En bref, toujours et plus que jamais: la révolution moléculaire. [In short, always and more than ever: the molecular revolution.]

All Readers tell the story of their editors’ reading and The Guattari Reader is no exception. The articles and interviews in this volume are assembled around five themes: “The Vicissitudes of Therapy”, “From Schizo Bypasses to Postmodern Impasses”; “Discursive Interlude” [a long interview on a variety of topics]; “Polysemiosis”; “Queer/Subjectivities”, and “Red and Green Micropolitical Ecologies” In other words, this Reader addresses the issues of anti-psychiatry and anti-psychoanalysis; the schizo process and the promise of a post-media era set against the dead end of postmodern theory; a wild and woolly polysemiotics based on creative extrapolations from the glossematics of Louis Hjelmslev and the semiotics of C.S. Peirce; the queering – that is, the polyphonic potentialization – of subjectivity; a theory of capitalism and how, and why, to resist it. These do not by any means cover the entire field of Guattari’s work, nor are the individual pieces meant to neatly tie up the five arrangements. None of the arrangements are solid blocks; they are all porous, internally diverse, and crossed by multiple thematics.

We are on the verge of a long-delayed and for some, long-awaited, explosion of interest in and publishing – in English, at least – on Guattari as his work emerges from the shadow of Gilles Deleuze The Guattari Reader will find itself in good company. Still, how many of you have been to a Deleuze and Guattari conference and not heard more than a few words on Guattari? Too many? Yet I have not attempted to separate Guattari from his co-authors. Such an attempt would be completely wrongheaded in Guattari’s own terms. Still, I am sorely tempted merely as a provocation – to frame the problem sociologically in terms of a generational (perhaps even a departmental) divide among readers, but this, too, would distort the important lessons Deleuze and Guattari have taught about the conjunction – among others – between their names. I have included Guattari and Deleuze and Alliez and Negri . . . because it
was not by accident that they all ended up writing together and between one another.

I will not enter here into a detailed justification of my selections. There is too much to say about them, none of which could satisfy all of the possible objections to them. Which is not to say that I'm not inviting second guesses. I did, however, want to avoid an imbalance between material already available in English and previously untranslated material (the situation is always, in this regard, fluid; a few retranslations of material are included), as well as using both short and long pieces, and have included journalistic articles as punctuation for the longer technical bits. I also wanted to make use of as many statements of position as muddy explorations (although, personally, I enjoy wading through the latter).

Instead, in this introduction I want to provide some background and critical material drawn from a variety of sources which support the themes that run through this Reader, without, I hope strangling any of the sections, and choking out the reader's own de-and reterritorializations. The first two introductory essays situate Guattari in terms of significant events, places, and debates in the European anti-psychiatry movement. The key concept under discussion is the 'sector', and the key site is La Borde clinic. The third section is organized around the concept of the therapeutic bestiary, and uses the 'animal' as a device for revealing tendencies in Freudian analysis against which Guattari theorized and also inherited and adapted to his own needs. Guattari, too, has a bestiary. The goal of the section on schizoanalysis is to explicate elements central to Guattari's "pragmatics of the unconscious" and provide an example of how a difficult concept such as the machine may be put to work on a text from pop culture. The final introductory section is devoted to Guattari's theory of Integrated World Capitalism and the emergence of his alternative brands of communistic and ecosophical thinking. The introduction ends by taking note of some of the particular political projects in which Guattari was involved before his death on August 29, 1992. Choose, then, as you like, and make connections as your reading progresses; treat this Reader like a rhizome. Or make a diagram. There is no need to match the following introductory sections to particular arrangements of material. This is supposed to be a user-friendly collection rather than a stodgy manual!

