The Autonomy of Affect

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I

A man builds a snowman on his roof garden. It starts to melt in the afternoon sun. He watches. After a time, he takes the snowman to the cool of the mountains, where it stops melting. He bids it good-bye, and leaves.

Just images, no words, very simple. It was a story depicted in a short shown on German TV as a fill-in between programs. The film drew complaints from parents reporting that their children had been frightened. That drew the attention of a team of researchers. Their study was notable for failing to find much of what it was studying: cognition.

Researchers, headed by Hertha Sturm, used three versions of the film: the original wordless version and two versions with voiceovers added. The first voice-over version was dubbed “factual.” It added a simple step-by-step account of the action as it happened. A second version was called “emotional.” It was largely the same as the “factual” version, but included at crucial turning points words expressing the emotional tenor of the scene under way.
Sets of nine-year-old children were tested for recall and asked to rate the version they saw on a scale of “pleasantness.” The factual version was consistently rated the least pleasant and was also the worst remembered. The most pleasant was the original wordless version, which was rated just slightly above the emotional. And it was the emotional version that was best remembered.

This is already a bit muddling. Something stranger happened when the subjects of the study were asked to rate the individual scenes in the film simultaneously on a “happy-sad” scale and a “pleasant-unpleasant” scale. The “sad” scenes were rated the most pleasant, the sadder the better.

The hypothesis that immediately suggests itself is that in some kind of precocious anti-Freudian protest, the children were equating arousal with pleasure. But this being an empirical study, the children were wired. Their physiological reactions were monitored. The factual version elicited the highest level of arousal, even though it was the most unpleasant (i.e., happy) and made the least long-lasting impression. The children, it turns out, were physiologically split: factuality made their heart beat faster and deepened their breathing, but it made their skin resistance fall. The original nonverbal version elicited the greatest response from their skin. Galvanic skin response measures autonomic reaction.

From the tone of their report, it seems that the researchers were a bit taken aback by their results. They contented themselves with observing that the difference between sadness and happiness is not all that it’s cracked up to be, and worrying that the difference between children and adults was also not all that it was cracked up to be (judging by studies of adult retention of news broadcasts). Their only positive conclusion was the primacy of the affective in image reception (Sturm 25–37).

Accepting and expanding upon that, it could be noted that the primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between content and effect: it would appear that the strength or duration of an image’s effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way. This is not to say that there is no connection and no logic. What is meant here by the content of the image is its indexing to conventional meanings in an intersubjective context, its socio-linguistic qualification. This indexing fixes the quality of the image; the strength or duration of the image’s effect could be
called its intensity. What comes out here is that there is no correspondence or conformity between quality and intensity. If there is a relation, it is of another nature.

To translate this negative observation into a positive one: the event of image reception is multi-leveled, or at least bi-level. There is an immediate bifurcation in response into two seemingly autonomous systems. One, the level of intensity, is characterized by a crossing of semantic wires: on it, sadness is pleasant. The level of intensity is organized according to a logic that does not admit of the excluded middle. This is to say that it is not semantically or semiotically ordered. It does not fix distinctions. Instead, it vaguely but insistently connects what is normally indexed as separate. When asked to signify itself, it can only do so in a paradox. There is disconnection of signifying order from intensity—which constitutes a different order of connection operating in parallel. The gap noted earlier is not only between content and effect. It is also between the form of content—signification as a conventional system of distinctive difference—and intensity. The disconnection between form/content and intensity/effect is not just negative: it enables a different connectivity, a different difference, in parallel.

