Metis and Cree resisted Canadian forces. This series of uprisings caused the Canadian government to increase their enforcement of Dominion law in order to keep the western frontier peaceful. Although the Blackfoot were not involved with any of the uprisings, the increased enforcement still impacted this nation.⁵⁰

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON THE BLACKFEET AGENCY, MONTANA TERRITORY, 1885-1899

Interestingly, between 1885 and 1889, the implications of the Major Crimes Act were largely unfelt; as time passed, it began to be enforced with growing intensity. The act legally prevented tribal precedent from superseding the law of the United States: in the Territories, native litigants were required to be transported to a federal court. Up until the passage of that law, on the Blackfeet Agency in Montana, John Young utilized the tribal court to handle disputes of Indian-on-Indian crime. Based on the reports submitted to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the years following his resignation, every subsequent agent on the Blackfeet Agency used a different judicial setup. As a result of this changing legal environment, loopholes opened up for the Blackfeet, enabling them to enact their own forms of justice.

By this point in time, the Blackfeet had been ravaged by starvation, perpetuated by the disappearance of the bison and the reluctance of Congress to provide more rations. These problems troubled John Young during the end of his term, but reached their height in 1884 when R.A. Allen wrote his first report. Because of the dire situation on the reservation, Allen's initial duties centered on rebuilding the community. Furthermore, Allen began requiring policemen to wear short haircuts and to be clean-shaven. These provisions were unpopular, causing many officers to resign.⁵¹ As a result, in the year preceding the passage of the Major Crimes Act, the judicial procedures on the reservation were weakened. Nevertheless, the Blackfeet

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still retained the legal authority to decide for themselves cases of intra-Indian crime because arbitrators settled all disputes.

Even though the Major Crimes Act legally removed the Blackfeet's authority to try their own cases, there was a period of time in which agents were unable and unwilling to comply with the new law. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs reported in 1885 that, especially in territories:

the cost of the apprehension and punishment of Indian offenders falls upon the county in which the crime is committed. This in some counties will be a matter of considerable magnitude, and, as no revenue is derived from the Indians or from their lands, the county authorities are unwilling to bear such expenses.⁵²

In 1885, agents prosecuted crimes leniently because of the costs they would incur. The commissioner made repeated suggestions for a provision to the Act that would relieve the territories of the costs of enforcement.⁵³ This loophole allowed the Blackfeet to continue to exert control over judicial matters within the reservation.

After the Major Crimes Act, the slow erosion of Blackfeet internal sovereignty was clearly apparent, traceable even through accounts in local news coverage. In the *Daily Yellowstone Journal*, between March 1885, the month the Act was passed, and March 1886, all reports of Indian crime indicate that the same basic judicial processes continued despite the new law. There were eight crimes reported in the paper during that period, all for horse stealing, and the results ranged from simply recapturing the horses to a fine of \$500 to a six-month prison sentence; none of the cases were tried as larceny or burglary in federal courts.⁵⁴ Starting in April of 1886, though, three men, infamous for horse stealing, were convicted in a Montana territorial court and incarcerated, receiving between one-to-three-year sentences.⁵⁵ Later in 1887, there was a case that received heavy coverage in the *St. Paul Daily Globe* about a group of Piegiens who were involved in a series of raids against the Crow Indians. When the Crow Indians returned to their Montana reservation, they resisted authority and even fired into the agent's building. The military was called in to assist with the situation, with orders from Washington to remember that "the troops have no right to interfere to preserve the peace except on direct instructions from the President, for under the law of 1885 the Indians are subject to arrest by the authorities, just like white men."⁵⁶ Despite the new law, proceedings in Montana Territory remained relatively consistent.

The Blackfeet salvaged another small measure of internal sovereignty in this latter part of the nineteenth century. In the years immediately following Young's resignation, his successor, Allen, proved unable to maintain a court system on the reservation, suggesting that intra-Indian crimes were

settled in accordance with Blackfeet tradition. The exact date of origin of the Blackfeet Indian court system is unknown, but between Allen's date of resignation and 1889 some system was in place, "for in 1889 the commissioner questioned the agent about stories of 'sometimes ridiculous decisions of the present Judges of the Court of Indian Offences.'" ⁵⁷ The courts were also reported to have done good work under Baldwin's term as agent. This change in the judicial system on the Blackfeet reservation worked to decrease Indian crime on the reservation, and, in the process, slowly stripped the Blackfeet of their sovereignty. In 1888, Baldwin reported that "during the year no acts of violence nor crimes ha[d] been committed, and a few misdemeanors (principally intoxication), the offenders being promptly punished." ⁵⁸ While Baldwin's observation seemingly suggests that the American justice system had precedence over Blackfeet ways, this statement also implies that the instances of "lawlessness" amongst the Blackfeet could have been pushed underground. The Blackfeet could have continued to practice their own forms of justice and could have reported these instances selectively to the Agent.

From 1885 to 1889, national reports illustrate that the enforcement of the Major Crimes Act was not posing so large a problem in established states as in the territories; throughout this period, though, the financial impacts of transporting and convicting Indian criminals in a civil court prevented agents on the Blackfeet reservation from following the law to the fullest extent. ⁵⁹ This allowed the Blackfeet to retain a small measure of internal sovereignty, despite the devastatingly large controls that national legislation imposed upon them. In time, that loophole was eliminated as enforcement of the Major Crimes Act became more uniform in the territories around 1889, leaving the Blackfeet in Montana Territory with significantly less sovereignty than they had in 1877.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON TREATY SEVEN LANDS, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, CANADA, 1885 - 1889

The Riel Rebellions in 1885 in Canada led to scrutiny of the NWMP and their tendency to be lenient towards Indian criminals. As a result, police commander Lawrence Herchmer developed an extremely organized system of patrols and outposts, instituting "a system of systematic patrols which eventually covered the police's entire jurisdiction, concentrating on border areas." ⁶⁰ These outposts increased the extent of NWMP surveillance and consequently, arrests increased in the Northwest Territories, but this did not necessarily correlate with a change in their treatment of crimes.

Canada introduced a pass system in 1885 that intended to strip freedom away from native populations. The pass system was created to restrict

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Indians to their reservations. The goal of this policy was to curb crime, especially border related offenses, as well as to prevent any further rebellions from occurring. This system had no legal basis, as Treaty Seven stipulated free movement for the Indians involved.⁶¹ Both parties were aware of this, and so the policy was largely ineffective, as the Blackfoot completely ignored the system. Canada kept its tight control over Indian affairs in other ways though. Their Indian agents had the authority to work as magistrates, either directly or through chiefs, and could serve as law enforcement on reserves in the post-1885 period. This was an additional extension of Dominion law with regards to Indian crime. There was still no legal provision made for tribal authority to exert influence over their own affairs.

Despite these institutional changes, the severity of *some* convictions increased, whereas overall number of convictions remained constant. There certainly was a spike in politically motivated convictions; the police made examples out of men who were involved in the rebellions, though none of these men were Blackfoot. Furthermore, as a result of heightened scrutiny, the police increased the frequency of convictions, but, still issued fairly short sentences. The only exception to this trend was repeat offenders, who were usually horse thieves; these men usually received upwards of three years imprisonment depending on the number and type of crimes they had committed.

The most common crimes of the time, stealing horses, killing cattle, transporting stolen goods across the border, and being drunk, were still handled in the same basic manner that they had been in between 1877 and 1884. For example, in 1885 an Indian named Iron Shirt was charged with horse stealing as a result of a complaint filed by another Indian named Black Horse. The NWMP report reveals that he was committed for trial and sentenced to two months hard labor.⁶² The report from that year details three other cases; the sentences range from seven days of hard labor to a \$20 fine to two months of hard labor. There are even instances where cases of assault and theft were simply “dismissed after a short time.”⁶³ These illustrate that convictions remained relatively lenient and inconsistent in their leniency.

This period especially reveals the major inconsistencies of the NWMP’s enforcement, despite Canada’s consistent policies. In 1888, the NWMP report discusses three different Blackfoot Indians who are guilty of the same crime, cattle killing, but a wide variety of sentences were delivered to the criminals. The tendency to defer to chiefs when deciding judgement still continued, even after the major rebellions. For example, after an Indian named Deer Foot escaped from custody, the police shot at and injured a man who turned out to be his brother. Then, a committee was called together involving the chiefs in order to discuss the matter.⁶⁴ As seen here, chiefs had the extensive

ability and authority to give input on a case. There was a large amount of cooperation between the NWMP and chiefs in the Northwest Territories as well. J.H. McIllree, assistant to the Canadian commissioner in 1889, reported that: “We have had to make but few arrests amongst the Indians, and there was no trouble with any of them. If an Indian is wanted and we cannot find him, it is usually sufficient to notify the chief of his band, and the man wanted is soon produced.”⁶⁵ Despite the fact that the chiefs were included at times, the process never legally belonged to the Blackfoot, and their involvement in the legal process depended on which aspect of Dominion law enforcement they dealt with.

CONCLUSION

The United States and Canada had remarkably different Indian policies, and they further diverged after 1885. In addition to the disconnect between the government’s perception of Indian needs and the diverse issues facing local communities, the Supreme Court’s decisive ruling in *Ex parte Crow Dog* (1883) moved Congress closer to creating a provision that would hold Indians on reservations subject to all U.S. laws. In the aftermath of the Act’s passage, the Supreme Court’s decision in *U.S. v. Kagama* (1886) upheld the law’s provisions. Although the federal government legally prohibited all Indians from practicing their forms of justice, the Blackfeet in Montana Territory retained their sovereignty because Indian agents in territories were unable to afford the costs of sending criminals to be tried in federal courts. This status quo was largely upheld until 1889, when the Major Crimes Act was enforced more universally and with more consistency.

In Canada, policies remained consistent and conservative — a characteristic that set them apart from their American counterparts and that caught the attention of the American government, Indian sympathizers, and policy reformers in the late nineteenth century. Restlessness of First Nations in the Northwest Territories, specifically the Riel Rebellions, caused the Canadian government to narrow their focus on the NWMP. From 1885 onward, repeat offenders received stricter sentences; however, this increased severity did not significantly increase the number of arrests. These decreases were not a reflection of the effectiveness of government policies. By 1889, the Blackfoot in both the US and in Canada still relied on government support for survival. Furthermore, the Major Crimes Act curbed internal sovereignty. In Canada, Dominion law did not allow for Blackfoot sovereignty. In this case, Dominion law filtered through tribal laws, but only when the NWMP expressly sought the chiefs’ input. Contrastingly, in the U.S., a legal provision allowed for Blackfeet sovereignty; however, this well-intentioned arrangement

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did not give the tribe complete control either. Rather, their laws and customs were filtered through the guidelines set by the Indian agent. So, no matter what the details were of how the Blackfoot retained sovereignty in the realm of criminal justice, overall, their sovereignty was a by-product of laws and processes that were not culturally relevant to them.

A comparison of the experiences of the tribe on both sides of the border leads to an interesting question of who retained more sovereignty throughout the late nineteenth century. In Canada, Dominion laws were understood to be supreme. There was no need for a comparable Canadian Major Crimes Act because the laws of Canada applied to all the residents of the Northwest Territories, white and Indian. Members of the Blackfoot tribe who lived in Canada never legally retained jurisdiction over internal affairs. The NWMP's enforcement of, or failure to enforce, Dominion policies created a system in which chiefs were often included in the law enforcement process for Indian-on-Indian crimes. Further, the NWMP were lenient in prosecuting Indian-on-Indian crimes, and would even ignore certain infractions. This allowed the Blackfoot to operate independently of the influence of Dominion law. Other tribes, such as the Cree, lost this freedom after the Riel Rebellions; however, because the Blackfoot did not participate in these uprisings, they were known as a peaceful tribe, maintaining a relatively constant amount of sovereignty despite the influence of the Riel Rebellions on NWMP policy.

Despite the evidence supporting the argument that the Blackfoot were able to maintain internal criminal jurisdiction, some could argue that the government inefficiencies that allowed for their de facto sovereignty did not really place them in a situation where they were fully in control. For instance, the Code of Laws in Montana Territory could be interpreted as a case where a provision that seemingly provided the Blackfeet with sovereignty was created through a negotiation and an approval process headed by the Indian Agent. This negotiation could be viewed as a combination of American and Blackfeet ideas of justice, instead of as a solely Blackfeet Code of Laws. Furthermore, the increased enforcement of Canadian policies appeared to strip the Blackfoot of tribal authority. Because offenders received longer sentences after 1885, their harsher punishments could be interpreted as a check on tribal authority. Despite this counterargument, while the Indian Agent in Montana had a role in creating and in enforcing the Code of Laws, he rarely acted as the supreme authority and allowed the chiefs to rule. In Canada, this increase in enforcement was irrelevant to the issue of sovereignty because it only affected repeat offenders and the majority of other cases were still handled internally.

