

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JESSE FRIEDMAN, :  
                   Plaintiff, : CV 06 3136  
                   -against- : U. S. Courthouse  
 REHAL, : Central Islip, N.Y.  
                                   : TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION  
                   Defendant.

----- X      October 3, 2007  
                                   2:05 p.m.

BEFORE:

HONORABLE JOANNA SEYBERT, U. S. D. J.

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: RONALD L. KUBY, ESQ.  
                                   DAVID PRESSMAN, ESQ.  
                                   118 West 23rd Street  
                                   New York, New York 10011

For the Defendant: OFFICE OF NASSAU COUNTY  
                                   DISTRICT ATTORNEY  
                                   262 Old Country Road  
                                   Mineola, New York 11501  
                                   BY: JUDITH STERNBERG, ESQ.

Court Reporter: HARRY RAPAPORT, CSR  
                                   United States District Court  
                                   100 Federal Plaza  
                                   Central Islip, New York 11722  
                                   (631) 712-6105

Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography.  
 Transcript produced by computer-assisted transcription.

1 THE CLERK: For oral argument, hearing, Friedman  
2 verse Rehal.

3 Please state your appearances for the record.

4 MR. KUBY: Ronald Kuby, 119 West 23rd Street,  
5 New York, New York.

6 MR. PRESSMAN: David Pressman, from the office  
7 of Ronald L. Kuby.

8 Good afternoon, Judge.

9 THE COURT: Good afternoon.

10 MS. STERNBERG: Judith Sternberg from the Nassau  
11 count DA's office, representing the defendants.

12 THE COURT: So I can hear all counsel, I would  
13 suggest you come up. And the oral argument can be cleared  
14 up quickly. And I'm attempting to ascertain as to whether  
15 obtaining knowledge of the alleged hypnotizing of the  
16 victims was known, or could have been known to the  
17 petitioner.

18 So, it is a very small item. It is not on the  
19 merits. And I think that we can proceed on that basis.

20 I do note that in my earlier memorandum and  
21 order, that unfortunately in the first paragraph I  
22 indicated petitioner's third claim, however, based upon  
23 failure to disclose the use of hypnosis on at least one  
24 accuser is timely. It should have read: Is possibly  
25 timely.

1           That's what I'm here to decide. And I will hear  
2 any additional arguments after we make that determination.

3           MS. STERNBERG: Did you want us to approach?

4           THE COURT: I don't think it is necessary,  
5 unless Harry indicates that it is hard to hear.

6           This is one of the world's worst courtrooms for  
7 acoustics. The sounds bounce off the panelling, and  
8 that's why we have the rather hideous panels here to  
9 absorb some of the sounds.

10           So, if you can't hear me, or I can't hear you,  
11 let me know.

12           Now, can you hear me now that I'm on the  
13 microphone?

14           MR. KUBY: Beautiful.

15           THE COURT: You heard what I said earlier?

16           MR. KUBY: Yes.

17           THE COURT: That we are here for a very limited  
18 purpose, which is to make a determination as to whether or  
19 not the petitioner knew or could have known the claims  
20 that one or more of the accusers was hypnotized.

21           MR. KUBY: Would you like me to proceed first or  
22 the People to proceed first? It is a little sua generics  
23 that we are doing.

24           THE COURT: I assume the State should go first  
25 at this point in time.

1 I have received the latest communication from  
2 the state. And I'm not too sure what vehicle you are  
3 attempting to use in terms of the Court's decision.

4 MS. STERNBERG: I'm sorry, Judge?

5 THE COURT: Why don't you go first and tell me  
6 why it is that I should find that the petitioner knew or  
7 could have known about the videotaping of the accusers --  
8 not the videotaping, rather, the hypnosis.

9 MS. STERNBERG: Your Honor, the plea in this  
10 case took place in 1988, and in January of 2003 the  
11 petitioner acknowledges, and the Court found in its  
12 previous decision, that he saw the movie, and in that  
13 movie there was an allegation by one of the complainants,  
14 that he had been hypnotized.

15 On that date the defendant knew the faces of the  
16 claimants. That's clearly the basis of the claim in his  
17 petition.

18 THE COURT: And the video we are talking about  
19 is Capturing the Friedmans?

20 MS. STERNBERG: Yes.

21 THE COURT: And that was the documentary that  
22 was produced I guess in 2002, or something like that?

23 MS. STERNBERG: I don't know what year it was  
24 produced.

25 I know that the petitioner claims he saw the

1 movie on January 10th, 2003, and the People have no reason  
2 to dispute that date.