Both levels, qualification and intensity, are immediately embodied. Intensity is embodied in purely autonomic reactions most directly manifested in the skin—at the surface of the body, at its interface with things. Depth reactions belong more to the form/content (qualification) level, even though they also involve autonomic functions such as heartbeat and breathing. The reason may be that they are associated with expectation, which depends on consciously positioning oneself in a line of narrative continuity. Modulations of heartbeat and breathing mark a reflux of consciousness into the autonomic depths, coterminous with a rise of the autonomic into consciousness. They are a conscious-autonomic mix, a measure of their participation in one another. Intensity is beside that loop, a nonconscious, never-to-conscious autonomic remainder. It is outside expectation and adaptation, as disconnected from meaningful sequencing, from narration, as it is from vital function. It is narratively de-localized, spreading over the generalized body surface, like a lateral backwash from the function-meaning interloops traveling the vertical path between head and heart.
Language, though head-strong, is not simply in opposition to intensity. It would seem to function differentially in relation to it. The factual version of the snowman story was dampening. Matter-of-factness dampens intensity. In this case, matter-of-factness was a doubling of the sequence of images with a narration expressing in as objective a manner as possible the common-sense function and consensual meaning of the movements perceived on screen. This interfered with the images’ effect. The emotional version added a few phrases that punctuated the narrative line with qualifications of the emotional content, as opposed to the objective-narrative content. The qualifications of emotional content enhanced the images’ effect, as if they resonated with the level of intensity rather than interfering with it. An emotional qualification breaks narrative continuity for a moment to register a state—actually re-register an already felt state (for the skin is faster than the word).

The relationship between the levels of intensity and qualification is not one of conformity or correspondence, but of resonance or interference, amplification or dampening. Linguistic expression can resonate with and amplify intensity at the price of making itself functionally redundant. When on the other hand it doubles a sequence of movements in order to add something to it in the way of meaningful progression—in this case a sense of futurity, expectation, an intimation of what comes next in a conventional progression—then it runs counter to and dampens the intensity. Intensity would seem to be associated with nonlinear processes: resonation and feedback which momentarily suspend the linear progress of the narrative present from past to future. Intensity is qualifiable as an emotional state, and that state is static—temporal and narrative noise. It is a state of suspense, potentially of disruption. It’s like a temporal sink, a hole in time, as we conceive of it and narrativize it. It is not exactly passivity, because it is filled with motion, vibratory motion, resonation. And it is not yet activity, because the motion is not of the kind that can be directed (if only symbolically) toward practical ends in a world of constituted objects and aims (if only on screen). Of course the qualification of an emotion is quite often, in other contexts, itself a narrative element that moves the action ahead, taking its place in socially recognized lines of action and reaction. But to the extent that it is, it is not in
resonance with intensity. It resonates to the exact degree to which it is in excess of any narrative or functional line.

In any case, language doubles the flow of images, on another level, on a different track. There is a redundancy of resonation that plays up or amplifies (feeds back disconnection, enabling a different connectivity), and a redundancy of signification that plays out or linearizes (jumps the feedback loop between vital function and meaning into lines of socially valorized action and reaction). Language belongs to entirely different orders depending on which redundancy it enacts. Or, it always enact both more or less completely: two languages, two dimensions of every expression, one superlinear, the other linear. Every event takes place on both levels—and between both levels, as they themselves resonate to form a larger system composed of two interacting subsystems following entirely different rules of formation. For clarity, it might be best to give different names to the two halves of the event. In this case: suspense could be distinguished from and interlinked with expectation, as superlinear and linear dimensions of the same image-event, which is at the same time an expression-event.

Approaches to the image in its relation to language are incomplete if they operate only on the semantic or semiotic level, however that level is defined (linguistically, logically, narratologically, ideologically, or all of these in combination, as a Symbolic). What they lose, precisely, is the expression event—in favor of structure. Much could be gained by integrating the dimension of intensity into cultural theory. The stakes are the new. For structure is the place where nothing ever happens, that explanatory heaven in which all eventual permutations are prefigured in a self-consistent set of invariant generative rules. Nothing is prefigured in the event. It is the collapse of structured distinction into intensity, of rules into paradox. It is the suspension of the invariance that makes happy happy, sad sad, function function, and meaning mean. Could it be that it is through the expectant suspension of that suspense that the new emerges? As if an echo of irreducible excess, of gratuitous amplification, piggy-backed on the reconnection to progression, bringing a tinge of the unexpected, the lateral, the unmotivated, to lines of action and reaction. A change in the rules. The expression-event is the system of the inexplicable: emergence, into and against (re)generation (the re-production of
In the case of the snowman, the unexpected and inexplicable that emerged along with the generated responses had to do with the differences between happiness and sadness, children and adults, not being all they're cracked up to be, much to our scientific chagrin: a change in the rules. Intensity is the unassimilable.