1 Anti-Psychiatry and the Sector

Throughout its various manifestations in literature, media, and even cinema, the anti-psychiatry movement of the early 1970s discovered the
close relationship between psychiatric and other forms of repression. In Guattari's view this decisive discovery led to a variety of developments in different European countries, some examples of which are reviewed in his essay, cobbled together from previously published short articles, "Alternative à la psychiatrie". For example, Le Réseau was established in Brussels in 1975. The Belgian project centered on developing an "alternative to the sector", and many radical psychiatrists from France, Italy, and elsewhere contributed to a colloquium held in January of that year. This colloquium blossomed into the European Network for Alternatives to Psychiatry. The phenomenon of sectorisation refers to psychiatric facilities outside hospitals (including day hospitals, dispensaries, home visits, drug rehab programs, etc.) which, in France, are divided into sectors or districts serving the mental health needs of as many as 60-70,000 people. The sector, let us say, brought psychiatry to the "community" The figure of 70,000 (mentioned by Guattari, among many others) acquired a life of its own and a relevance far beyond its initial importance. This was considered to be the smallest district and thus was not, in relation to super-sectors of over 200,000 inhabitants, normative. But unfortunately it became so. The rigid formula of three beds per thousand, based on the ideal figure of 70,000 people per sector, very quickly bore no relation to the reality for many doctors in the fast-growing suburban satellite cities around Paris.

The question of the sector had an enormous impact on French, and European, mainstream and radical psychiatry. For what was at issue was nothing less than whether the hors l'hôpital could succeed in something other than reproducing the psychiatry dans l'hôpital. Sectorisation became the official doctrine of the French Ministry of Health in 1960, the year the famous Circulaire du 15 mars was issued by Ministère Aujaleu, long-serving Directeur général de la santé (1956–64), a military doctor and close ally of De Gaulle. A community mental health pilot project was launched in the XIIIth arrondissement of Paris. It was only after the events of May 1968 and in the early 1970s, that this experiment in sectorisation became the model for actual changes in the delivery of a national mental health care system. But the XIIIth, too, acquired a mythic dimension, despite the questions raised about whether it was transposable to other fully socialized sectors since it was, among other things, semi-private, without a hospital infrastructure, or an asylum. It needs to be kept in mind that sectorisation had a silent period from 1964 to 68 after Aujaleu was replaced.

Initially, the "policy of the sector" was considered by many activists to be socially progressive, given the need to reform the French asylum system. But by the time the policy was put into place, it was considered to be reactionary. Members of Le Réseau with personal experience of
this policy, and whose political views at first allowed them to cooperate with it in good will, "came to realize", as Guattari put it, "that no fundamental problem will be solved in this domain as long as we do not have the goal of what they call a *depsychiatrization of madness*". This understanding of the condition of the psychiatrized is reached through the recognition that psychiatric repression functions by other means in the absence of hospitals: to use Guattari's imagery, a neuroleptic or chemical straightjacket replaces a physical straightjacket. In developing his perspective on "popular alternatives to psychiatry", Guattari emphasized that mental illness was irreducible to social alienation and the critique of capitalism. As Guattari explains, it is not so much a matter of "politicizing madness" as of opening the eyes of traditional political organizations to the hitherto misunderstood relationships between a series of problems concerning the condition of the mentally ill, immigrants, women, children, etc. Indeed, Guattari's own practice aimed at overcoming the reduction to social alienation, which denies and suppresses the specificity of madness, and evading the trap of familialism, which in its turn denies, by excluding, extra-familial or social factors.