3 Obviously, on that date he knew this allegation  
4 of hypnosis. And, therefore, on that date, the one year  
5 statute of limitations as prescribed began to run.

6 362 days later he filed his post-judgment motion  
7 in the state court, thereby tolling the one year statute.

8 He had then three days left within which he  
9 could file his petition.

10 The Appellate Division denied him permission to  
11 appeal from the denial of the post judgment motion on  
12 March 10th, 2006. His three days ran on March 13th.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Straightforward in your mind.

14 MS. STERNBERG: I would like to also address  
15 that I believe it is the petitioner's position that he did  
16 not have the factual basis of this claim when he saw the  
17 movie; he did not have the factual basis of this claim  
18 until the producer of the movie chose to give him the  
19 identity of the young man who said in the movie that he  
20 had been hypnotized.

21 The law is very clear, and your Honor discussed  
22 it in her earlier decision, that your time is -- your time  
23 doesn't begin to run when you gather all, or begin to  
24 gather your evidence. Your time begins to run when you  
25 know the factual predicate.

1           And the fact of the hypnosis is the factual  
2 predicate, and that's obvious from the defendant's papers.  
3 Regardless of the complainant's identity -- his papers  
4 don't make any reference to the complainant's identity.  
5 They don't depend on his identity. They depend solely on  
6 his claim, which the People dispute. But nonetheless,  
7 that is the claim, that he was hypnotized.

8           THE COURT: That the accuser was hypnotized?

9           MS. STERNBERG: Pardon me?

10          THE COURT: The accuser was hypnotized?

11          MS. STERNBERG: Yes, the young man's  
12 testimony -- not his testimony, but the statement in the  
13 movie. And that happened on January 10th, 2003. On that  
14 date the complainant knew that claim.

15          THE COURT: Thank you.

16          Mr. Kuby.

17          MR. KUBY: Thank you, Judge.

18          Good afternoon.

19          The People allege that it was indeed January  
20 10th, 2003, Jesse Friedman sees the film Capturing the  
21 Friedmans, and that's when the factual predicate of the  
22 claim was discovered.

23          In fact, and I will attempt to demonstrate in  
24 argument that it was in fact July 2003, the time that  
25 Jesse Friedman obtained access to the director's materials

1 that he knew the factual predicate that would support the  
2 claim.

3 Now, in order to sort of break that down, on  
4 January 10th, 2003, he sees the film.

5 What does he have? He sees a person on the  
6 screen, a person whose face is cloaked in shadows, an  
7 undisclosed location, who is both anonymous and presented  
8 anonymously, about whom there is no identifying  
9 information. It is a person who states not under oath  
10 that he was one of the people who testified in the  
11 Friedman case, and he remembered nothing about his  
12 molestation until he was hypnotized.

13 Now, Jesse Friedman did not recognize him. He  
14 didn't know his identity. He didn't even know if in fact  
15 he was a complainant. Most important here, he had no way  
16 of finding out until he obtained access to the Jarecki  
17 material.

18 No degree of due diligence would have led Jesse  
19 Friedman to the facts underlying his claim until he got  
20 access to the director's material.

21 What is clear is Jesse Friedman didn't have the  
22 designation Gregory Doe, until he obtained access to the  
23 director's material.

24 He is not named, obviously, by his real name nor  
25 the Gregory Doe designation.

1           So the Court understands this, the significance  
2 of the Gregory Doe designation is this: The complainants  
3 were named in the original paper turned over to Jesse  
4 Friedman's defense counsel in the pretrial hearing as  
5 Richard Doe, Gregory Doe, and Samuel Doe, and generally  
6 identified as to where the alleged molestation took place  
7 and other details.

8           But without the Gregory Doe designation, Jesse  
9 Friedman had absolutely nothing. He was able to learn  
10 that the mystery man was indeed Gregory Doe when he got  
11 access to the Jarecki materials.

12           He was able to obtain a transcript of the actual  
13 interview. He was able to obtain identifying information.  
14 And it was there and at that point that the due diligence  
15 clock began to run.

16           To try to illustrate this in a different way,  
17 assume a continuum. Someone makes an anonymous phone call  
18 to Friedman in a phone call, and says I testified in the  
19 Friedman case, and I had my testimony hypnotically  
20 refreshed. I remember nothing before I was hypnotized.  
21 Click.