For present purposes, intensity will be equated with affect. There seems to be a growing feeling within media and literary and art theory that affect is central to an understanding of our information- and image-based late-capitalist culture, in which so-called master narratives are perceived to have foundered. Fredric Jameson notwithstanding, belief has waned for many, but not affect. If anything, our condition is characterized by a surfeit of it. The problem is that there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to affect.¹ Our entire vocabulary has derived from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure even across irreconcilable differences (the divorce proceedings of poststructuralism: terminable or interminable?). In the absence of an asignifying philosophy of affect, it is all too easy for received psychological categories to slip back in, undoing the considerable deconstructive work that has been effectively carried out by poststructuralism. Affect is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion.² But one of the clearest lessons of this first story is that emotion and affect—if affect is intensity—follow different logics and pertain to different orders.

An emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is crucial to theorize the difference between affect and emotion. If some have the impression that it has waned, it is because affect is unqualified. As such, it is not ownable or recognizable, and is thus resistant to critique.

It is not that there are no philosophical antecedents to draw on. It is just that they are not the usual ones for cultural theory. Spinoza is a formidable philosophical precursor on many of these points: on the difference in nature between affect and emotion; on
the irreducibly bodily and autonomic nature of affect; on affect as a suspension of action-reaction circuits and linear temporality in a sink of what might be called “passion,” to distinguish it both from passivity and activity; on the equation between affect and effect; on the form/content of conventional discourse as constituting an autonomous or semi-autonomous stratum running counter to the full registering of affect and its affirmation, its positive development, its expression as and for itself. The title of Spinoza’s central work suggests a designation for the project of thinking affect: Ethics.3

II

Another story, about the brain: the mystery of the missing half-second.

Experiments were performed on patients who had been implanted with cortical electrodes for medical purposes. Mild electrical pulses were administered to the electrode and also to points on the skin. In either case, the stimulation was felt only if it lasted more than half a second: half a second, the minimum perceivable lapse. If the cortical electrode was fired a half-second before the skin was stimulated, patients reported feeling the skin pulse first. The researcher speculated that sensation involves a “backward referral in time”—in other words, that sensation is organized recursively before being linearized, before it is redirected outwardly to take its part in a conscious chain of actions and reactions. Brain and skin form a resonating vessel. Stimulation turns inward, is folded into the body, except that there is no inside for it to be in, because the body is radically open, absorbing impulses quicker than they can be perceived, and because the entire vibratory event is unconscious, out of mind. Its anomaly is smoothed over retrospectively to fit conscious requirements of continuity and linear causality.4

What happens during the missing half-second? A second experiment gave some hints.

Brain waves of healthy volunteers were monitored by an electroencephalograph (EEG) machine. The subjects were asked to flex a finger at a moment of their choosing, and to note the time
III

Next story.

The last story was of the brain. This one is of the brainless. His name is Ronald Reagan. The story comes from a well-known book of pop-neurophysiology by Oliver Sacks (76–80).