Although Guattari came to criticize the elitist and largely theoretical aspects of what is called the second wave of anti-psychiatry - to which I will return momentarily - for him it was still in many ways superior to the first phase of the movement. In the first phase, doctors such as Thomas Szasz maintained, in his influential *The Myth of Mental Illness*, that mental illness was a *myth* that needed to be debunked so that a non-medical model of social dis-ease, existential and ethical problems of living (interpersonal and moral conflicts), could emerge and provide for a radical critique and renewed understanding of existing practices. Szasz would later, in another *myth* book, this time *The Myth of Psychotherapy*, suggest that psychotherapy be renamed *iatrologic*, belonging to rhetoric and logic, as an art of healing souls without medical, professional, and institutional pretensions. His paradigm was hysteria - a diagnosis he demythologized by using a game-conflict model to reveal that it was a longstanding term of evasion referring to a condition arising from a person's inability to forget old rules and relinquish playing old games, often marked by the refusal to play any games at all. By the same token, transference-neurosis arose from the projection of old goals on new games; likewise, disappointment-reactions of varying degrees resulted from the recognition that there were no transcendentally valid games. Guattari would not, however, play Szasz's game of social alienation.

Despite his differences with Franco Basaglia, the Italian anti-psychiatrist of the second wave, Guattari claimed that Basaglia's work challenged both anti-psychiatric elitism, marginality, and did not flirt with the "convenient myth" hypothesis. In Guattari's review of Basaglia's
L'institution en négation, he defends Basaglia's critical approach to the ideas of British reformers such as Maxwell Jones and applauds his ability to refuse the reformist politics of the sector. Basaglia's group Psichiatria Democratica was a mental health employees' association and lobby group whose task was to influence change in psychiatric practices and to politically educate its members on matters such as refusing to become "functionaries of consent", refusing to use "medical alibis", while admitting the reality of psychiatric problems, learning to deal with psychopathological problems related to conditions at work, at home, in the city, in the university, etc.

The documentary film Fous à délier was created by the group at the hospital in Parma gathered around Mario Tomasini (Marco Bellochio, Sylvano Agnosti, Sandro Petraglia, Stefano Rulli). This film was, for Guattari, "the illustration of the politics adopted by the mental health workers in Italy united around Basaglia, Giovanni Jervis and the militants of the movement Psichiatria Democratica". In Fous à délier, psychiatric survivors face the camera and recount their experiences. But it is not only a record of ordeals. Some of the most poignant stories, Guattari notes, are those told by children who were "caught in the machinery of medico-pedagogical sectorization"; the many women who relate the horrors of their lives in the hospital retain their dignity and display resilience in dealing with the daily challenges and fears of life outside the hospital. To these examples are added the testimonies of labor activists who recount their efforts at integrating so-called "profoundly mentally deficient" persons into the workplace, transforming themselves, their new comrades, and the atmosphere on the shop floor, in the process.

Guattari's praise for this film was high indeed. He wrote: "In my view this film does not call for debate: it closes it. The time has come to close the files, the files of the psychiatric hospital archaic or modernist versions ←, the files of sectorization, those of medico-pedagogical institutions, those of psychoanalysis, etc. What is on the agenda is no longer grand theoretical demonstrations, vehement denunciations and programs of all kinds, but genuine passages à l'acte (actings out)". What is called for, then, is the genuine revelation of hitherto suppressed (and even repressed) experiences and events in the psycho-pharmaceutical complex, with political militantism focusing on everyday life and the transformation of public opinion, rather than on the creation of utopian communities with few social effects. Forget guruism, le lacanism, psychoanalytical silence, and all miniaturizations of repression, all shrinking. But don't forget them altogether since the confessions of a star of madness like Mary Barnes can reveal the inner-workings – pressures, contradictions, absurdities, failures, successes – of English anti-psychiatric projects such as Kingsley Hall. Men and women in documentary
films such as *Fous à délier* do not always produce truths, Guattari admits, even if, ultimately, everything concerning the psychiatric hospital must be, with a view to both balance and urgency, brought into direct contact with the "minimum good sense of people directly concerned" such as those who found their voices in the film and those who watched it. Roger Gentis, too, praised *Fous à délier* and the work of Psichiatria Democratica, but wondered whether it was a difference in the political situation in Italy that made this progressive change possible. To this question he answered no: provincial communist administrations were not "naturally open and receptive" to problems and solutions [pro]posed by anti-psychiatric activists.\textsuperscript{11} For his part, Guattari believed (circa 1970) that national conditions needed to be taken into account since in Italy "the state of the hospitals and the legislation is undoubtedly one of the most archaic in Europe".\textsuperscript{12} Circa 1989, Guattari would again turn to the Italian example, this time pointing to the work of Franco Rotelli in the psychiatric hospital in Trieste. Rotelli's group transformed the hospital into an international cultural centre whose political goal was the transformation of traditional psychiatry and other psychiatric hospitals in Italy.\textsuperscript{13}