22           No one could argue under those circumstances  
23 that the clock would begin to run. No one could argue  
24 that the due diligence clock could begin to run there  
25 because there was no place to go with this phone call.



1           At the other end of the continuum, someone walks  
2 in and says, hi, my name is X, I'm better known as Gregory  
3 Doe. I testified at the grand jury to the charges to  
4 which you pled guilty, and I didn't know anything until I  
5 attended the hypnosis sessions, and I'm more than willing  
6 to testify for you.

7           Clearly there the due diligence clock begins to  
8 run.

9           For Jesse Friedman's case, this was not an  
10 anonymous phone call. But it was an anonymous depiction  
11 in a film.

12           It is not as though Jesse Friedman saw that and  
13 did nothing.

14           Again, I'm not entirely clear on what we are  
15 doing besides arguing, but I want to bring the Court's  
16 attention to two letters we were unable to uncover. And  
17 let me give copies to the People. And I will submit them  
18 to the Court in the nature of an offer of proof, and  
19 obviously they can be authenticated at a later time if  
20 necessary.

21           THE COURT: Sure.

22           (Handed to the Court.)

23           MR. KUBY: I will not read them all to the  
24 Court. But I will note that on April 3rd, 2003, and  
25 that's the one-page document, and that's an E-mail from an

1 attorney Sammy Israel, who was retained by Jesse Friedman.

2 And it is an E-mail to Jarecki, and Jarecki's response.

3 Israel says I want to start a time log with  
4 certain of the individuals you contacted in the film.

5 Jarecki puts him off. And he says, I'm not  
6 going to give you access now. Wait. Wait for the press  
7 to build up a little more, let's meet on April 18th.

8 We don't know the result of that meeting, but we  
9 know the consequence. Because on May 9th Sam Israel sends  
10 the letter to Jarecki, claiming that Jarecki has  
11 effectively prevented Jesse from having counsel, and  
12 states, and I quote the small portion, denied me his  
13 lawyer access to materials that might help Jesse in  
14 launching a collateral challenge to his conviction. Close  
15 quotes.

16 So, again, as of May 9th, Jesse still doesn't  
17 have access.

18 If the Court examines the case law, and I know  
19 you have because you cited much of it, what is key here is  
20 actually access to the facts, not some sort of belief that  
21 facts may exist.

22 In Pacheco versus Artuz (ph), we cite in our  
23 papers, habeas action, the star eye witness submits an  
24 affidavit saying he perjures himself, and in fact, the  
25 defendant didn't do the shooting.

1           The prosecution says, hey, Mr. Defendant, you  
2 are way out of time. You knew all along you didn't do the  
3 shooting. You could have gotten this at any point prior  
4 to now. This is years too late.

5           The Artuz court said, no.

6           He didn't actually discover the facts necessary  
7 until the witness wrote to him and said, I testified  
8 against you. I lied, and I'm willing to come forward now  
9 and tell the truth.

10           Once he had that type of access to the witness,  
11 the one year clock began to run.

12           This is true in Hector versus Greiner,  
13 G-R-E-I-N-E-R, where the Court noted the petitioner had  
14 access to the transcript. He had access to the book. So,  
15 of course, he was on notice of the facts.

16           It is true in the Ludicore, L-U-D-I-C-O-R-E  
17 case, where the one year clock began once the defendant's  
18 attorney received the clerk's police report.

19           Now, he didn't receive all the evidence to make  
20 this claim. But once he made -- had actual access to the  
21 police report, that's when the one-year time began. It  
22 didn't happen when he felt there may be a Clarkstown (ph)  
23 police report, or even if there was evidence that there  
24 was a Clarkstown police report somewhere. It began when  
25 he had access to the facts.

1           So, let's see if we can agree on something.

2           How do we characterize the Gregory Doe comments  
3 in the movies in terms of their factual significance?

4           And I have a thought, and the thought is this:  
5 It might be fair to characterize them as a commercial  
6 film, containing snippets of interviews, cut and spliced  
7 and taken out of context, all unsworn, is reliable  
8 evidence of nothing.

9           And I think it follows that that description  
10 cannot possibly provide access to the factual predicate  
11 necessary to support a claim.

12           So, this is my characterization, but it is not  
13 mine alone. This is Ms. Sternberg's characterization of  
14 the film and the depictions and the tape, which she made  
15 as recently as August 21st, 2007, and as long ago as  
16 November 4th, 2004.