Sacks describes watching a televised speech by the “Great Communicator” in a hospital ward of patients suffering from two kinds of cognitive dysfunction. Some were suffering from global aphasia, which rendered them incapable of understanding words as such. They could nonetheless understand most of what was said, because they compensated by developing extraordinary abilities to read extraverbal cues: inflection, facial expression, and other gesture—body language. Others on the ward were suffering from what is called tonal agnosia, which is the inverse of aphasia. The ability to hear the expressiveness of the voice is lost, and with it goes attention to other extraverbal cues. Language is reduced to its grammatical form and semantic or logical content. Neither group appeared to be Reagan voters. In fact, the speech was universally greeted by howls of laughter and expressions of outrage. The “Great Communicator” was failing to persuade. To the aphasics, he was functionally illiterate in extraverbal cueing; his body language struck them as hilariously inept. He was, after all, a recycled bad actor, and an ageing one at that. The agnosics were outraged that the man couldn’t put together a grammatical sentence or follow a logical line to its conclusion. He came across to them as intellectually impaired. (It must be recalled that this is long before the onset of Reagan’s recently announced Alzheimer’s disease—what does that say about the difference between normality and degeneration?)

Now all of this might have come as news to those who think of Reagan and other postmodern political stars on the model of charismatic leadership, in which the fluency of a public figure’s gestural and tonal repertoire mesmerizes the masses, lulling them into bleary-eyed belief in the content of the mellifluous words. On the contrary, what is astonishing is that Reagan wasn’t laughed and jeered off the campaign podium and was swept into office not once but twice. It wasn’t that people didn’t hear his verbal fumbling or recognize the incoherence of his thoughts. They were the butt of
constant jokes and news stories. And it wasn’t that what he lacked on the level of verbal coherence was glossed over by the seductive fluency of his body image. Reagan was more famous for his polyps than his poise, and there was a collective fascination with his faltering health and regular shedding of bits and pieces of himself. The only conclusion is that Reagan was an effective leader not in spite of but because of his double dysfunction. He was able to produce ideological effects by non-ideological means, a global shift in the political direction of the United States by falling apart. His means were affective. Once again: affective, as opposed to emotional. This is not about empathy or emotive identification, or any form of identification for that matter.11

Reagan politicized the power of mime. That power is in interruption. A mime decomposes movement, cuts its continuity into a potentially infinite series of submovements punctuated by jerks. At each jerk, at each cut into the movement, the potential is there for the movement to veer off in another direction, to become a different movement. Each jerk suspends the continuity of the movement, for just a flash, too quick really to perceive—but decisively enough to suggest a veer. This compresses into the movement under way potential movements that are in some way made present without being actualized. In other words, each jerk is a critical point, a singular point, a bifurcation point. At that point, the mime almost imperceptibly intercalates a flash of virtuality into the actual movement under way. The genius of the mime is also the good fortune of the bad actor. Reagan’s gestural idiocy had a mime effect. As did his verbal incoherence, in the register of meaning. He was a communicative jerk. The two levels of interruption, those of linear movement and conventional progressions of meaning, were held together by the one Reagan feature that did, I think, hold positive appeal—the timbre of his voice, that beautifully vibratory voice. Two parallel lines of abstractive suspense resonated together. His voice embodied the resonation. It embodied the abstraction. It was the embodiment of an asignifying intensity doubling his every actual move and phrase, following him like the shadow of a mime. It was the continuity of his discontinuities.12