To divide these two nations into "good" and "bad" camps with respect to their Indian policies fails to acknowledge the intricacies in both sets of

policies and in their enforcement. In the late nineteenth century, the idea that Canadian Indian policy was more effective than American Indian policy first became widely accepted. Although Canada is noteworthy for remaining consistent with its policies throughout the nineteenth century, both nations failed to achieve their goals of encouraging assimilation, while, simultaneously decimating traditional ways of life. Through their policies, any sovereignty the Indians retained after being confined to reservations/ reserves had been lost by the turn of the twentieth century.

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The Physicality of Service

in German Ideas of Knighthood, c.1200-1500

Patrick Meehan

“Ich Jörg von Ehingen, ritter...”²¹

Close to death, a fifteenth-century Tyrolian knight by the name of Jörg von Ehingen decided to tell the story of his early days as a knight. His memoirs spin the tale of an eager young man ready to fulfill his destiny in a life of courtly service. He rises in rank, distinguishes himself in a network of princely politics, and travels throughout Europe in search of monarchs seeking voluntary service. Rarely do medieval sources come so close to the inner world of that evocative and perplexing historical figure, the medieval knight. Today, imagining knighthood draws on the long and diverse tradition of portrayals by others, whether twelfth-century clerics or nineteenth-century Romantics. Even the most romantic visions of knights largely conjure a literate or reflective individual. More likely is the frightening image of a conqueror ravaging the countryside, or perhaps a hero more interested in romancing ladies and participating in tournaments than bloodying himself in real battles.

It might be that neither impression is all that far off. Jörg himself, straddling both ends of the spectrum, is a perfect example. As a fifteenth-century knight serving in various princely courts, he was frequently obliged to take part in the fineries of courtly life – dances, feasts, pageantry. On the other hand, he traveled across the continent in search for active service in battle until finally coming to the rapidly expanding kingdoms of Portugal and Spain. Nor was the distinction between courtly and practical lifestyles black and white. He admits in his memoirs the utility of courtly games as tests of strength and exercises in martial skill, for instance. Failing to neatly fit either category, his story demonstrates that while both images of knighthood have some plausibility, neither on its own sufficiently characterizes the knight as a historical figure.

Jörg’s memoir is a particularly informative example of how one knight understood his own calling to knighthood and his practice of it. The medieval knight had a voice, and although precious few memoirs like Jörg’s exist, knightly perspectives inform a considerable breadth of primary materials. Like Jörg’s memoirs, they reveal perceptions of knighthood that are deeply complex and often acutely conflicted. Naturally, each individual knight

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differed to some degree, and it is crucial to recognize that there was no one medieval “knight,” but rather many knights whose backgrounds were as diverse as their experiences. Nevertheless, certain critical commonalities emerge in the sources which challenge the historian to reassess traditional approaches to knighthood, chivalry, and violence.

Indeed, established scholarship on knighthood still has a ways to go in devising satisfactory frameworks for understanding the knightly penchant for violence. One common theory contrasts courtly “ideals” with stark contemporary “realities.”² Whether explained as unrealistic, wishful thinking; as complete disconnection between the knights themselves and those setting the parameters of their conduct; or as lofty goals simply out of reach, the dichotomy of ideals and harsh realities remains in place. In an article exploring ideas of chivalry in *The History of William the Marshall*, however, John Gillingham makes a provocative conclusion:

All this...is to reinforce Maurice Keen’s point that the tendency of chivalry was not to limit the horrors of war, but ‘rather to help make those horrors endemic’....In this interpretation the horrors of war are looked upon as an inevitable and regrettable side effect of going to war. But is it entirely right to treat them merely as side effects? *Surely...the chivalric ethos of the thirteenth century already took the horrors of war for granted.* What it also shows is that ‘pillage and robbery’ were central to chivalrous war-making. The good knight regretted them only when it was his dependants who were the victims. When he was on the attack then pillage and robbery were not simply taken for granted, rather they were actually approved of as the right, the proper, the courteous way to make war by ‘the best knight in the world’, the man whose life was held up as a model for all good men to follow.³

His evaluation of chivalry in the *History* largely foreshadows an argument that I will make shortly. He rightly challenges the notion of a single idealized “chivalry” both in its content and in its very existence. But his conclusion does not go far enough. Apart from the basic argument that a good knight serves his lord well, Gillingham provides no satisfying reason for why the simple reality of terrible violence was satisfactory as a commonly held ideal of conduct. Perhaps it was simply the medieval way of life, where “the horrors of war [are taken] for granted”? Or, even worse, is it just human nature? Building on Gillingham’s assessment of chivalry and taking it even farther, I contend that attitudes towards the body offer an informative lens for approaching the complex dynamics of knightly violence.

To this end, the present chapter analyzes the parallels among three seemingly dissimilar texts in order to synthesize a fundamentally “physical” understanding of knighthood and chivalry. It explores how knightly authors

perceived their vocation as subordinating the body in service of some social and political hierarchy. This dynamic takes multiple forms. For instance, the subordination of the body is manifest in notions of self-sacrifice and martyrdom in battle, in voluntary submission to painful wounds or grotesque mutilation, and in the disciplined cultivation of athletic and martial prowess. In this light, even Gillingham's reasonable claim that "good knights regretted ['pillage and robbery'] only when it was his dependents who were the victims" requires reevaluation – as often as (or more often than) regret, knightly sources convey pride and indeed admiration for those allies willing to sacrifice their bodies in faithful service.

A physical framework for understanding knighthood is not altogether new. The "ideals" of the contrast theory usually feature stark examples of disciplined physical self-control. In the literary context of the court – service of the king or a lady, for instance – the ideal knight is expected to appropriately constrain his sexual desires and to suppress his predilection for destructive violence in order to conform to the orderly objectives of courtly service. The dichotomy of ideals and realities tends to conclude that this wishful didactic to tame unruly knights was altogether impossible, that destructive violence was ultimately a medieval norm beyond anyone's control.⁴ But analysis of *knightly* perspectives attests that the body was consistently fundamental to their self-perception. The court was not the only authority or hierarchy to which knights subscribed their physical service, as military orders like the Teutonic Knights illustrate. Thus, ideal knightly service was predicated primarily on submission of the knightly body to an honorable superior, whoever that might be. Context would then determine what form the service would take, be it courtly tournament pageantry or stark crusading life.

Locating the role of the body in the fundamental conceptualization of knightly service is critical to breaking from the dichotomy of chivalric ideals and realities, and instead moving towards an understanding of how diverse acts of violence could constitute exemplary service. Furthermore, it offers insight into how dynamics of violence and objectification of the body informed knightly notions of spirituality, hierarchy, gender, belonging, caste, and so on. In short, a definition of "physical" knighthood – where "service" is predicated on voluntary discipline, submission, and even mutilation of the body – facilitates a coherent and consistent framework for approaching medieval knightly identity.

ONE CRUSADER'S IDEAL OF "CHIVALRY" – MARTIAL AND MARTYRED KNIGHTS IN THE BALTIC

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Teutonic Knights

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sought to revitalize recruitment by advertising their Baltic crusading mission as a low-risk, seasonally convenient opportunity for courtly nobles to prove their martial worth.⁵ At the time of the composition of the early thirteenth-century *Livonian Rhymed Chronicle* (*Livländische Reimchronik*), however, the Order's work was extremely dangerous, and the members carrying it out came primarily from the lower service elite (*ministeriales*, or *Dienstmänner*).⁶ The literature of the Order (*Deutschordensliteratur*) was intended to reflect contemporary states of affair and to convey salient messages and information to specific audiences. The *Reimchronik* is no exception – not only was it intended to be dramatic and entertaining, but the circumstances and purpose of its composition fundamentally informed the paradigm of knighthood it proposes. Versified by an anonymous Teutonic Knight, the chronicle is a historical and literary text produced for the entertainment and edification of fellow brothers – a history of the Order “for knights, by knights” – and its vision of heroism and perfect knighthood thus resonated with the contemporary demands on those men engaged in the Baltic crusades.

But the notions of chivalry which the *Reimchronik* espouses are relentlessly violent, callously pragmatic, and utterly removed from familiar “courtly” guidelines of proper conduct. A campaign carried out against the Russians c. 1209, is a fairly typical one which exemplifies the brutality consistently associated with the calling of knighthood:

A brother named Hartmund, who was the commander at Ascheraden, summoned his best men and undertook a journey which widows and orphans would later rue....They came to Gerzike early one morning and took the castle. There they struck many bold men, causing them to cry out in anguish, *and awoke many who were sleeping by bashing their heads. That was a knightly campaign!* Six hundred Russians were killed and the women and children were taken away from there by the Christians. The brothers rejoiced. Unchallenged, they safely took back much booty both by ship and overland. This campaign served poor Christendom well and gave glory to the heroes.⁷

There is no hint of mercy or decorum in this “knightly campaign.” The commander and his men ambushed their enemy, slaughtered them indiscriminately, took their women and children hostage, and enriched themselves with plunder, all for the glory of “poor Christendom.”⁸ The fight was far from fair, and the treatment of “widows and orphans” flagrantly transgressed the ideal of protection invoked in literary or clerical exhortations to orderly behavior. Throughout the *Reimchronik*, similar conflicts are consistently couched in the same language of glory, bravery, and true knightliness. In short, the Russian campaign embodies the author's belief

that how extraordinary violence was not only necessary, but indeed glorious.

On the surface, then, the episode seems to confirm the contrast theory of discordant ideals and practices. Brutal violence is commonplace, but knights carrying it out are hailed as valiant and chivalrous. How the historian ought to approach the paradox is not entirely clear. On the one hand, dismissing the dissonance as inevitable ignores the complex dynamics of crusading violence. Nor is it enough to accept that routine atrocity was simply the knight's job, tolerable as long as it favored the right side, without questioning why this could be so. As further evidence from the chronicle demonstrates, however, the framework of physical knighthood is one explanation – by engaging in conflict, the knights of the Order submitted their own bodies to violence. Of course, recognizing the significance of the passive dynamic (*suffering violence*) does not preclude or replace the importance of the active dynamic (*committing violence*). Indeed, an exclusively passive warrior is not a very effective one. However, approaching knightly violence from both angles does enhance our understanding of the austere physical ideal that the knights held themselves to. It was one of grueling endurance, cut-throat strategic pragmatism, and masochistic, even lethal, asceticism. Bodily discipline underlay competence in performing obligations of service to the Order, and was crucial to achieving individual spiritual fulfillment.

In its mission of conversion and expansion, the German Order was locked in a long and harsh struggle for survival in the cold, dark, and unfamiliar forests of the Baltic. Allies were few, and friends were fewer. The chronicle does suggest a strong relationship with the Prussian headquarters, and shipments of men and goods were frequent arrivals in Riga and other harbor towns. Nevertheless, supplying the Order's frontier castles was an enormously costly and difficult venture. Particularly beyond harbors or cities with controllable access to food production, the acquisition of sufficient supplies was critical. In February of 1279, Eilard von Hohenberg, headman at a town called Reval far to the north of Riga on the border separating the lands of the Estonians and the Lithuanians, rode out with a contingent of brothers, Kurs, and Semgallians in a skirmish against the Livonians.⁹ The chronicler describes the “chivalrous [*ritterlichen*] knights of Reval” in their “glittering helmets” and “breastplates shining like glass,” who cut a striking figure as they plundered and burned the land.¹⁰ After slaying many and ravaging “in many proud bands [*mit vil maniger stolzen schar*]” they returned “in knightly fashion [*ritterlichen*],” their hands filled with spoils.¹¹

The raid is a classic example of unruly knightly behavior, and exemplifies the author's compellingly paradoxical association of chivalric ethos with destructive violence. Scouring the land in small bands, the heavily-armored knights outmatched their Lithuanian enemies. They thoroughly roved across

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enemy territory with the intent to seize Lithuanian goods for their own. This was a common and effective strategy, and medieval warfare typically played out in supply-wars waged on the land and its inhabitants, or in drawn-out sieges of fortified towns and castles.¹² In fact, the *Reimchronik* illustrates that the brothers and their allies tended to fare better in short skirmishes for supplies than the pitched battles in which they often found themselves fighting an enemy superior in number and with intimate knowledge of the terrain. It is not altogether surprising, then, that the author claims this aggressive guerilla method of warfare to be the height of knightliness.

In fact, throughout the history, the chronicler continues to laud the virtues of a supply war. In one instance, the master of the Order took a small contingent to build a castle in Semgallia, the region directly south of Riga, after assembling a large gathering of brothers and natives. Asserting that they had all they need to supply the castle, he requested advice on the logistics of transporting the goods through rugged and hostile territory. These supplies would have consisted not only of food and tools for daily use, but also building materials, clothing and armor, food and instruments for the care of horses, weapons for defense like crossbows and arrows, and so on. A castle could only exert influence if it was able to defend itself and sustain its inhabitants through siege – in short, the logistics of supply were crucial to success. In response to the master, it was a “chivalrous [*vrome*] knight” (more loosely translated as “pious,” “competent,” or “valiant”) who suggested the use of native sleds in order to distribute supplies widely and efficiently.¹³ Thanks to his advice, the Knights were able to ride far into Semgallian lands and establish a powerful and crucially strategic castle at Doblein.¹⁴ The chronicler applauds the knight as chivalrous because of his competence in overcoming the logistic challenge of transporting supplies across physical space, thereby enabling the construction and maintenance of a new base. The knight’s solution would allow his brothers on the outer frontier to effectively defend themselves and, ultimately, to survive.