17           Reliable evidence of nothing.

18           To look at it in one more way. Let's assume  
19 that Jesse Friedman sees this film on January 10th, and  
20 forgetting about exhaustion requirements and other claims,  
21 files his habeas petition the next day and says, look, I  
22 have these facts.

23           What would the People say about that petition  
24 that showed the film?

25           We know the answer to that. We know the answer

1 because the People have successfully invoked this phrase,  
2 as well as others, time and time again, to say that this  
3 film is absolutely worthless.

4 The People's memorandum in opposition to the  
5 440, they say that that Jarecki's interviews, quote, may  
6 be a provocative sound bite for a movie, but it has no  
7 place in a serious consideration of the allegations now  
8 before the Court. They said these snippets are, quote, a  
9 textbook example of non-evidence that, quote, fails to  
10 establish the factual allegation on which he bases his  
11 motion.

12 That claim, had Jesse Friedman brought it at  
13 that time, without at least being able to verify that this  
14 was a complaining witness, would have been dismissed.

15 So, the same state state that has repeatedly  
16 and successfully argued that this unsworn snippet of this  
17 person is entitled to no weight whatsoever; it is just a  
18 good sound bite, but has no place for serious issues  
19 before the federal court.

20 This same state comes forward and says, it is  
21 more than enough to establish the factual basis that  
22 supports the claim.

23 And I urge you to reject that. And I urge you  
24 to reject something else.

25 THE COURT: Aren't they very dissimilar

1       responsibilities and obligations?

2               Think about it. Your client for the first time  
3       learns, according to your argument, that there has been  
4       someone that has made a claim that he would not have  
5       brought these charges if it hadn't been for this hypnotic  
6       incident.

7               MR. KUBY: Right.

8               THE COURT: That's very different from what the  
9       People's responsibility would be at the time that they are  
10      arguing against the 440 motion. Very different context.

11              MR. KUBY: Understood.

12              But the tone and quality of the argument as to  
13      the value of this evidence, the significance of it, the  
14      weight to which it is entitled, and its non-evidentiary  
15      character. I do think that that argument, since they made  
16      it so successfully below, it is not the least bit unfair  
17      to point out to this Court that this is exactly the same  
18      evidence that they repeatedly categorize as non-fact,  
19      non-evidence, and utterly meaningless.

20              I don't see how you can take this utterly  
21      meaningless, quote-unquote, set of allegations, and then  
22      claim that it makes out the factual support necessary.

23              The factual support necessary wasn't obtained by  
24      Jesse Friedman until he had actual access.

25              Had Andrew Jarecki chosen to wait a year and a

1 half before Jesse Friedman was given access, there was  
2 nothing he could have done. He did his best, and that's  
3 all he could do.

4 But I do want to address the issue of the  
5 People's timeliness in making these arguments before this  
6 Court today. Because I think that the People have waived  
7 the very argument on timeliness grounds that they have  
8 advanced here.

9 I'm reminded of the case of Davis versus  
10 Johnson, we simply had the, quote, timing works both ways.  
11 If the State wants to kill a man because his filings are  
12 not on time, it should raise the issue promptly.

13 By order dated July 13th, 2006, the first judge  
14 to have this petition, ordered the People to answer the  
15 petition within 60 days. The People chose not to answer.  
16 Instead, they filed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6),  
17 without first securing leave or at any time securing leave  
18 to file an answer. But that's fine, they can make a  
19 12(b)(6) motion. They did so in December of 2006.

20 Point one on the motion is that the petition is  
21 untimely and should be dismissed. And they made a number  
22 of timeliness arguments.

23 They did not make the timeliness argument that  
24 they make here today, and that they attempted to make back  
25 in August.

1           Now, it is a basic rule of civil litigation --  
2           at least when I was going to law school, and I don't see  
3           that anything changed -- that if you are making a motion  
4           dismiss on the basis of 12(b)(6) you are required to  
5           include all of the grounds available to you at the time  
6           you make the motion. Otherwise you've waived. At least  
7           that's what I remember learning.

8           This is not fancy lawyering, like  
9           post-conviction relief when the Court of Appeals has  
10          jurisdiction. This is just basic lawyering 101.

11          They elected not to raise this timeliness claim  
12          and proceed on the other claims, which is fine. Textbook  
13          definition of waiver. This Court ruled in their favor on  
14          almost everything, almost.