Reagan operationalized the virtual in postmodern politics. Alone, he was nothing approaching an ideologue. He was nothing, an idiocy musically coupled with an incoherence. That’s a bit un-
fair. He was an incipience. He was unqualified and without content. But the incipience that he was, was prolonged by technologies of image transmission, and then relayed by apparatuses, such as the family or the church or the school or the chamber of commerce, which in conjunction with the media acted as part of the nervous system of a new and frighteningly reactive body politic. It was on the receiving end that the Reagan incipience was qualified, given content. Receiving apparatuses fulfilled the inhibitory, limitative function. They selected one line of movement, one progression of meaning, to actualize and implant locally. That is why Reagan could be so many things to so many people; that is why the majority of the electorate could disagree with him on every major issue, but still vote for him. Because he was actualized, in their neighborhood, as a movement and a meaning of their selection—or at least selected for them, with their acquiescence. He was a man for all inhibitions. It was commonly said that he ruled primarily by projecting an air of confidence. That was the emotional tenor of his political manner, dysfunction notwithstanding. Confidence is the emotional translation of affect as capturable life potential; it is a particular emotional expression and becoming-conscious of one's side-perceived sense of vitality. Reagan transmitted vitality, virtuality, tendency, in sickness and interruption. (“I am in control here,” cried the general, when Reagan was shot. He wasn’t, actually.) The actualizations relaying the Reagan incipience varied. But with the exception of the cynical, the aphasic, and the agnostic, they consistently included an overweening feeling of confidence—that of the supposedly sovereign individual within a supposedly great nation at whose helm idiocy and incoherence reigned. In other words, Reagan was many things to many people, but within a general framework of affective jingoism. Confidence is the apotheosis of affective capture. Functionalized and nationalized, it feeds directly into prison construction and neo-colonial adventure.

What is of dire interest now, post-Reagan, is the extent to which he contracted into his person operations that might be argued to be endemic to late-capitalist, image- and information-based economies. Think of the image/expression-events in which we bathe. Think interruption. Think of the fast cuts of the video clip or the too-cool TV commercial. Think of the cuts from TV
programming to commercials. Think of the cuts across programming and commercials achievable through zapping. Think of the distractedness of television viewing, the constant cuts from the screen to its immediate surroundings, to the viewing context where other actions are performed in fits and starts as attention flits. Think of the joyously incongruent juxtapositions of surfing the Internet. Think of our bombardment by commercial images off the screen, at every step in our daily rounds. Think of imagistic operation of the consumer object, as turnover time increases as fast as styles can be recycled. Everywhere, the cut, suspense—incipience. Virtuality, perhaps?

Affect holds a key to rethinking postmodern power after ideology. For although ideology is still very much with us, often in the most virulent of forms, it is no longer encompassing. It no longer defines the global mode of functioning of power. It is now one mode of power in a larger field that is not defined, overall, by ideology. This makes it all the more pressing to connect ideology to its real conditions of emergence. For these are now manifest, mimed by men of power. One way of conceptualizing the non-ideological means by which ideology is produced might deploy the notions of induction and transduction—induction being the triggering of a qualification, of a containment, an actualization; and transduction being the transmission of an impulse of virtuality from one actualization to another, and across them all (what Guattari calls transversality). Transduction is the transmission of a force of potential that cannot but be felt, simultaneously doubling, enabling, and ultimately counteracting the limitative selections of apparatuses of actualization and implantation. This amounts to proposing an analog theory of image-based power: images as the conveyors of forces of emergence, as vehicles for existential potentialization and transfer. In this, too, there are notable precursors. In particular, Walter Benjamin, whose concept of shock and image bombardment, whose analyses of the unmediated before-after temporality of what he called the “dialectical image,” whose fascination with mime and mimickry, whose connecting of tactility to vision, all have much to offer an affective theory of late-capitalist power.

At this point, the impression may have grown that affect is being touted here as if the whole world could be packed into it. In
a way, it can, and is. The affective "atoms" that overfill the jerk of the power-mime are monads, inductive/transductive virtual perspectives fading out in all directions to infinity, separated from one another by dynamic thresholds. They are autonomous, not through closure but through a singular openness. As unbounded "regions" in an equally unbounded affective field, they are in contact with the whole universe of affective potential, as by action at a distance. Thus they have no outside, even though they are differentiated according to which potentials are most apt to be expressed (effectively induced) as their "region" passes into actuality. Their passing into actuality is the key. Affect is the whole world: from the precise angle of its differential emergence. How the element of virtuality is construed—whether past or future, inside or outside, transcendent or immanent, sublime or abject, atomized or continuous—is in a way a matter of indifference. It is all of these things, differently in every actual case. Concepts of the virtual in itself are important only to the extent to which they contribute to a pragmatic understanding of emergence, to the extent to which they enable triggerings of change (induce the new). It is the edge of virtual, where it leaks into actual, that counts. For that seeping edge is where potential, actually, is found.