Even with supplies, however, manning an isolated stronghold was a task demanded considerable prowess, ample courage, and grueling endurance at the individual level. A later episode narrates the misfortune of a small band of brothers, the original group of fifteen whittled down to even fewer by recent attacks, who are pitted in the tenacious defense of Dünaberg castle against a superior force of Semgallians vying to capture the fortress for their own.¹⁵ After holding out for four days, the brothers agreed that their force was too small and that they instead must “risk their lives and abandon the castle.” It was in the midst of this decision that one “chivalrous knight [*ein vromer*]” made the suggestion of burning the mill near the keep in hopes of setting the entire castle alight.¹⁶ The brothers’ tactical maneuver illustrates the brutal nature

of survival on the Baltic frontier. In an all-or-nothing act of desperation, the burning of the castle had tragic consequences – in addition to the regrettable death of a nun who fell while trying to escape the burning ramparts, it resulted in the deaths of the brothers themselves, suddenly completely vulnerable to the enemy crowding “grimly” at the gate. Nevertheless, the knights’ aim was to deprive their enemy of the castle’s strategic location and supplies, and in this they succeeded. The reverential chronicler memorializes the nameless knight as “*ein vromer*” not because of his courteous and righteous spirit, but because he understood how to cut large-scale losses in a hopeless battle. He and his brothers knew well their role in the greater mission of their Order. In the ethos of the Chronicle, their heroism was strategically prudent and tactically suicidal; the sacrifice of the body yields honorable service.

If the heroism and righteousness of the Order were idealized, the nature of conflict was not. Engaged on an inhospitable frontier far from the princely courts of Germany, the Order waged a vicious war in which brutally aggressive tactics were critical to conquering territory, repelling invaders, and preserving the tenuous friendship – and fickle piety – of converted natives. Battles in the *Reimchronik* appear as episodes in a continuous war of attrition, and the best knights are masters of the physical demands placed on them. The “chivalrous” crusader was stubbornly courageous in face of overwhelming odds; he was adept at ruthlessly obtaining supplies for survival, and he was skilled at prudently managing them in direly hostile conditions over indefinite spans of time and across considerable distances. Nearly always nameless, he was nevertheless ultimately willing to sacrifice himself for the good of the Order. Indeed, with the pledge of service, the knightly body becomes the property of the Order. In literary ideals, the knightly body is typically subject to the expectations and limitations of a courtly paradigm which transforms violence into a force of order. Though the hierarchical structure is different, the ideal of knighthood in the *Reimchronik* also binds the knightly body into a physical ethos tempered to suit the Order’s specific notion of constructive and honorable service. It is this physical perception of knightly function which fundamentally informs the chronicler’s understanding of conflict, vocation, and community.

THE ARISTOCRATIC BODY: ULRICH VON LICHTENSTEIN’S “IDEAL” OF KNIGHTLY SERVICE

Far from the snowy Baltic frontier, Ulrich von Lichtenstein’s *Service of Ladies* (*Frauendienst*) follows the story of Ulrich, a thirteenth-century Styrian knight whose undying love for a particularly haughty lady leads him – dressed for some time in drag – to undertake a mock-serious odyssey of devoted

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service through a vivid world of tournaments and courtly pageantry. The satirical “autobiography” has long elicited the interest of scholars who have not always been duly mindful of Ulrich’s biting sense of humor.¹⁷ That said, the text’s historical value is inherent in how the author – a knight himself – portrays service, hierarchy, and sexuality in the literary world he constructs. Like the *Reimchronik*, Ulrich intended his poem to entertain and edify, but his irreverent approach to the aristocratic lifestyle targeted a markedly different audience than the self-affirming history of the *Deutschorden*.

As is typical of much medieval literature, the re-imagined world serves as a space for exploring and critiquing contemporary issues.¹⁸ Ulrich’s work explores the demeaning and oppressive underside of a courtly ideal in which the knight is expected to exercise tremendous physical discipline with little or no reward. Naturally, it is important to take the poem with a grain of salt. But with wry wit and a healthy sense of the absurd, Ulrich combines the genres of *minnesang* and satire to effectively confront very dilemmas in the expectations of idealized courtly knighthood, especially the callous objectification of the body. Having sworn loyal service, the story’s protagonist finds himself (gladly!) bound to carry out any quasi-sadistic whim of his lady whose condescending attitude varies from indifference to exasperated hostility. Throughout his itinerary, Ulrich pushes his body to bizarre extremes in order to please her. Although his adventures often take on a humorous and light tone, they emphasize the degree of control implicit in the binding hierarchical relationship between the knightly vassal and his lord (or lady). In fact, by merit of their satiric intent, Ulrich’s observations, if exaggerated to some degree, illuminate aspects of “reality” which he found worthy of criticism.

The *Frauendienst* is full of passages exhorting the reader to ideals of chivalrous service. Early in the poem, for example, young Ulrich entreats his aunt to approach the lady on his behalf. During the ensuing conversation, Ulrich’s aunt urges the lady not to begrudge her eager suitor, as this is a natural and right yearning for young men, even if they are unworthy. She claims that “They show their honor by their goal: / the high desire, the lofty soul, / and say a knight should prove his worth / by wooing one of noble birth.”¹⁹ In this stanza, the aunt effectively proposes a definition of knighthood which underlies the courtly narrative. On the one hand, it is outwardly sexual – the knight orients his service towards the objective of “wooing” his ladylove. In this sense, romantic narrative would seem to inform knightly reality.

But her subsequent entreaty to her nephew highlights another element of chivalry. She tells him to “Live as God wanted you to live / and take whatever He may give / as being for you best and right; / this is the spirit of a knight.” In addition, she appends a warning: “To want what God does not ordain / reveals a spirit much too vain.”²⁰ Her attitude that the “spirit of a

knight” is to *take* implies an aggressive and physically forceful knightly code not far from the violent prescriptions in sources like the *Reimchronik*. But it is tempered by the notion that there are objects too lofty for the knight’s taking, and that God Himself has put this order in place. Early in the poem then, Ulrich’s aunt situates the courtly knight within a restrictive paradigm – bodily desire is a perfectly acceptable motive of service, even the rightful intention of knighthood; and the proper knight carries out his service through deeds of physical prowess. However, he is obliged to conform his behavior and objectives to the reasonable and expected boundaries of a divinely ordained framework.

Many of Ulrich’s adventures demonstrate these constrictive dynamics of courtly knighthood. He continues to pursue the sole objective of winning his lady’s love through devoted service, but he does so in ways that appear oppressive and increasingly futile. As he participates in various tournaments, for example, he sings: “My body and my wealth I spent / quite willingly, ‘t was my intent.”²¹ Throughout his young career, the service he renders is thus explicitly physical. Yet it is by playing his knightly role through devoted service that Ulrich consequently reinforces the social hierarchy limiting his ability to attain his desires. Of course, the feudal relationship is not entirely parasitic.²² Ulrich’s fulfillment of honorable service is a testament to his prowess and loyalty as a knight, and he thus has a degree of agency in proving his worth. Whatever his reputation may be, however, the power dynamic inherent to his oath-bound relationship remains in place. Only by putting himself through various corporal transformations does Ulrich seek to break the social limitations dictated by his knightly status.

The following examples illustrate how courtly service in Ulrich’s *Frauendienst* is fundamentally bound to the exploitation of the knightly body – through sacrifice, masochistic suffering, and aesthetic athleticism. Ulrich’s knightly career is noteworthy for the sheer multitude of tournaments he participates in. From the earliest years of his service, he leads an itinerant lifestyle, moving from court to court in search of worthy tournament opponents, a popular stock caricature of knighthood. Naturally, his participation in tournaments is linked to his hunger for personal glory and his delight in the fairer sex (“I spent the winter visiting / the ladies all around”).²³ Much of the comedy in Ulrich’s poem is indeed derived from this interplay of sexuality and gender in the tournament, particularly those he attends during his outrageous itinerary dressed as Venus, the goddess of Love. Skill in martial play enhances Ulrich’s value as an honorable knight and makes him an attractive figure in the world of courtly lords and ladies. But this lifestyle also plays another explicit role – his participation in tournaments is, in imitation of warfare, both dangerous and physically demanding.

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Whatever his personal interests might be, Ulrich's bid for love motivates him to perform perfect service for his lady. He articulates this desire early in the poem, soon after his induction into knighthood. What he openly describes is willing self-sacrifice in her name:

(150) For you, my lady kind and good,
I'd risk my life whene'er I could
in any knightly deed or game
and always do it in your name.
Whatever way a knight can serve
I'll serve you well, as you deserve.
I should, I will, indeed I must
remain your knight till I am dust.²⁴

As far as Ulrich is concerned, a knightly "game" is worth as much as a knightly "deed," and a good knight must be dedicated to both forms of knightly duty until his death. And Ulrich is clearly willing to risk death for the honor of his lady. Granted, Ulrich is likely driven by the desire for his lady's love and for his own personal glory more than a true capacity for selfless service. Nevertheless, at the tale's comical denouement, wherein the impossibility of the protagonist's desire becomes explicit, the poet retroactively casts a darkly absurd sense of futility over the entire narrative.

In any case, whatever Ulrich's true motives might be, he espouses a particular paradigm of chivalrous conduct in order to realize his objectives. The value he ascribes to self-sacrifice in feats of martial daring performed for a social superior recalls the Teutonic author of the *Reimchronik*. The knightly game is far more than a carefree spectacle of jovial mock-battle – it is a risky and competitive contest where the reward is high and the stakes are higher. If he remains alive, the contestant's rise or fall in personal status is directly linked to the reputation of his lord (or, in Ulrich's case, his lady). The knight's relationship with his superior subsumes his "individuality." Of course, contenders like Ulrich were certainly interested in their own advancement, but the tale does show that deeds performed even at the microcosmic level of the joust were inseparable from the hierarchical nature of knighthood, be it allegiance to a lord, vowed obligation to a military order, or membership in a knightly brotherhood. Whether we conceptualize the tournament as courtly ceremonial, public spectacle, or martial sport – all manifest in the *Frauendienst* – it is fundamentally a contest of arms, not necessarily non-lethal, by which the knight pushes and risks his body to perform service.

A further example from Sir Ulrich's fantastic career fortifies the argument that he perceives his duties of service to be both physical and self-sacrificing. Despite receiving only harsh words from his lady after pledging his unending loyalty, the servitor and would-be suitor is unabashed in his

pursuit. He remains convinced that his suit is going “rather well”, even after she dismissively advises him to leave for good.²⁵ He decides to rove the land as a member of a certain notorious “knightly band.” In the summer, he strikes an opponent “clear off his steed,” a deed for which he claims his lady later thanked him.²⁶ His service is thus twofold. On the one hand is his participation in the knightly band, likely one of the tournament brotherhoods which were common throughout Germany in the high and late middle ages.²⁷ Since these brotherhoods frequently acted independently of the courtly scene, however, it is possible that Ulrich’s knightly band is somewhat less reputable than the poet admits. In any case, he intends to enhance his lady’s repute by participating in a knightly collective. The passage also clearly conveys the importance of the joust. Ulrich cogently and prosaically (hallmark qualities of satire) summarizes the nature of the joust: “one time in a joust I struck / a worthy knight clear off his steed. / (She thanked me later for this deed.)”²⁸ As flashy as Ulrich’s tournaments become, at heart they are contests of the skill in knocking one’s opponent off his horse, a deed considered to be worthy service.

Two curious episodes in the story serve as final illustrations of a service mentality bordering on the masochistic. In both, Ulrich deliberately disfigures his body as a form of service to his lady. The first instance is entirely voluntary – the young knight journeys to a foreign doctor who quite violently operates on a lip defect displeasing to the lady. In the second, Ulrich loses a finger during a particularly vicious joust. The lip operation and the finger loss exemplify how Ulrich’s eagerness to conform to quasi-sadistic expectations of knightly aesthetics results in painful disfiguration of his body. Naturally, he undergoes the trials with stoic and serene poise.

Ulrich’s *Frauendienst* offers a drastically different context of courtly service from the crusades of the *Reimchronik*. The similarities between the knightly authors’ projections of ideal knighthood are nevertheless striking. Both advocate a degree of submission achieved by the discipline, sacrifice, and reshaping of the knightly body. Ulrich’s poem expands this physical dynamic from the explicitly martial expectations of the *Deutschorden* to the theatrical ceremonies and games of the courtly world. Both Ulrich’s poem and the *Reimchronik* envision knighthood as actively and passively corporal – training the body to deal violence unto others as well as receive it themselves. Furthermore, these sources not only project physicality and corporality as fundamental facts of knightly function, but they *idealize* knightly behavior which embraces subordination of the body as exemplary service.