More recently, Guattari praised the revelatory aesthetic of *film-verité* in the cause of making visible the interfaces between patient-doctor-institution in Raymond Depardon's film *Urgences*.\textsuperscript{14} The twenty-odd sequences in the documentary, shot at the psychiatric *service des urgences* of the Hôtel-Dieu in Paris, powerfully reveal that "it is our own subjectivity which finds itself encircled in this nightmarish carousel" of alcoholics, depressives, compulsives, etc. While *film-verité* can access the "interiority of madness and dereliction", Guattari emphasized that "the spectacle of all these existential ruptures work directly upon our own lines of fragility". Depardon's film brings the viewer into contact with a phenomenon to which one is close, even if one is content to treat this proximity as a sufficient distance.

In terms of institutional politics, Guattari stated that the staff psychiatrists in general "are totally deprived of the means of organizing a humane reception worthy of the name". Whether or not there is a demand for a humane reception is a question that they need to ask themselves. Guattari was, however, unequivocal: a reception facility must distinguish between new arrivals whose stays will be long and who therefore may be admitted in a relaxed manner, and those new arrivals who will have much shorter stays. Having made this distinction, however, Guattari maintained that with regard to the latter: "The expeditious interviews dispensed one after another by the psychiatrists would not even suffice in such cases, especially if the people who turned up are to remain there for only a few hours".\textsuperscript{15} Since this problem is well known to specialists in institutional therapy, Guattari could ask: "Why, then, is it there today in the heart of Paris?"
If, on the one hand, English anti-psychiatry distinguished itself brilliantly on the theoretical level but held confused political goals, then, on the other hand, in Germany the SPK (Sozialistisches Patientenkollektiv), despite being burdened with an "ossified Hegelianism", created an "unambiguous political cleavage". For Guattari, the "affaire de Heidelberg" of 1971 marked "the first time psychiatric combat was taken to the street, to the quarter, to the entire city. Like the 22nd of March at Nanterre, the SPK was mobilized around a real struggle."  

In the Polyclinic at the University of Heidelberg, a group of forty patients and their doctor (Hubert) developed a critique of the institution in which psychiatry was shown to function as an instrument of repression. The director of the clinic considered this group to be "a collective of hate and aggression" Guattari remarks that what began as a "little intra-hospital experiment became a mass struggle", largely in virtue of the fact that as institutional opposition to the collective increased, so did state resistance. Guattari relates that when administrative and legal means failed to dissolve the group, a vote was taken behind closed doors in the University Senate mandating a public show of force. Using an unrelated event in suburban Heidelberg involving an exchange of gunfire as an excuse, 300 riot cops, helicopters, and special brigades were mobilized with the goal of crushing the SPK. Patients and doctors were arrested, Dr. Huber's children were kidnapped, and many of the persons arrested were drugged into submission in order to make it appear that they were cooperating with the invading force. Dr. Huber and his wife languished in prison for years on trumped-up charges that, first of all, they themselves were insane, and second, that they were terrorists. No end of legal irregularities and police dirty tricks surrounded the case. It needs to be kept in mind that on several occasions in the 1970s Guattari, too, was harassed by the French police who searched his apartment in Paris and La Borde on the trail of, as they say, "suspected" militants and "pornographic" publications. In Chapter 5, "Queer/Subjectivities", the first entry "Three Billion Perverts On The Stand" is the collection of notes Guattari used in his legal defense against the charge of "affronting public decency" brought about by the publication of an issue on homosexuality of the journal he edited, Recherches.