Resistance is manifestly not automatically a part of image reception in late-capitalist cultures. But neither can the effect of the mass media and other image- and information-based media simply be explained in terms of a lack: a waning of affect, or a decline in belief, or alienation. The mass media are massively potentializing—but the potential is inhibited, and both the emergence of the potential and its limitation are part and parcel of the cultural-political functioning of the media, as connected to other apparatuses. Media transmissions are breaches of indetermination. For them to have any specific effect they must be determined to have that effect by apparatuses of actualization and implantation that plug into them and transformatively relay what they give rise to (family, church, school, chamber of commerce, to name but a few). The need actively to actualize media transmission is as true for reactive politics as it is for a politics of resistance, and requires a new understanding of the body in its relation to signification and the ideal or incorporeal. In North America at least, the far right is far more attuned to the imagistic potential of the postmodern body
than the established left, and has exploited that advantage for the last decade and a half. Philosophies of affect, potential, and actualization may aid in finding counter-tactics.

IV

Last story:

A man writes a health-care reform bill in his White House. It starts to melt in the media glare. He takes it to the Hill, where it continues to melt. He does not say goodbye.

Although economic indicators show unmistakable signs of recovery, the stock market dips. By way of explanation, TV commentators cite a second-hand feeling. The man’s “waffling” on other issues has undermined the public’s confidence in him, and is rebounding on the health-care initiative. The worry is that Clinton is losing his “presidential” feel. What does that have to do with the health of the economy? The prevailing wisdom among the same commentators is that passage of the health-care would harm the economy. It is hard to see why the market didn’t go up at the news of the “unpresidential” falter of what many “opinion-makers” considered a costly social program inconsistent with basically sound economic policy inherited from the previous administration, credited with starting a recovery. However, the question does not even arise, because the commentators are operating under the assumption that the stock market registers affective fluctuations in adjoining spheres more directly than properly economic indicators. Are they confused? Not according to certain economic theorists who, when called upon to explain to a nonspecialist audience the ultimate foundation of the capitalist monetary system, answer “faith.” And what, in the late-capitalist economy, is the base cause of inflation, according to the same experts? A “mindset,” they say, in which feelings about the future become self-fulfilling prophesies capable of reversing “real” conditions (Heilbroner and Thurow 151).

The ability of affect to produce an economic effect more swiftly and surely than economics itself means that affect is itself a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late-capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory. Actually, it is beyond infrastructural, it
is everywhere, in effect. Its ability to come second-hand, to switch domains and produce effects across them all, gives it a meta-factorial ubiquity. It is beyond infrastructural. It is transversal.

This fact about affect—this matter-of-factness of affect—needs to be taken seriously into account in cultural and political theory. Don't forget.

Notes

1. The thesis on the waning of affect in Jameson's classic essay on postmodernism ("Cultural Logic") powerfully raised the issue of affect for cultural theory. The most sustained and successful exploration of affect arising from subsequent debates is in Grossberg. The present essay shares many strands with Grossberg's work, including the conviction that affect has become pervasive rather than having waned. Differences with Grossberg will be signaled in subsequent notes.

2. Grossberg slips into an equation between affect and emotion at many points, despite distinguishing them in his definitions. The slippage begins in the definition itself, where affect is defined quantitatively as the strength of an investment and qualitatively as the nature of a concern (82). This is done in order to avoid the perceived trap of asserting that affect is unformed and unstructured, a move which Grossberg worries makes its analysis impossible. It is argued here that affect is indeed unformed and unstructured, but that it is nevertheless highly organized and effectively analyzable (it is not entirely containable in knowledge, but is analyzable in effect, as effect). The crucial point is that form and structure are not the only conceivable modes of differentiation. Here, affect is seen as prior to or apart from the qualitative, and its opposition with the quantitative, and therefore not fundamentally a matter of investment (if a thermodynamic model applies, it is not classical but quantum and far-from-equilibrium; more on this later). For more on the relation between affect and quality/quantity, see Massumi.