THE KNIGHT ERRANT: JÖRG VON EHINGEN’S COURTLY LIVES

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Some years into his lowly service for Austrian Prince Sigismund's queen, Jörg von Ehingen made a momentous decision. Having "come to man's estate" and taking heed of his burgeoning strength, the young page made up his mind to leave the queen in search of more honorable service. He wished to attach himself to an "active prince" so that he might learn and master "all the practices of knighthood, rather than remain in peace and pleasure at Innsbruck."²⁹ The opening to the Swabian knight's engaging memoir immediately confronts the reader with Jörg's Spartan outlook. His coming-of-age story is informative: physical development into a man signals the need to transition into a mature social rank. The tradition of knightly service that he deemed appropriate had strict guidelines wherein "peace and pleasure" were counterproductive, and an "active" (that is, engaged in some measure of armed conflict) lord was the most honorable.

Jörg was a proud member of his family who wished to continue and enhance the long dynastic tradition of honorable knightly service. His memoir opens, in fact, with a short family history beginning with his grandfather Burkhard whose epithet "with the tress" indicated membership in the Viennese Order of the Tress.³⁰ Burkhard's grandson clearly harbored a deep sense of familial duty predicated on military service, and the showcasing of this honor is the likely reason for the memoir's existence in the first place. It quickly becomes clear that Jörg, firmly rooted in an austere tradition of family honor, felt uneasy as a member of a fifteenth-century court. This period, the onset of what historians now term "early modern," witnessed the rise of the princely court to new prominence as an aesthetic political space in Western Europe. This shift augmented the demands on courtly knights like Jörg to conform to the stylized pageantry of games, feasting, dancing, and so on. Jörg himself appears to have been a high-ranking figure in the princely courts of Germany thanks to his family's strong ties to Hapsburg Austria, and his ancestors had long enjoyed a stable power base in Württemberg and the area surrounding Tübingen. Yet his perception of honorable, combat-oriented service was largely at odds with the courtly lifestyle which he considered idle, and this conflict of interest shades his narrative with a degree of tension.

His intent in recording the story of his itineraries was thus to prove in posterity that he "Jörg von Ehingen, ritter," in imitation of his knightly predecessors, had indeed lived a proper and worthy life, though he was departing a world beset by rapid change. It is significant, then, that Jörg's memoir ends quite abruptly. Although the editor does not suggest it, it is certainly possible that the rest of the manuscript (only one manuscript copy is preserved at Stuttgart) was lost or unfinished.³¹ Without completely discounting this possibility, it nevertheless seems likely that Jörg's account ends precisely where he wished it to. After returning to Germany from Spain

c. 1459, Jörg assumed a largely administrative function in his prince's court. His sense of self-worth was clearly predicated on his role as an active knight, and the impression that he wished to leave of himself reflects this mentality.

Like the *Reimchronik* and the *Frauendienst*, the memoir advocates an understanding of chivalry corresponding with the bodily service that Jörg considered "useful." The advice that Jörg's father Rudolf gives him at the beginning of the narrative echoes his son's readiness to take on the world: "Dear son, you are sufficiently strong [*stark genuog*] and well grown [*recht geschaffen*] to undertake all that is fitting to a young knight. I gather from your speech that you are ready to perform such duties, and are content to bide your time."³² Father and son both articulate an Ehingen ideal of knightly conduct honoring physical prowess first and loyal service second. Their intersection drives the narrative – Jörg's travels take him where his active duty as a warrior is needed. Furthermore, if his intriguing relationship with courtly pastimes demonstrates that he perceived tournament culture as "chivalrous" by virtue of its practicality, it enhances our understanding of what "active" service meant to knights like him.³³ While in the hire of Portuguese monarch Alfonso V, for instance, he describes with relish the games held during the preparations for an invasion into Africa. Hunting, wrestling, fencing, horse-racing, javelin-throwing, and of course jousting fill the kingly itinerary of merrymaking, and Jörg modestly boasts that he was "particularly diligent in the combats in armor."³⁴

But more striking is the distinct unease that the young knight admits regarding such pastimes. Just as he had embarked on his mission to become a knight because he considered his position in peaceful Innsbruck too lowly, he similarly decided to leave Germany because of his fundamental mistrust of idleness. He claims to have done the best he could in the knightly sport held at Rottenburg or Freiburg in the hopes that the exercises might "profit me in my knightly undertakings and be serviceable to me." Yet mindful of his father's denunciation of idleness as the greatest vice, Jörg continued to feel troubled when "peace prevailed in all the kingdoms of the Christian world." Not content to uselessly linger in a court without need of his knightly service – that is, of his martial prowess – he intended to embark instead on a courtly itinerary in search of "serious and important affairs."³⁵

A troubled picture of courtly chivalry thus emerges from Jörg's text. The knight's attachment to violence as his core purpose fundamentally clashed with the archetype of peace-seeking and merciful "courtliness." This is not to suggest, of course, that violence is absent in the stories of vernacular romance. Indeed, much romance literature shares with Jörg's memoir the same dedication to violent activity as a productive form of service. But the world of courtly manners, tender mercies, dainty ladies, and stylized social

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interaction is precisely the world that Jörg wished to escape. Herein lay a key source of internal conflict. Jörg asserts that attachment to a courtly prince was the only means to learn the ways of true knighthood, and rising through the ranks towards ceremonial dubbing required the young chamberlain to act the part of the courtier. Although this dual nature was nothing new – as the growth of the *ministerialis* class during the eleventh and twelfth centuries certainly attests – the stylized character of courtly service was becoming more pronounced in the fifteenth century, and Jörg often found his ideal of knightly service compromised by contemporary mores. In a way, the serious Swabian knight's self-portrait inverts the traditional historiographic dichotomy of what true “chivalry” is and is not.

Jörg's ideal of knighthood, like that of the *Reimchronik* and of Ulrich, was predicated on binding the knightly body to military service. His willingness to put himself in danger – and in fact his deep unrest if not given the opportunity to do so – informed the duty and essence of knighthood, and his identity as an individual, as a scion of familial honor, and as a functioning member of society hinged on this viscerally physical dynamic. Several key episodes in his account exemplify his idea of active service. The first is the journey to the Holy Land which his father entreated him to undertake, urging his son that rather than spend his time in “peace and uselessness in the courts of princes,” he should embark on “a splendid expedition under the command of the knights of St. John...setting out for Rhodes,” a journey that he himself had never been able to make.³⁶ The expedition was a bust; the Turks never launched their invasion on the island. But Jörg occupied himself by partaking alongside his captains in “those knightly exercises that I had come there to perform” before leaving Rhodes for a short tour of the Holy Land.³⁷ His activity in the courts of Iberia further illustrates the nature of Jörg's perception of honorable service. For the Portuguese monarch Alfonso V, “the most righteous King I have ever known,” the German knight journeyed to the North African city of Ceuta to defend the recent Christian acquisition from Muslims seeking to recapture it. In the course of his involvement, Jörg acted as both a spy and, decidedly more successfully, as a warrior.³⁸ Having challenged a leader of the Muslim army to personal combat, he emerged victorious from the flurry of tangled struggle with three trophies: his enemy's ornate armor, his spirited stallion, and his head.³⁹

After returning to the peninsula, he took up residence in the court of the Spanish monarch Henry IV whose armies were sporadically engaged in the last phases of the *Reconquista*. It was during one grisly campaign into the hinterlands of Muslim Granada that Jörg suffered a grievous wound: “I was badly wounded on the shin by an arrow from a sling, and although the wound healed subsequently, it broke out again when I returned to Swabia, and

I retained until my old age a hole in the shin and a flux.”⁴⁰ Like his armor, a knight wore his wounds as striking visual indicators of his status. As Jörg grew older and more distinguished, climbing the ranks of the courtly world, the memory of his past was indelibly written onto his body. His own wound must have served as a constant painful reminder to his superiors, to his peers, to his family, and to himself that he had once served as a true knight, risking his body for the sake of his lord, for his family’s honor, and for the love of his God. Doubtless he intended his memoir to serve the same purpose in posterity once his scarred and broken body had been finally laid to rest.

THE PHYSICALITY OF KNIGHTHOOD: VOLUNTARY SUBJECTION OF THE KNIGHTLY BODY

The *Reimchronik*, *Frauendienst*, and Jörg von Ehingen’s memoir are, on the surface, three vastly different texts. Spanning several centuries, taking place in different locations, and involving distinct expectations of the knights they depict, the three sources nevertheless share critical similarities. The *Reimchronik* praises the prowess of men fighting vicious supply wars in a hostile environment; Ulrich’s poem sings of lavish tournaments and beautiful ladies; Jörg’s career emphasizes the duty of the courtly knight to find meaningful employment wherever war touches Christian society. Nevertheless, the three distinct authors are alike in their fundamental perception of knighthood as a rendering of service through the subjection of the body to violence.

Shocking cruelty, lurid pain, and grotesque disfigurement color each narrative. Brother Hartmund’s valiant attack on the Russians quickly devolves into indiscriminate carnage. Sir Ulrich’s operation is a mess of blood and knives. Jörg von Ehingen, while on campaign in the hinterlands of Granada, is terribly and permanently wounded. It is precisely these moments of brutality that the knightly authors believe to be total fulfillment of their chivalric ethos, an observation which closely echoes Gillingham’s reading of William the Marshall’s *History*. It is crucial, however, to take the analysis further by more broadly exploring the dynamics of violence and the position of the knights therein. Obviously, there is an aspect of aggression perpetrated on a justified enemy, often a religious other (as in the *Reimchronik* and Jörg’s memoir). But there is another essential dimension. In fulfilling what they perceive to be their duty, the knights subject themselves to vulnerability, inviting violence upon their own bodies in the service of some projected superior – their lord, their lady, their God. True service involves the willingness to engage in self-endangering conflict, perhaps with the explicit intention of being wounded or even killed (thereby winning martyrdom). This voluntary mortification of a masochistic knightly body – a fundamental aspect of each “chivalrous” ideal

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considered thus far – is the real meaning of “physical” knighthood.

A final episode from the *Reimchronik* powerfully illustrates the notion of the masochistic body and its potency in the chronicler’s perception of ideal chivalry. Following closely after the Semgallian attack on a small number of brothers holding a fortress and one chivalrous knight’s suggestion to burn down the mill, the surviving brothers became captives. In dramatically laconic verse, the chronicler recounts their fate:

Some of them were captured. Such was the outcome of the battle. The Semgallians had had their way. Soon afterward they conducted a tribunal. They all stood around in a wide circle, forced a brother into the ring, and then hacked him to pieces. Some of the other brothers went on into Lithuania where they rebuilt the castle which had earlier belonged to the Order...and continued fighting from there. What more shall I say?⁴¹

Even if the poet has applied a degree of hyperbole to the event in order to project the monstrosity of the pagan enemy, the butchery is a dreadful and frightening affair. After risking the suicidal tactic of burning the castle in order to cut any advantage the advancing enemy might gain in victory, the remaining brothers – both pitiful and heroic in their anonymity – met a gruesome fate, their bodies literally hacked to pieces. But it is just one episode in the overarching narrative of the Order’s history. Nameless brothers die and new brothers volunteer to take their places, leaving their homes to defend the frozen frontier castles of the Baltic. Because of its members’ chivalrous acts of self-sacrifice, the Order continues to live on. “What more shall I say?” It was, after all, the good of the Order that mattered most in the stark martial ethos which the chronicler impressed upon his brothers. Physical sacrifice and suffering were not incidental “side effects” of endemic warfare – they embodied the very core of chivalrous service.

ENDNOTES

1. Jörg von Ehingen, *Des schwäbischen Ritters Georg von Ehingen Reisen nach der Ritterschaft*, ed. Franz Pfeiffer (Stuttgart: Literarischen Vereins, 1842), 7.
2. Historians like Joachim Bumke, C.S. Jaeger, and T.N. Bisson have studied the development of “courtly” culture – largely, if not exclusively, driven by characters other than knights (i.e. Jaeger’s court bishops). Johann Huizinga lamented the decline of chivalrous ideals in the later middle ages, and spun a compelling study of tournament culture as a play-acting cultural aesthetic and escapist dream in reaction to disillusionment with warfare. Others

including Benjamin Arnold, Jean Flori, Richard Kaueper, and Karl Leyser have depicted knighthood primarily as a social status predicated on complex practical and ritual parameters. Some historians such as Maurice Keen, John Gillingham, and Malcolm Vale have variously sought to bridge (or at least explain) the gap between perceived ideals and realities with results not necessarily altogether convincing.

3. John Gillingham, "War and Chivalry in the History of William the Marshal," *Thirteenth-Century England* 2 (1991): 1–13 (my emphasis).

4. See especially Johan Huizinga, *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, trans. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Malcolm Vale, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France, and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1981); Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Gillingham, "War and Chivalry in the History of William the Marshal."

5. On chivalry in the later Order, see William L. Urban, "The Teutonic Knights and Baltic Chivalry," *The Historian* 56, no. 3 (March 1994). I refer to Order here alternately as Teutonic Knights, the Teutonic Order, the German Order or the *Deutschorden*.

6. For example, see one knight described as a farmer: Smith and Urban, *The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle*, 9.