15          It is a little unexpected that they didn't get  
16          everything, and they come in 364 days later and make a  
17          brand-new argument that they could have made back on  
18          September 11th, 2006, saying, Judge, we got all the time  
19          in the world. Why not?

20          Now, when I make a mistake, and I'm three months  
21          out of time, the People say the remedy should be, of  
22          course, my client is precluded from proceeding further.

23          But when the People are a year late making this  
24          argument on timeliness, what happens?

25          Well, I submit that the rules should apply to



1 them. This is waiver. It is deliberate waiver as that  
2 term is construed under the Supreme Court case of Day  
3 versus McDonough (ph), and they have waived their right to  
4 proceed on this argument.

5 Thank you.

6 THE COURT: Mr. Kuby, if you could just go back  
7 to a moment on your time line.

8 I assume this is so from the initial statement  
9 made by the respondents, that on January 10th, 2003 the  
10 petitioner saw this film.

11 MR. KUBY: Correct.

12 THE COURT: When for the first time did he learn  
13 the identity of or have access to the facts, the materials  
14 of Gregory Doe?

15 MR. KUBY: My understanding is he first began to  
16 obtain the Jarecki materials at the beginning of July  
17 2003.

18 We have been unable to at this point to  
19 reconstruct whether he saw the Gregory Doe interview in  
20 the first week or the fourth week --

21 THE COURT: When you say saw the interview?

22 MR. KUBY: Saw the transcript of the interview;  
23 saw the identifying information; saw the Gregory Doe file.  
24 Just because of the remoteness in time and the fact that  
25 nobody really foresaw this was ever going to be an issue

1 at the time, didn't minutely chronicle the box by box,  
2 document by document search. But he first gained access  
3 the beginning of July 2003.

4 So, even if he saw it on day one, if the very  
5 first thing in the first box he opened was, Gregory Doe,  
6 this is it, he still would be within the one-year period.

7 THE COURT: How many boxes were there  
8 approximately? Give me some idea of the type of material,  
9 and also whether it still exists today.

10 MR. KUBY: Give me a moment on that.

11 (Whereupon, at this time there was a pause in  
12 the proceedings.)

13 MR. KUBY: The first question I can only answer  
14 in generalities, thousands of pages, but not hundreds of  
15 thousands of pages.

16 The second question as to what still exists? I  
17 would love to know the answer to this myself.

18 I contacted Andrew Jarecki in the course of this  
19 litigation, and I asked that I be given access to the  
20 file. I, too, have been put off at various times and in  
21 various ways. And I don't yet have subpoena power to  
22 conduct discovery. So I'm presuming that the corpus of  
23 his material is intact. But as to where it is, how to get  
24 it, and as to specifically if he kept, for example, any  
25 sort of log as to when Jesse came, when Jesse didn't come,

1 I can't answer those questions now.

2 I can represent that July 1st is the absolute  
3 earliest date Jesse received any of these materials, and  
4 that's the day we used in the course of this litigation.  
5 I know the People dispute the significance of it, but I  
6 don't believe they dispute the date.

7 THE COURT: Ms. Sternberg.

8 MS. STERNBERG: I haven't seen these letters and  
9 these E-mails before. I don't think it supports the  
10 petitioner's position. That's exactly what I said in my  
11 papers.

12 THE COURT: If you can just speak into the  
13 microphone, because I don't believe we can hear you.

14 MS. STERNBERG: The movie is not evidence of  
15 anything. But it is the factual basis of these claims.  
16 And he had that factual basis in January.

17 Petitioner argues just now that he didn't have  
18 to do anything. If the producer Jarecki chose not to give  
19 him access for a year, ten years, twenty years, he didn't  
20 have to do anything. But he had the opportunity  
21 immediately to file his 440 motion in the county court  
22 with his myriad of other claims, and to ask the county  
23 court to order Jarecki to give him access to that  
24 material.

25 In fact, when the 440 was pending before the

1 county court, it ordered Jarecki to allow the People  
2 access to the out-takes of interviews that were in the  
3 film and represented to the Court as evidence.

4 The defendant -- the petitioner, I'm sorry, in  
5 this case, made no effort to do anything to get access,  
6 except apparently to wait.

7 These papers that Mr. Kuby has just given me,  
8 indicate that he knew as soon as he saw the movie that  
9 these claims would be the basis -- that these statements  
10 in the movie could be the basis of legal claims. And he  
11 chose to wait until Mr. Jarecki gave him access. That's  
12 not due diligence.