3. The reference to conventional discourse in Spinoza is to what he calls "universal notions" (classificatory concepts that attribute to things defining structural properties and obey the law of the excluded middle) and "transcendental notions" (teleological concepts explaining a thing by reference to an origin or end in some way contained in its form). See The Ethics, book 2, proposition 40, scholium 1 in Volume 1 of The Collected Works.

4. The retrospective character of attributions of linear causality and logical consistency was analyzed by Henri Bergson under the rubric of the "retrograde movement of truth." See The Creative Mind.

5. See in particular chapter 2 (an analysis of the chemistry of crystallization). Simondon carries out throughout his work a far-reaching critique of concepts of form and structure in philosophy and the natural and social sciences.

6. On proprioception and affect, see Massumi.

7. A connection could be made here with the work of Walter Benjamin on shock and the circulation of images. Susan Buck-Morss (312) quotes from Benjamin's Passagen-werk on the "monadological structure" of "dialectical images." This structure is a "force-field" manifesting a nonlinear temporality (a conflict between "fore-history" and "after-history" in direct connection with one another, skipping over the present without which the conflict would nevertheless not take place: "in
order for a piece of the past to be touched by present actuality, there must be no connection between them."

8. For a brilliant analysis of affect in terms of intensity, vitality, synaesthesia ("amodal perception"), and nonconscious sense of self, see Stern.

9. Deleuze discusses perception, the brain, and matter in Cinema 1, chapters 1 and 3 (in relation to Bergson). Deleuze and Guattari make the connection between the brain and chaos in What Is Philosophy?, conclusion.

10. The main difference between this perspective and that of Lawrence Grossberg is that his approach does not develop a sustainable distinction between implicate and explicate orders (between virtuality and actuality, intension and extension). Although Meaghan Morris does not use the term affect, her analysis of the function of the TV screen brings her approach to the mass media into close philosophical affinity with the one being developed here. In "Ecstasy and Economics (A Portrait of Paul Keating)," she describes the screen image as triggering a "phase of empowerment" that is also a "passage" and "transport," not between two places but between a place and a non-place, an "elsewhere": "the screen . . . is not a border between comparable places or spaces . . . What visibly "exists" there, 'bathed' in glow, is merely a 'what'—a relative pronoun, a bit of language, that relation 'your words describe'" (Morris 70–72).

11. On these and other topics, including gory detail of Reagan's crumblings, see Dean and Massumi. The statement that ideology—like every actual structure—is produced by operations that do not occur on its level and do not follow its logic is simply a reminder that it is necessary to integrate implicate order into the account. This is necessary to avoid capture and closure on a plane of signification. It signals the measure of openness onto heterogeneous realities of every ideological structure, however absolutist. It is a gesture for the conceptual enablement of resistance in connection with the real. Ideology is construed here in both the common-sense meaning as a structure of belief, and in the cultural-theoretical sense of an interpellative subject positioning.

12. On mime, see José Gil.

13. For one account of how this larger field functions, see Deleuze, "Postscriptum" 240–47.

14. The concept of transduction is taken, with modifications, from the work of Gilbert Simondon.

15. In addition to the quotes in Buck-Morss cited in note 7 above, see in particular Benjamin 160–63. See also Michael Taussig 141–48. Bakhtin also develops an analog theory of language and image, in which synaesthesia and the infolding of context discussed earlier in this essay figure prominently.

16. Bohm and Hiley (353–54) use a holographic metaphor to express the monadic nature of the "implicate order" as "enfolded" in the explicate order.

17. Heilbroner and Thurow 138: "Behind [currency], rests the central requirement of faith. Money serves its indispensable purposes as long as we believe in it. It ceases to function the moment we do not."

Works Cited