7. "sie wecketen manigen der dâ slief, / daz im der kopf zebrochen wart. / daz war ein ritterlichiu vart!" Franz Pfeiffer, ed., *Die livländische Reimchronik* (Stuttgart: Literarischen Vereins, 1844), lines 673-75 (italicized selection). The translation is from Smith and Urban, *Rhymed Chronicle*, 9 (my emphasis).

8. Smith and Urban, *Rhymed Chronicle*, 9n43.

9. *Ibid.*, 85n317 for date.

10. "die ritter ritterlîchen dâ / von Revele wâren îsgrâ / gewâpnet wol mit êren." Pfeiffer, *Reimchronik*, lines 8350-52. Smith and Urban, *Rhymed Chronicle*, 85.

11. "daz der herte her unde dar / mit vil maniger stolzen schar." Pfeiffer, *Reimchronik*, lines 8362-63. "die rîten ritterlîchen dan / wider ûz dem lande." *Ibid.*, lines 8371-72. Smith and Urban, *Rhymed Chronicle*, 85.

12. The classic overview of medieval warfare is Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (New York: B. Blackwell, 1984). For more recent surveys, see Helen Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare* (New York:

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Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Maurice Keen, *Medieval Warfare: a History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

13. “dô sprach ein ritter, der was vrome,” Pfeiffer, *Reimchronik*, line 5358. Smith and Urban, *Rhymed Chronicle*, 57.

14. Smith and Urban, *Rhymed Chronicle*, 58.

15. *Ibid.*, 88.

16. “ein vromer helt genante, / daz er die mülen brante, / diu lac von deme hûse ein teil.” Pfeiffer, *Reimchronik*, lines 8720-22. Smith and Urban, *Rhymed Chronicle*, 88.

17. For a discussion of how past historians have approached Ulrich’s work, see J.W. Thomas, introduction to *Ulrich von Lichtenstein’s Service of Ladies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 12-13.

18. Joachim Bumke, *Courtly Culture: Literature and Society in the High Middle Ages*; Keith Busby and Christopher Kleinhenz, eds., *Courtly Arts and the Art of Courtliness. Selected Papers from the Eleventh Triennial Congress of the International Courtly Literature Society* (Rochester, N.Y: D.S. Brewer, 2006); Roberta L Krueger, ed., *The Cambridge companion to medieval romance* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

19. Ulrich von Lichtenstein, *Ulrich von Lichtenstein’s Service of Ladies*, trans. J.W. Thomas (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 65.

20. *Ibid.*, 66.

21. *Ibid.*, 80.

22. I recognize the potentially problematic nature of the term “feudal”. I use it here in a narrow sense to refer to the lord-vassal relationship.

23. Ulrich von Lichtenstein, *Service*, 67.

24. *Ibid.*, 75.

25. Ulrich von Lichtenstein, *Service*, 76.

26. *Ibid.*, 76.

27. For a general overview of knightly brotherhoods, see Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). W.H. Jackson discusses later medieval German *Gesellschaften* as organizations dedicated to the preservation of knightly status, particularly in response to the rise of towns: “The Tournament and Chivalry in German Tournament Books of the Sixteenth Century and in the Literary Works of Emperor Maximilian I” in *Ideals and Practices of Medieval Knighthood*, ed. Christopher Harper-Bill

and Ruth Harvey (Dover, NH: The Boydell Press, 1986), 49-74. See also Benjamin Arnold, *German Knighthood, 1050-1300* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1985).

28. Ulrich von Lichtenstein, *Service*, 76.

29. Jörg von Ehingen, *The Diary of Jörg von Ehingen*, trans. Malcolm Letts, FSA (New York: Oxford University Press, 1929), 19.

30. Malcolm Letts, introduction to *Diary*, 1. The Order of the Tress was an Austrian monarchical order whose founding legend told of a lady who had cut a tress of her hair as a token of thanks for her knight's service. The knights of the eponymous Tress accordingly donned tresses of hair to indicate their membership.

31. For a short formal discussion on the manuscript, see Malcolm Letts, introduction to *Diary*, 9-10.

32. "Lieber sun, du bist stark gnuog und recht geschaffen, alles dasz zu thuon, das ainem jungen riterrmessigen man zuostaat. Ich verstand auch an deiner red, das du sollich ding gern thon und darnach stetten wilt." Jörg von Ehingen, *Des schwäbischen Ritters*, 8. Jörg von Ehingen, *Diary*, 19-20.

33. On the practical value of tournament culture, see Malcolm Vale, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France, and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1981).

34. Jörg von Ehingen, *Diary*, 31.

35. *Ibid.*, 26-27.

36. *Ibid.*, 22.

37. *Ibid.*, 24.

38. Jörg's stint in amateur espionage is perhaps as humorous as it is fascinating. Unable to gauge the size of the enemy army "to within 20,000 [men]," Jörg and his companions resorted to counting the tents on the mainland from a little boat. Relying on the apparent expertise of those "familiar with the habits of the infidels," they came up with the estimate of 10,000 tents "from which countless numbers might be estimated." Having essentially confirmed that the enemy force was pretty big, they made an informed decision to remain, "dead or alive, in the town." *Ibid.*, 33.

39. For the description of his combat activity in Ceuta: *Ibid.*, 35.

40. *Ibid.*, 38.

41. Smith and Urban, *Rhymed Chronicle*, 88.

The Soul and the Siege:

How the 900 Days Constructed Leningraders' Identities

Alexandra Macfarlane

On the evening of September 8, 1941, a blood-red cloud engulfed the sky over the city of Leningrad. As the days had gotten shorter and colder that fall, Leningraders had braved air raids and German bombs, but this night of fire was different. That night the sky was red and the air reeked of burned fat, charred sugar and smoking flour. "A white cloud started to grow," one Leningrader recalled, "it expanded quickly and other clouds piled on this one. They were all dyed amber in the setting sun. They filled up the entire sky; then the clouds turned bronze, while from below a black stripe started moving upwards. It was so unlike smoke that for a long time I could not comprehend that it was fire. They say it was the oil tanks and the Badaev warehouses burning. It was an immense spectacle of stunning beauty."¹ That night, the food stores of the Badaev Warehouses, containing the many tons of flour, sugar, meat and other essential supplies burned in a dramatic display of color, smell and anxious anticipation. For Leningraders, whose rationing had before been equal to the rest of Soviet citizens, this conflagration represented the moment when they began to starve.² The whole city knew how important Badaev was as a source for food, and they quickly began to comprehend the significance of what had transpired. They uttered declarative and heavy sentences: "Badaev has burned... It's the end—famine."³ As the largest food source stored in the city, the warehouses were a symbol for what was to come, even after official estimates deemed the losses less catastrophic than Leningraders perceived them to be.⁴ For those who suffered through the horrific 900-day siege of Leningrad, the days that the Badaev fire turned the sky over the city blood red were the source of the city's starvation – the moment when life was plunged into darkness and hunger for more than three years.

But each individual's awareness of an event is revealing: what the Leningraders believed was happening was most important to them. The days the Badaev Warehouses burned were crucial, a before and after point against which to understand the rest of their lives. The events and conditions of the siege gave Leningraders a new framework in which to examine the most basic of actions, what to eat and how to stay alive. As the citizens reevaluated the

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reasons they kept rising from bed in the mornings, basic moral values and traditions were shattered; good men stole and once devoted wives let their dead husbands bodies rot in the next room. Because the simplest aspects of life were called into question in evolving ways throughout the siege, Leningraders of any age and place could not be defined in straightforward terms of good and bad, loyal or disloyal, believing or resisting; no simple definition or set of categories can fully capture the collective experience. The Siege of Leningrad was an identity crisis, where men and women searched their souls for the will to survive 900 horrific days, a catastrophe that remade citizens through the most basic aspects of life.

The identity of the Soviet subject at large has captivated scholars since the inception of the socialist state. After the Second World War, western scholars and observers of the Soviet Union such as Carl Friedrich, Z. K. Brzezinski and F. A. Hayek conceived of two types of subjects: the western liberal subject and the Soviet subject. The liberal subject was the individual freed from bonds of government control and subversion who was allowed “autonomous spheres” in which he could discover his identity.⁵ By this logic, scholars found his natural foil in the Soviet man, “the immoral opposite of the liberal self, a subject-position logically precluded in a state-controlled, plan-driven society.”⁶ According to this argument, whether Soviet subjects agreed or disagreed, their loyalties were defined by the regime’s control. These scholars demarcated a binary, the Orwellian finite binary, “a framework that allowed his main characters but two positions in society: a complete inner break with the system or a complete identification with it.”⁷ In her paper, *The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies*, Anna Krylova argues against this binary to say that subjectivity in Stalinist Russia was directed by its own understanding.⁸ Despite the war, political turmoil and constant attempts by the state to control its subjects, individuals decided how they fit within the Soviet framework between total loyalty and resistance. Individuals in Soviet society acted as “actor” and, simultaneously, as “product”—whose reasoning abilities, self-understanding, and perceptions of the outside world are circumscribed by particular historical dynamics, often traumatic and undermining for the self.”⁹ Krylova argues that Soviet identity was realized against the backdrop of the traumatic historic framework of the USSR. Soviet citizens could be both the semi-independent actors of their circumstance and the product of the events unfolding around them. During the war, the state awarded artist, printmaker, book illustrator and Leningrad citizen Anna Petrovna Ostroumova-Lebedeva as an ‘Honored Artist of the Soviet Union.’ Her diary, however, would never have made it through the scrupulous tests of a censor. As the diary’s editors note, she “writes openly of the inequities of the food-distribution system... and the

animosity she and her friends felt toward the Jews.”¹⁰ In addition, Lebedeva was arrested in early 1942 for sketching on the streets (an artistic hobby prohibited in Leningrad during the war) and interrogated by the NKVD (the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs). Lebedeva is indicative of a woman paving her own path of self-construction, picking and choosing what to believe and where to be loyal. She is neither the liberal subject nor his rival; her words and her art show her power of decision-making outside of these pure categories. The connection between Soviet citizens, like Lebedeva, and the stressful influence of Soviet history demonstrates the importance of studying the evolution of identity in the most traumatic crises of Soviet history. Examinations of identity should allow each period of Russian and Soviet history to speak for itself.

In order to discover the most uninfluenced form of identity preserved since the end of the Siege of Leningrad, the historian must find the source where identity was recorded with the least outside influence (SYN), “before time has a chance to reshape memory or endow events with a retrospective significance.”¹¹ Beginning with the Stalinist era, the diary was a place for the Soviet subject to work out his commitment to the pieces of socialism around him, a place for the individual to discover his control over his self. The diary can be the source of preserved and relatively uninfluenced identity. Jochen Hellbeck, who examines the authorship of diaries in his book *Revolution on My Mind*, notes “the diary showed tensions and fissures that other personal narratives glossed over or repressed. For this reason diaries yield unsurpassed insights into the forms, possibilities, and limits of self-expression under Stalin.”¹² Because of this privacy and unmatched freedom in the Soviet Union’s atmosphere of pervasive control, the diary was the workshop to construct and understand the self, loyalties, connection to ideology and the ways to understand the life-wrenching events so common in the Soviet period. A diary marks out the sources of identity that exist outside of state control. In Hellbeck’s monograph, which studies the former kulak Stepan Podlubnyi, the importance and significance of the examination of diaries becomes clear. The diarist suffered both physically and emotionally through dekulakization, forced resettlement, concealed and revealed identity, and the terror. He tried to reinvent himself and position himself providently within the new regime, even as his past held him back from becoming the new man.¹³ At the same time, Podlubnyi was constantly worrying about those who could have turned him in as a former kulak. Podlubnyi tried to become the very kind of person he feared the most, the person that would turn in those most dear to them for counter-revolutionary sympathies. After reading and analyzing Podlubnyi’s diary, Hellbeck is able to understand that the former kulak personally defined freedom as removal from the Soviet boundaries. Despite the ability to discern

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the limits of his own country's system, Podlubnyi used the government as both his representation for what to become and the source for the identity he wanted to construct.¹⁴ Hellbeck's interpretation of Stepan Podlubnyi's diary demonstrates the methods for examination of diaries and the further understanding of the Soviet experience of identity that can be gained from this endeavor. Hellbeck shows why to use the diary to understand identity, why it is the laboratory of the soul.¹⁵

Diaries show the record of identity, the consciousness that evolves against the backdrop of historical events. Subjectivity does not inhabit categories of good and evil, support and resistance; rather individuals discover their subjectivity, as they understand the events around them and respond with according decisions and explanations. Identity in Leningrad followed this pattern laid out by Krylova, Hellbeck and others. For inhabitants of the Soviet Union's most western city were confronted with some of the worst conditions in history, conditions that altered the very nature of their identities. As the siege dragged on, citizens could only do what would keep them alive, what was most important. For Leningraders, food and every aspect of sustenance was critical to survival. This meant not only consumption, but how to find food, nourishment as a structure for the day, and bread as a rhetorical tool to express longing. How Leningraders expressed these aspects of food showed how they lived and how their identity lived with them. As the days added up, Leningraders found that with so little food, they needed further willpower to survive. The citizens who survived, those who finished accounts of their experiences, all describe motivation to live through both food and some *other* willpower, though this motivation was found in varying ways by different Leningraders. How to survive and how to keep living through the impossible, was the source for the identity of Leningraders throughout the siege.