13 THE COURT: What about the fact that he got a  
14 lawyer, and the lawyer contacted Jarecki?

15 MS. STERNBERG: And the lawyer apparently chose  
16 to wait. The lawyer is in his stead.

17 THE COURT: And you are suggesting at that point  
18 in time he should have sought an order directing access in  
19 county court?

20 MS. STERNBERG: Yes.

21 He should have sought legal assistance from the  
22 Court in getting access to these materials that he knew  
23 from the movie was the factual basis for his claim.

24 THE COURT: Not relied on counsel representing  
25 him on the 440 motion?

1 MS. STERNBERG: Well, if there is the suggestion  
2 that counsel was ineffective, failing to do that --

3 THE COURT: I don't know.

4 MS. STERNBERG: -- but he has no constitutional  
5 claim concerning effectiveness of counsel in the  
6 collateral motion.

7 THE COURT: Yes.

8 MS. STERNBERG: His time ran when he knew  
9 someone was hypnotized and that was the basis a now Brady  
10 claim.

11 THE COURT: Yes.

12 MR. KUBY: Again, the issue isn't when he had an  
13 inkling. The issue is when he had access to the factual  
14 basis, without knowing that this person actually was one  
15 of the people who testified against him resulting in an  
16 indictment to which he ultimately pled guilty -- without  
17 that fact -- again, the Gregory Doe name was not used, and  
18 it was all shrouded in anonymity. He had no facts, he had  
19 allegations.

20 He could have gone into court and said, look, I  
21 believe this is an accuser.

22 And the People would have come back and said, we  
23 don't know who these people are. This is a Hollywood  
24 movie. We are not going to go run around and defend a  
25 claim against any or every actor made in every movie that

1 Hollywood puts out. This has no business in the federal  
2 court.

3 What does Jesse do? He gets a lawyer, the  
4 lawyer asks for materials.

5 The lawyer puts him off. May 9th he asks again.  
6 A couple of months later Jesse gets the  
7 material.

8 Should he have filed a 440 and spent a year and  
9 a half fighting it, as to whether he will get discovery,  
10 fighting a motion to dismiss, because you have not alleged  
11 any facts, Mr. Friedman? You just alleged conjecture  
12 based on an unsworn Hollywood film.

13 To give you an example, the DNA cases, Johnson  
14 versus United States, 544 US 295.

15 You are on notice for the facts that support  
16 your claim when you get the DNA test back with the  
17 results. That's when you are on notice of the facts.

18 Of course, the courts have said, nonetheless,  
19 once you have your sample, and you know that there is a  
20 sample to compare it with, and the technology exists, then  
21 you have to proceed with reasonable promptness.

22 So, to make an analogy here, Jesse knows that  
23 there is somebody out there saying these things. He is  
24 trying to find out who this person is. And he does so  
25 with reasonable promptness, within a six-month period of

1 time. But the facts that underlie his claim don't exist  
2 until he knows this in fact was one of the witnesses who  
3 testified against him. And he didn't have that Gregory  
4 Doe information until July at the very earliest.

5 THE COURT: Anything else you would like to  
6 respond to, Ms. Sternberg?

7 MS. STERNBERG: No. Thank you, your Honor.

8 THE COURT: I will reserve decision on this.

9 Obviously, the respondents aren't claiming that  
10 there is much in dispute here other than the effect of the  
11 defendant's -- excuse me, the petitioner's waiting until  
12 sometime in July 2003 to actually get these materials.  
13 And it is a question of interpretation.

14 I don't think there is any need to have  
15 additional testimony at this point in time. It is pretty  
16 much as a matter of law that I can decide these issues,  
17 unless you have some case law supporting to the contrary,  
18 I will make that determination and I will render a written  
19 decision.

20 MR. KUBY: Thank you, Judge.

21 THE COURT: As far as the discovery motion, I  
22 think at this point in time it is premature, and it is  
23 related more to the merits than anything else.

24 MR. KUBY: I understand. It is not surprising  
25 given the procedural posture of the case. It does

1 illustrate though one of the difficulties, even once one  
2 files one's claim, actually using the judicial process to  
3 get discovery, as opposed to the more informal process  
4 that Mr. Friedman was ultimately able to use which  
5 probably gave him the material faster.

6 THE COURT: Sometimes we have to wait a while to  
7 render justice, Mr. Kuby.

8 MR. KUBY: And I don't have a problem with  
9 waiting.

10 THE COURT: Motion to have discovery is denied.

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13 (End of proceedings.)

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