In this paper, I will use diaries to explore the identity of Soviet citizens in Leningrad during the siege of Leningrad from 1941-1944. As Leningraders suffered through the 900 days, the siege gave them "a more austere sense of measure concerning suffering and human possibility."¹⁶ This paper will begin by examining the official sense of this possibility both from the Soviet-recognized mouthpiece and from an author who herself reflected many of the governments wishes. The paper will argue that though this diarist displayed these tendencies, she herself had some measure of freedom and control over what she wrote and thought. She displayed the binary-less world of identity that could exist for the Soviet individual. After examining this concept of identity without a binary in Leningrad, this paper will delve into the actual complexities of what constructed subjectivity in the siege. Each facet of identity came from the ways that Leningraders kept themselves alive

through the most horrific of circumstances. The principal method of survival was an absolute obsession with every aspect of food. Leningraders fanatically hunted for food, structured their days around food, developed routines with the nourishment that they did have and even centered all thoughts and words on the dwindling bread supply. This paper makes the argument that food was the foremost aspect of survival and therefore all facets of identity have to do with how Leningraders related to food. After examining the essentiality of bread for survival, this paper presents the idea that miniscule amounts of food that grew smaller and smaller during the course of the siege were not the only parts of survival in the siege. Leningraders also had to find the willpower to survive, a motivation to adapt to the horrible conditions they endured. This willpower, and the places in which Leningraders discovered this other piece of their survival, formed the other part of their identity throughout the siege.

IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL: HOW SURVIVING THE SIEGE CONSTRUCTED IDENTITY

Just days after Hitler and his Blitzkrieg broke the Non-Aggression Pact with the USSR, Elena Kochina the young diarist and mother noted, “the Germans draw closer to Leningrad with every hour, every minute. Waking up, we rush to our radios. Washing down the bitter pills of the news bulletins with cold leftover tea, we’re not immediately able to comprehend what is going on. And all the same we believe that sooner or later victory will admit its mistake and come our way.”¹⁷ Kochina’s diary, only recently published in the United States is an essential source for the understanding of identity in the siege as she wrote of the way her own “attitudes and relationships evolved under the impact of hunger.”¹⁸ Kochina described the fear, the anticipation, and the hope that mingled in the hearts of Leningraders in the first days of the war. She and her fellow citizens were in a city on the literal front of the war, so close that soldiers on the front lines could invite Leningraders into their camps to entertain them in exchange for the soldier’s superior rations.¹⁹ In the weeks, days and years following June 21, 1941, Leningraders became encircled and besieged, their only channel of escape across the icy Lake Lagoda, which was officially titled the “Road of Life,” but, because of its promise of frigid peril, Leningraders dubbed it the “Road of Death.”²⁰ The ensuing winter marked on of the worst periods for Leningraders. In late November of 1941, workers received only up to 375 grams of bread per day. Those with office jobs or no jobs got only 125 grams per ration, the amount of bread made from only one cup of flour. Indeed it was so cold and people so deprived of food that no epidemic diseases swept

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through the city at any point; even microbes could hardly stand such a state of icy starvation. Leningraders had so little food that “there are grounds for the assumption that the absence of mass epidemics when famine was raging may have been connected with the lack of susceptibility of the emaciated organism to infection.”²¹ This state of starvation and anxiety led to the deaths of an uncountable number of Leningraders. Just after the war, the Soviets announced, officially, that 632,253 inhabitants had died from conditions of starvation. Later estimates, both Soviet and outside the USSR put that number as high as one million or more.²² To put that number in modern comparisons, Harrison Salisbury said “more people died in the Leningrad blockade than had ever died in a modern city—anywhere—anytime: more than ten times the number who died in Hiroshima”²³. And yet, some men, women and children of Leningrad survived. If they did, they had a tale to tell at the end of the war. This setting — of complete deprivation where men and women were stripped bare, yet managed to live — reveals complexities and specifics of Soviet identity. The population was forced to find a reason to stay alive when dying could otherwise be so easy, and as they woke each day, the way that they made the decisions that kept them alive changed the very definitions of their identities.

As in any Soviet city, the government and the party controlled many aspects of the lives of Leningraders even through the wartime. During the siege, the government had an official position displaying and conveying the way the starving citizens should have related to their surroundings and conditions. It is important to understand this official position in order to see how it comes across in the diaries of Leningraders, how citizens delineate their own experience in the siege despite the attempt to control it. As Leningraders fought for their lives against physical and psychological enemies, they needed fuel to sustain mind and body. For many, a sense of pride and passion in pursuits outside of basic human necessities carried them through. Though this pride sometimes corresponded with the general pride in the USSR that party and state members tried to impress upon their citizens, Leningraders did not always either follow party lines or outright resist. The ways that Leningraders related to this official position displays a Soviet identity outside of a binary explanation. Aleksander Fadeev was a Soviet writer and champion of Stalin who penned a memoir championing the survival of Leningraders. The representations featured there display the attitude Soviet officials would have liked Leningraders to take on, the position they perpetuated. Though the memoir represents a historical source that is sometimes flawed in its retrospective nature, Fadeev’s words explain the official attitude, important to understand in a paper that attempts to find identity outside the binary of control and resistance. Fadeev wrote

that an individual in the siege should have been “a person of singular moral firmness, self-disciplined, knowing that the cause of her hardships was the savage enemy standing almost at the city’s gates, a person filled with hatred for this enemy and with an unconquerable resolve to live, to work and to fight in defiance of him and in spite of all he could accomplish.”²⁴ He expected that pride in city and country and a singular resolve of character would have sustained the individual throughout the siege. Understanding an individual who actually seems to represent this position is crucial to an understanding of the methods of survival.

Leningraders found ways to boost their personal dignity and discover a sense of purpose in their starving days, as Fadeev suggested all citizens should, though this fact cannot be understood as simple repetition of the government’s version of how to survive. Endeavors completely separate from the basic necessities, contributed to people’s sense of humanity; many Leningraders carried on with intellectual and artistic projects. The cultural and intellectual outposts of the city, “displayed extraordinary dedication to their work during the bleakest periods. This reflected their overall seriousness of purpose. Thus their devotion to culture was also a way to discipline their minds to preserve and avoid falling into a state of listless resignation.”²⁵ Finishing dissertations, dedicating time to hospitals and even composing and performing symphonies were some of the ways these Leningraders kept their minds sharp and gave their foodless days a purpose, a method of survival that Fadeev and other officials would have supported. But the truth of these pursuits and the reality behind these individuals’ endurance is expectedly more complex. Displaying a version of both the official position and her own reality, the diary of Vera Inber, a Soviet poet and writer, reflects this complexity. Published in 1971, shortly before the death of its author, *Leningrad Diary* is a moving, thoughtful and at many times official account of the 900 days. Not a Leningrader by birth, Inber went to the city with her doctor husband at the outset of war. While there, she wrote many poems and stories dedicated to the city and kept her diary that reflects many of the mantras also perpetuated by Fadeev. In her diary, she claims that her poems and publications kept her mind sharp and preoccupied. On 20th of January in 1942, she explained that her poem and the upkeep of her house kept her from regular time spent recording in her diary. She notes that “Never have I worked with passion. Even at night, lying down, I cannot stop.”²⁶ With no fuel for energy, this woman found her drive to live in a passion for writing, a passion that took over her waking hours. She was a woman in a foodless city that offered no hope of survival, driven to survive by the love of her art. Later, on July 10, 1942 – her birthday, Inber declared that except for the death of her young grandson who lived outside of Leningrad, she was been

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completely happy this year with her work; writing was the constant battle that made her life good.²⁷

Vera Inber was not the only Leningrader using higher intellectual and cultural pursuits to occupy her time and keep her mind sharp as her body deteriorated. Her husband worked at the hospital and she constantly mentioned her communication with other writers and artists. On April 18 in 1942, Inber went to the hospital and noticed students preparing for final exams. Not only did they study though they had had no real food or way to bathe themselves for months, but Inber described the stellar grades they received on their exams.²⁸ These students huddled together in full winter clothes as they read their studies aloud and memorized their lessons. Eventually, in November of that year, the same students graduated in a large celebration that Inber and her husband attended.²⁹ In a laboratory in the Institute where she worked, Inber described a project in progress, where scientists extracted linseed oil to help feed workers.³⁰ All of the Leningraders described by Inber worked and kept their minds busy like Inber, allowing intellectual and artistic pursuits to carry them through. Like Fadeev suggests, “the greatest feat of the school population in Leningrad was that they continued to study. Yes, they went on with their studies, in spite of everything.”³¹ These students used their studies as a will to live; graduation was the goal, not just eating enough bread each day. In some ways, these Leningraders threw themselves into their passions because they were hungry and needed another reason to keep moving, even to get out of bed in the morning.

In her diary, Vera Inber rarely mentioned the decrease in rations. We cannot tell if this means that she does not think of her dwindling food supply. We can discern, however, that she was worried for the health and weight of her husband and by that we can understand that her rations were most likely equally as small.³² Despite the worst winter of Leningrad and the concern for her family, Inber did not hate her position or complain for what she lacked. Instead she recognized that her work and her personal battle were the key to her life. Inber’s battle with survival prompted her to discover artistic and literary endeavors that could sustain her mind while her body suffered. At one moment in the midst of the first winter of the siege, Inber wrote that there was still no bread, so she substituted for the want with an intellectual and written pursuit. In this instance, she is acknowledging what she lacks and the drastic loss of even the smallest ration of bread. She wrote “for the first time I cried from grief and fury: inadvertently I overturned the saucepan of porridge on the stove... there is still no bread. But to make up I wrote three very good stanzas and the end of the chapter.”³³ Inber is also acknowledging that staying alive meant distracting her mind with higher

thoughts. Inber did live to tell her story and see her diary read.

NOURISHMENT AND ENDURANCE: THE SIEGE AND THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF SURVIVAL

This positive and constructive outlook is ideal, carrying Inber through her harrowing days. But it is not without some mention of what she lacks. The motivation to write and compose is the outlook championed by Fadeev explains that a true Leningrader, the citizen to admire, is the individual who recognizes that work and the ultimate desire to live are the best methods of survival. But her complaint and description of her anger at losing food is not exactly something the official version would convey, a moment where loss was more encompassing than the effort to overcome it. Fadeev touts the official position, explaining the highest moral reason for survival according to the government. Inber reflects this moral conviction for continued living when she claims her art is her reason for living; her words reveal a certain loyalty to her leaders as she lives by the methods they suggest to her, even as she records her own frustrations and trials as food supplies run lower and lower. Inber's personal struggle was part of a larger scheme for her, where hardships made a better worker and, in her case, writer.

Vera Inber's diary displayed a version of the official ideal of a starving Leningrader, working hard despite the hunger and discovering the productive activity that most contributes to both her life. It also displays the realities of those who saw value in the official position; Inber records the days she struggles with no food and anger she feels when she loses it. Passion was the most important source for sustenance when food was scarce, but this source this zeal as the most important source for survival was not universal for all Leningraders. Not every citizen found value in Fadeev's suggested sources. Many discovered that the most important aspect to their survival was not self-discipline and intellectual pursuits, as Fadeev suggested. For many citizens, food and every aspect of its relationship to their wellbeing was the most essential source of energy for each day. The hope of finding food could get them out of their homes, into the freezing cold and under enemy fire. One diarist explains this essential nature in stark and simple words. Elena Skrjabina, the wife of a Leningrad engineer, mother of two young boys and student of French literature wrote as early as September 20, 1941, that "this question of nourishment is the most important... everyone is occupied with only one thought; where to get something edible so as not to starve to death."³⁴ Skrjabina kept a diary before and throughout the siege, and her account of the war while in the city of Leningrad was published alongside her other works of prose and fiction after she moved to the United States

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in 1950. For Skrjabina and many other Leningraders, nourishment was the most crucial aspect to each day and the most fundamental source of motivation. This does not mean that she found no other source for survival, nor that Skrjabina and Inber's accounts offer opposing ends of a binary, merely that for most Leningraders not under the official position of the government, food was the essential source for survival. This rest of this section will address how food was the most basic form of endurance through the siege for most Leningraders and how survival and identity revolved around sustenance.

For Leningraders, every aspect of food was part of their survival. Food, a fanatical search for it, an obsessive structuring of the day around it, rituals for consuming it, and endless rhetoric and dialogue about it gave some Leningraders the purpose to stay alive. Every aspect of their sustenance sustained Leningraders. Skrjabina wrote of long days moving from one bread line to the next. Many spent most waking hours in bread lines, rose early in the morning just to have the most favorable positions in the queue. Skrjabina found her son a job as a courier, providing him with an extra meager bowl of soup once a day, even though the work took extreme amounts of energy and sent him from one end of the city to the other throughout the day.³⁵ Almost each day Skrjabina recorded her thoughts in her diary, she spoke of trades she made with peasants and merchants, the luxuries like wine, furs, jewelry, furniture and even shoes, that she and other Leningraders gave in exchange for just some bread or a little oil to cook with.³⁶ Skrjabina noted the health and food status of each of her neighbors and documented her son's descent into complete apathy, one of the many stages of a dystrophic. For this woman, her life and the lives she witnessed were all about food. For Leningraders, food was the principal component of survival. Skrjabina's position, in contrast to Inber's, opens a window to scholars on the many ways a Leningrader stayed alive when chances of survival were impossibly slim.

For many during the 900 days of starvation, an obsession with food was the only way to remain motivated to live. As Kirschenbaum notes in her book, detailing the mythological nature of the city's survival, throughout the progression of both the winter and the siege, "Leningraders became more and more isolated from one another and from their prewar, pre-famine selves. They became fixated on food – finding it, preparing it, eating it, documenting it, dreaming of it. Diaries written during starvation winter speak eloquently and clearly of this narrowed field of concern."³⁷ Each aspect of food captivated the pages of diaries and as Kirschenbaum suggests diaries that do not contain obsessive accounts of all aspects of food were probably rewritten after the war from notes kept during the siege.³⁸ By

contrast, some Leningraders, as they moved farther and farther into the depths of starvation, detailed days spent only in a fanatic pursuit of food. Kirschbaum's analysis of this obsession remained true for many diary accounts. In late November of the first winter of the siege, Elena Kochina wrote about a day when she returned home with an exceptionally small portion of bread from her ration card. Her husband, in a fit of starving passion, found a neighbor's scales and discovered that this portion was more than three ounces short of the normal ration. Kochina hurried back to the distributor to get her full portion.³⁹ Both Kochina and her husband had little strength, but at the possibility of less food than usual, they both expended a great deal of energy to get their allotted amount. They were obsessed with getting the right amount, driven to fanatics by hunger. Food was the only thing to think about each day and when the already miniscule amount of food might be any smaller than usual, it was essential to the rest of the day that Kochina and her husband be allowed their whole daily ration. This was not just the usual look for food in hard times but a more fanatical search for food. An obsessive focus on the pursuit of food was the only reason to stay alive for some Leningraders, like Kochina and her husband.

Leningraders often had obsessive rituals for consuming their bread ration. These routines allowed Leningraders to structure the day around food, when they ate it and how they ate it. Many diaries describe some citizens who would eat their bread greedily the moment they received it, and others who would eat slowly and methodically to make the food last the whole day. As the rations sunk to lower and lower amounts, Elena Skrjabina wrote about differences in bread consumption. Rations for those who didn't work, like Skrjabina, were just 125 grams, only enough to make a sandwich. The amount had to be divided equally throughout the family. "Everyone wants to use his own portion in his own way. For instance, my mother tries to stretch her piece into three meals. I eat my entire portion right away in the morning with the coffee so that I might have at least enough strength to stand in line or perhaps to make some sort of trade."⁴⁰ Her family took their food more seriously than anything else, using the chance to eat it as a structure for the day, deciding how much energy could be used at any time. Skrjabina explained her choice to eat quickly as a chance to have a burst of energy but at the loss of strength later in the day. Food determined how much a person could accomplish in any given day, and Leningraders manipulated the symbiotic relationship between food and energy in every way possible. The smallest new addition to the daily calorie intake was cause for a new framework of the day. In early November of the first winter of the siege, Skrjabina and her neighbors received some butter from a cooperative. She called the spread "unbelievable" and explained "we are torn by the wish to

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eat it all at once and the realization that we must stretch it out somehow.”⁴¹ With a new food source came a new structure for the day and the realization that a new source of energy only renewed the need to consume strategically.

These differing choices on consumption could cause tense moments, even among those who took similar approaches. Elena Kochina described a tense moment with her hungry husband where she still had a few bites left and he was already finished. Dima, her once devoted partner who used to force his ration upon wife and child, now looked on with hatred as Kochina enjoyed her last bites of bread.⁴² Still other Leningraders held out from eating rations until the end of the day, looking forward to their few precious ounces until the last moments of daytime had passed. In this way, Leningraders used food as the most important marker for each part of the day; food decided when they could work, how long they could be awake and even how they would act as others around them ate. Food was the primary framework for the day for citizens throughout the siege.

But it was not just energy expended to get a full bread ration that displays an obsession with food. Leningraders could literally talk and think of nothing else. In a way, Leningraders developed an almost rhetorical relationship with food in the way the spoke and wrote about it. Anna Ivanovna Likhacheva worked as a doctor in the clinic of the Red Banner factory. Her diary was published in Russian in 1968 as part of collections of memoirs and diaries of those who lived through the siege. Anna was assigned with the task of studying the workers sent to the factory’s cafeteria for supplemental food. Her diary is full of accounts of food, not only because it was the subject of her study, but also because she lost her young son and husband in the early winter months of the first year of the Blockade. Drawing on her experiences both scientific and personal she noted on May 16 1942, “excruciating hunger forces a person to think and talk about one thing—about food... Wherever two or three people meet, at work, at the office in line, the talk is only of food. What are they giving on the ration cards, how much, what is available, etc.—it is life’s most vital question.”⁴³ Here, Likhacheva explicitly explained that food was the measure of each day, subject of all talk and the object of all thought. Unlike the motivations that drive Inber’s purpose for life, food was the primary incentive for action and the principal focus of thought in the blockade for many, as Likhacheva described. Even Inber, the supposed bastion of the official experience took a moment, one morning in the first winter and lamented “our position is catastrophic... there is no water, and if the bakery stops even for a single day what happens?”⁴⁴ The question of food concerned all, even if it was not the motivation to survive for each Leningrader. For some, bread was the only thing that could make them happy. Kochina called bread “the measure

of everything”, the good that was exchanged for as high as 800 rubles for a mere two pounds. On the second day in January of 1942, deep in the middle of Leningrad’s worst wartime winter, Kochina used a lyrical description for her bread, suggesting that Leningraders wanted nothing else the way they wanted bread. For her and for Leningraders “life itself is contained in it. The Russian peasant understood this. That is why he called it ‘dear bread.’ We have only now realized the meaning of ‘dear bread.’ It sounds like music to us now.”⁴⁵ Not only actions, but also thoughts and words themselves showed an obsession with bread in the collective minds of Leningraders. Even a higher relationship, a more rhetorical relationship developed with the nourishment. For some, the thought and prospect of one small morsel of bread was the most essential motivation to rise from bed in the morning, to stay active and stave off death. For some Leningraders, food was the primary impetus to survival, the aspect of life around which every moment of the day revolved. Food got them out of bed, helped them work, drove familial and communal relationships and was a framework for each day.

In this way, food can show the variance of many methods of survival. Though many saw nourishment as their purpose, not all pursued it in the same way. In fact, even those who seemed to show the official position, such as Vera Inber, demonstrated that for many, food displayed a person’s primary mode of survival. The formation of character centered on food during the Siege of Leningrad. But this is not to suggest that a fanatic focus on sustenance can serve as the basis of understanding every Leningrader’s identity. Rather, the search for nourishment actually displayed the range of methods of identity; no two people understood their purpose to survive in the same way. The range of emotions and reactions to starvation displayed in the diaries of the sufferers reflect this range and the lack of categorical understanding of the survival of Leningraders. The doctors of Leningrad, who saw first hand the effects of starvation on a person’s subjectivity, reported that complete lack of food brought out the worst in people, demolishing their sense of morals. Often, those who starved did not bathe and relieved themselves in the streets. But despite this:

Alongside this ‘moral decline,’ they also documented an unspecified, but apparently not inconsequential, number of cases of starving people who retained ‘genuinely human traits of steadfast self-sacrifice.’ The doctors’ reported an ability to ‘maintain personality,’ to preserve ‘human traits’ in the face of the ‘wolfish hunger’... the doctors ended their discussion of the psychological effects of starvation with the finding that in at least some cases, humanity triumphed.⁴⁶

As the doctors explain, the effects of starvation showed a different side of each sufferer. Survivors, as understood from their diaries, cannot be

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categorized into a binary of those who stated an official position and those who lamented and described their suffering. As Krylova explains, no set of categories properly explains the experience of suffering. However, some kinds of trends existed from citizen to citizen. Starvation and food affected each Leningrader separately. Skrjabina suggests that the question of nourishment was the primary concern of Leningraders. While those who starved each felt extreme anxiety for the source of their next meal, they each answered that question in their own, unique way.

HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE SIEGE: FINDING THE WILL POWER TO SURVIVE

As Elena Skrjabina suggests, the “question of nourishment” was the foremost question in the minds of Leningraders, the answer to which revealed the identity and the modes of definition for citizens of the besieged city. Though this question of daily sustenance was the most important question and the most important element in keeping Leningraders alive, the answer to this question was not the only element of survival. It was not just food that kept Leningraders alive for the 900 horrific days. Skrjabina noted in early November “now people die so simply. At first the person loses all interest in everything: he goes to bed and never gets up again.”⁴⁷ It was not enough for people to leave bed in the morning, eat what could be found and then sleep; a focus on food alone could not bring survival. Indeed, “in the face of such devastation, Leningraders developed strategies not only for surviving but also for retaining their sense of themselves, their human identity.”⁴⁸ Each Leningrader who survived the siege found the other important facets of their purpose for life, the tool to staving off apathy that would come easily in the first stage of starvation. The specific identity of each person is revealed by not simply their relationship with their sustenance but also by what else sustained them, the aspects of life beyond food that gave them purpose. Lack of food and emotional capacities were innately connected; indeed, “nutritional dystrophy developed against a background of preceding mental and emotional stress.”⁴⁹ Because starvation and mental stress were so interconnected, in order to survive one, Leningraders needed to adapt to both elements. In her essay about the relationship between the physical and mental trauma of the siege, Svetlana Magaeva discovers that willpower creates the lasting purpose to carry on and allows the victim of famine and siege to survive through otherwise fatal physical and mental traumas. Indeed, willpower provided the necessary adaptation that allowed for the possibility of survival. This “follows from the very fact of continued existence even in the worst period of starvation and attack from the air.

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The survival of several hundred thousand victims of the siege is convincing proof. Life cannot persist under conditions of starvation unless there is quite pronounced adaptation.”⁵⁰ Leningraders had to have methods of willpower to survive, the other important and varied piece of continued existence in Leningrad. Using Magaeva’s conclusion that willpower, the motivation to stay alive, formed the other essential piece to survival during the siege of Leningrad, the rest of this paper will explore the many varied methods in which Leningraders found the willpower to continue living. How citizens found the purpose to stay alive beyond their relationship with nourishment showed the individuality of their subjectivity and formed the basis of their identity.

On September 1, 1942, Dmitri Shostakovich spoke to the city of Leningrad in a radio announcement. The famous composer with his own complicated relationship to the regime declared that despite the dangers of war that were growing closer and closer to the city by each day, he had finished the first two sections of his symphony. In the broadcast, he declared, “I tell you this so that those Leningraders who are now listening to me shall know that the life of our city is going on normally. All of us now carry our military burdens.”⁵¹ This symphony was eventually dedicated to the city that Shostakovich refused to leave until his composition was finished. Like Shostakovich, many Leningraders remained in the city because they felt a sense of duty to their hometown, a pride in the defense of the places they had lived for years. The attitude of Shostakovich also underscored the pride in survival that many Leningraders felt throughout the siege, a dignity that could help combat apathy and disillusionment. One of the most shocking elements of the lives of those who lived in Leningrad through the siege was that many had stayed when they could have left. The poet Anna Akhmatova, who was often censored by the Stalinist regime, claimed that “All my life is connected with Leningrad... in Leningrad I became a poet. Leningrad gave my poetry its spirit. I, like all of you know, live with one unconquerable belief—that Leningrad will never be Fascist.”⁵² For Akhmatova, a defense of the city was her defense of self; her city gave her the will power to survive.

Some Leningraders remained in the city because they felt a sense of pride in their hometown, an emotion that stirred them to stay and defend. Leningraders had pride in their city; they stayed there, worked there, kept up families and personal relationships there. Vera Inber felt this pride and motivation to defend most sharply when she ventured to Moscow several times during the course of the blockade. The poet and writer recalled from Moscow in the late spring of 1942, “only when I am here can I feel how dear Leningrad is to me, how close. I want to be there, to share my fate with it, to give it all my strength.”⁵³ For Inber, Leningrad and its survival are a

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source of pride and her purpose to stay alive is to see the future of the city. Throughout her diary, she referenced the state of the city; as winter descends and as spring warms the streets, Inber noted that she wanted to live so that she can tell the story of Leningrad and use her talents for the story of the city. She constantly questioned her work, making sure that it made some impact on the city itself, and in her final words recorded, she claimed that nothing could ever efface the memory of Leningrad for the survivors.⁵⁴ In this way, though Inber displays the qualities prized by the officials of the city and of the nation, she also writes of the other important piece of survival, the pursuit of something higher than the basic need for food. Her diary is an important account of the intellectuals and artists who survived the siege and represents many of them. For Inber, Akhmatova, Shostakovich and many other artists and culturally minded Leningraders, this pride in the survival of the city provided a motivation to survive, this willpower being the second important piece in the method of living through the siege.

But this pride in the city as a means for survival felt by Inber and others was by no means universal. Just like Leningraders' relationships to food, though the topic of willpower and the motivation to live was a question on the minds of many, and the answers ranged widely. In many ways, like other entries in Inber's diary, this pride seems to follow the dictates of the party line. In early spring of 1942, Inber visited the dugout of the divisional commander and heard the following toast (just after a toast for Stalin himself): "to live or not isn't the question. Our life belongs to Leningrad."⁵⁵ Inber's representation exhibits just one of the many ways Leningraders found motivation to stay alive. Though not all could find the will to live in a defense and protection of their city, some Leningraders found their purpose of life in maintaining some facets of normalcy. Even as friends and neighbors died around them, daily life persisted in the lives of some. For the young Evgeniia Vadimovna Shavrova, this maintenance is displayed in a letter to her father written by both her and her mother. She said in the early summer of 1942, "we are for now alive and healthy. I go to school every other day and we have three classes a day. In my spare time I embroider and go around to the stores... we have air-raid alarms here, and when they happen, we go out into our front hall."⁵⁶ For the young Evgeniia, normalcy persisted to the extent it could under the siege, and she worked hard to ensure that it did. Air raids were just as commonplace as going to school and yet she called her life "monotonous". Further the letter, her mother revealed that things were not as regular as the girl portrayed them, indeed the year they have been besieged had made them all much older. Evgeniia was eleven kilos lighter than her pre-war self and spent three weeks in the hospital for extra nourishment.⁵⁷ Though all was not well, Evgeniia wrote as though it was, trying to hold

on to her own dignity. She constantly reported on her quality of life in her diary, but recorded positive moments. In early 1943, she noted, “It has somehow become a little more enjoyable to live and study.”⁵⁸ Keeping up with the actions of regular life was one way to sustain her life through extreme physical and emotional stress. Will power to live and adapt to the harshest conditions could be discovered by those who kept up the actions of a normal life, incorporating stresses such as starvation and air raids into their daily routine.

Maintaining some aspects of normal routines was not just practiced by young schoolgirls. Elena Skrjabina, who lived in a communal apartment with four other families during her time in Leningrad talks of the nights when each housewife took to the kitchen simultaneously to prepare meals for their families. She described a typical scene in December of 1941: “our kitchen is the scene of something unbelievable. Four housewives try to prepare their meals on one stove. They boil oil cakes, baking pancakes from them, heat soup brought from the mess hall, argue, groan and complain.”⁵⁹ These housewives tried to perpetuate the chores of the gender roles, continuing the role of mother and cook even as there is barely enough food for them and their families. For these women, cooking and arguing like they would before the war was a way to find routine in the day and assume positions that they probably knew well. Again, food was the structure for the day, but other elements helped to make up a framework for the waking hours. Routine was a method of adaption where normalcy could give them something to do with different hours of the day and a reason to rise from the apathy the came with no motivation.

Leningraders did not just focus on thier own lives to aid thier adaptation to the extreme conditions of the siege; for many citizens, focusing on the importance of other people’s lives was a motivation to keep the individual alive. Family and keeping loved ones together gave many Leningraders the willpower to endure through the seemingly impossible conditions of the siege. The mother of Evgeniia Shavrova displayed this specific kind of motivation in the excerpt of the letter she wrote herself. She told her husband of her idea to keep their child alive, “to send Zhenia by herself to you to get fattened up, just for a while, and I could stay here and somehow fight for my life and nothing more.”⁶⁰ This Leningrad mother cared only for the health of her daughter and not her own safety and accepted the danger of Leningrad in order to keep her child alive. She willed her life to continue with the motivation to keep her own daughter alive in any way possible. Conversely, for Elena Skrjabina, the thought of sending her child into the unknown, away from her, was unthinkable, and it kept her up at night. Her husband also worried for his son and brought home his meager

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rations to feed their youngest child.⁶¹ Situations between the two mothers were different; one mother had a safe place to send her child, and the other mother could only offer her own care in a dangerous city, but both mothers wanted to do the best for their children to keep them alive. The lives of the children kept some mothers motivated to sustain their own lives. Skrjabina wrote, “Will we survive? My only wish is not to lose the children. I don’t want to see them die.”⁶² The lives of some mothers of Leningrad were given in the service to their children, their reason to stay alive, when food alone could not prolong their endurance.

Many parents worried for their children, but not all families could remain so united. Though Elena Kochina worried fiercely for her daughter throughout the course of the siege, her husband could not sustain this worry as a source for motivation.⁶³ Elena’s husband, Dima, began the siege as many other concerned parents and spouses; again, he forced his rations upon others and gave his small lunch from work to Kochina and their daughter Lena. But as Kochina noted, this insistence and self-sacrificing nature could not last; “he can’t hold out long this way, and I have less milk every day anyway.”⁶⁴ A few months later, as the worst winter of the siege raged on, Kochina was able to get an extra ration for her starving child, but when she sent Dima to exchange the ration card for bread, he returned empty handed, having eaten two days worth of bread rations himself.⁶⁵ Not only was Dima unwilling to save bread for his wife and daughter when his extreme hunger set in, but he was jealous of his wife’s extra emotions, which were directed towards their child and not him. Kochina wrote “he never approaches her anymore now himself. He probably thinks I’m reproaching him for that... But to me it seems stupid to waste energy on discussing our relationship. I need that energy to take care of Lena, and of him as well as far as that’s concerned.”⁶⁶ Though Kochina still used her child and family and the care of them as a reason to stay alive, her husband was not so motivated. For him, hunger was all-encompassing, and after many entries by Kochina we learn that Dima stayed alive by stealing her food and others’, as well as her own efforts. Though Dima could not find his own motivation in his family and his child, his selfish concerns helped to keep him alive and the efforts of his wife were his ultimate savior. In this way, mother and father found will power in separate parts of their lives. Neither Dima nor Kochina reflected the same position as Inber or Fadeev, but their family itself displays the varying modes of survival outside of a binary experience of the siege.

The poet Pushkin wrote, “fortune’s harsh blows and long denials/steeled Russia. The heavy hammer thus/Shapes iron while it shatters glass.”⁶⁷ He was then cited by the artist Liubov’ Vasil’evna Sharporina, his words being a symbol for her that her endurance through the horrific conditions of the siege

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would make her city and her country stronger. For artists and intellectuals like Sharporina, Inber, Shostakovich and others, their nature was to live for a larger cause and to dedicate their survival to the city itself. Culturally-minded Leningraders viewed their identity as part of the larger collective identity of Leningrad itself. Their lives was forfeited to the whole of the city, and in this loss, they gained their own survival. But this willingness to live for the city was not a universal motivation. Leningraders each had to find their individual impetus to survive; the common citizen searched within himself to discover his greatest will power, the adaptation that would deliver him from the blockade. Each human body was affected by hunger, but the manner in which the soul coped with tragedy was unique to each individual. Examining this specific adaptation reveals the unique identity of each Leningrader, the identity that was shaped by the conditions and decisions made in the most trying of circumstances.

ENDNOTES

1. Simmons and Perlina, *Writing the Siege of Leningrad* in the diary of Liubov Vasil'evna Shaporina (25).
2. Many diarists present this perception in entries after the fact. Only two days after the last of the warehouses were bombed, Elena Skrjabina said the "destruction threatens Leningrad with inevitable starvation" (Skrjabina 27). Later in the first and worst winter of the Siege, Vera Inber saw the stores burned in the bombings and fires "necessary to maintain life" (Inber 34).
3. Salisbury, Harrison E. *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad*. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. (292 - Chapter entitled *The Blood-Red Clouds*).
4. Kochina, Elena trans. Samuel C. Ramer. *Blockade Diary*. Ann Arbor: Ardis, (in footnote 8), Salisbury, *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad*, (291/295).
5. Anna Krylova, "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 1, no. 1 (2000): 119-146 (5)
6. Krylova, "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies" (6)
7. Krylova, "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies" (12).
8. Krylova, "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies" (27).
9. Krylova, "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies" (28).
10. Cynthia Simmons, and Nina Perlina, *Writing the Siege of Leningrad*:

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Women's Diaries, Memoirs, and Documentary Prose., (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), (26). Simmons et al. explain that anti-Semitism was never officially condemned but Soviets were expected to live with tolerance towards each other. In this way, Petrovna is using her own interpretation to judge a Soviet policy rather than judge it blindly; furthering her own self discovered identity.

11. Kochina *Blockade Diary*, in the Foreword by Samuel C. Ramer (8)

12. Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution On My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin* (8).

13. Hellbeck, Jochen. *Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931-1939)*. (362-363)

14. Hellbeck, Jochen. *Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931-1939)*. (353).

15. Hellbeck reaches an interesting conclusion about the identity of Stepan Podlubnyi, that the government, in some ways, controls his actions, though not explicitly. It is important to understand that this does not show the death of the liberal subject or that Podlubnyi is the enemy of the Western liberal man, rather that his experience is a unique moment of identity in the greater spectrum of identity construction.

16. Kochina, *Blockade Diary*, (22-23)

17. Kochina, *Blockade Diary*, (35).

18. Kochina *Blockade Diary*, in the Foreword by Samuel C. Ramer (9).

19. Simmons et al., *Writing the Siege of Leningrad* (Foreward xxi). Page 62 and 63 show a menu of soldier's rations that were provided for entertainers as recorded in the diary of Tamara Petrovna Nekliudova on December 12, 1941.

20. Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, (59).

21. Magaeva, Svetlana ed. John Barber, and ed. Andrei Dzeniskevich. *Prerequisites for Survival and Recovery (in Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad 1941-1944)*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, (124), Pavlov, Dmitri V and trans. John Clinton Adams. *Leningrad 1941, The Blockade*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. (125).

22. Kochina *Blockade Diary*, in the Foreword by Samuel C. Ramer (8), Pavlov, Dmitri V et al. *Leningrad 1941, The Blockade*, (125).

23. Salisbury, *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad*, (513).

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24. Fadeev, Aleksandr and trans. R. D. Charques. *Leningrad in the Days of the Blockade*. London: Hutchinson and Company Limited, (35).
25. Simmons et al., *Writing the Siege of Leningrad* (Foreward xxi).
26. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (52).
27. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (95).
28. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (81-82).
29. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (115).
30. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (88).
31. Fadeev, Aleksandr, *Leningrad in the Days of the Blockade*, (47).
32. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (78).
33. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (54).
34. Skrjabina, Elena, trans. Norman Luxenburg. *Siege and Survival: The Odyssey of a Leningrader*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971. (28)
35. Skrjabina, *Siege and Survival* (40-41).
36. Skrjabina, *Siege and Survival* (31).
37. Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments*. (59)
38. Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments*. (59)
39. Kochina, *Blockade Diary* (47).
40. Skrjabina, *Siege and Survival* (30).
41. Skrjabina, *Siege and Survival* (35).
42. Kochina, *Blockade Diary* (44, 55).
43. Simmons et al., *Writing the Siege of Leningrad* (59-60).
44. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (53).
45. Kochina, *Blockade Diary* (67-68): in a footnote, translator Samuel C. Ramer notes that *Khlebushka* is a form of endearment for the word bread that has no real English equivalent; 'dear bread' is his form of translation that does not fully explain the Russian expression.
46. Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments*. (67).

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47. Skrjabina, *Siege and Survival* (37).
48. Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments*. (63)
49. Magaeva, Svetlana, *Prerequisites for Survival and Recovery (in Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad 1941-1944)* (126).
50. Magaeva, Svetlana, *Prerequisites for Survival and Recovery (in Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad 1941-1944)* (126).
51. Salisbury, *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad*, (283-284).
52. Salisbury, *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad*, (285),
53. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (85).
54. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (140, 175, 207).
55. Vera Inber, *Leningrad Diary* (70).
56. Simmons et al., *Writing the Siege of Leningrad* (40-42).
57. Simmons et al., *Writing the Siege of Leningrad* (41, 42).
58. Simmons et al., *Writing the Siege of Leningrad* (44)
59. Skrjabina, *Siege and Survival* (46).
60. Simmons et al., *Writing the Siege of Leningrad* (42).
61. Skrjabina, *Siege and Survival* (7-8, 32).
62. Skrjabina, *Siege and Survival* (33), the diarist reiterates this idea again when she escapes the city and lives as a refugee for several months. In the spring of 1942 while on the train, an acquaintance warns Elena not to let the children out of her sight lest they be killed in front of her. It was not just the mothers, but many other adults who lived through the horrors of the war who wanted to see the children live.
63. Kochina, *Blockade Diary* (7), here Kochina displays the level of concern and work for her daughter that she maintained throughout the course of the siege.
64. Kochina, *Blockade Diary* (44).
65. Kochina, *Blockade Diary* (72-73).
66. Kochina, *Blockade Diary* (71).
67. A phrase from Pushkin's Poltava cited by Liubov' Vasil'evna Sharporina in her diary that symbolize Russia's resilience and transformation through hardship.

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