Far beyond reformist politics of all sorts, the example of the SPK posed for Guattari a new kind of practice in which the patients themselves, having repudiated reformism and the seductions of modernization, established an inextricable link between political struggle and mental illness, making madness the concern of everyone. And they did this despite the reticence of the left to enter into new kinds of alliances with groups that normally did not march through the streets, attend meetings, and tow the party line. Guattari could thus state: "To put it in
a somewhat excessive manner, the SPK is in a way the equivalent of the Commune de Paris on the level of proletarian struggles”. The German example also needs to be contrasted with Basaglia’s experiments in Gorizia. The latter ended, Guattari thinks, not by falling into theoretical dogmatism, but by turning the “rightfully violent” negation of repressive institutions into institutional change based upon social alienation rather than on an understanding of the “unconscioussignifying assemblage [where] madness dwells, [and] which predetermines the structural field in which political options, drives, and revolutionary inhibitions are deployed, beside and beyond social and economic determinisms”.

Turning briefly, then, to Spain circa 1975 and the activities of the Psychiatrists Against Francoism of the Hospital of Conxo, in Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle, in Galicia, Guattari describes some effects of the process of modernization (loss of beds, shrinking of the hospitalized population, deterioration of the staff–patient ratio, the recruitment of young doctors – at first for full-time positions but, later, in a standard union- and unity-busting measure, reducing these to part-time). The hospital was, however, transformed through the implementation of an open door policy, patient self-determination, meetings between staff and patients, and community contact. These changes were met with a “violent fascist reaction” in which, ultimately, the government installed a new director and used the occasion of the national strike of the MIR (Les Médecins Internes Résidents) to gut the staff and replace them with their own appointees.

This anti-psychiatric episode was inseparable, Guattari believed, from the anti-fascist struggle in Galicia against the Franco government’s non-recognition of Galician cultural and political heritage and aspirations. “Under these conditions”, Guattari wrote, “it is impossible to envisage a partial amelioration of the fate of the psychiatric inmates at the hospital without gradually raising all the other problems of the emancipation of the Galician people.” The issues raised by modernization point in several directions in this case: the loss of traditional rural community organizations dealing with the mentally ill, coupled with the will to improve the conditions of the hospitalized, and give staff better salaries. Guattari concludes that the lesson of the Galician response to modernization is that the anti-psychiatric struggle must hold onto the goal of separating madness from its administration and evaluation by specialists and groups of experts.

**II La Borde**

Before co-founding La Borde with Guattari, the psychiatrist Jean Oury practised at the clinics of St. Alban (1947–49) and Saumery (1949–53).
For him “Saumery represented a kind of concrete initiation period into the technical and medical problems posed by psychopathology, but equally an initiation into a collective life with all its misadventures.” Guattari, Oury recalls, visited him for long periods at Saumery. Saumery was also Guattari’s initiation into psychiatry. Oury convinced him to abandon his study of pharmacy for a politically committed psychiatry. While at St. Alban, Oury met François Tosquelles, whose criticisms of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology, which he developed during his wartime psychiatric work in Catalonia, would have a decisive influence on St. Alban, and later, on La Borde.

Oury downplays any suggestion that a group at Saumery made a “bid for power” by leaving the clinic in order to found La Borde. Rather, the case was less dramatic. Saumery was a small clinic that had already expanded from 12 to 50 beds. The absence of a psychiatric hospital in the department of Loir-et-Cher presented the opportunity to build something original from the ground up.

Jean-Claude Pollack, co-author with Danièle Sabourin of *La Borde ou le droit à la folie*, for which Guattari wrote the introduction “La Borde, un lieu-dit”, remarks of the Lacanian beginnings of the clinic: “When I first arrived at La Borde one didn’t have the right to speak if one had not gone over Lacan with a fine tooth comb.” Despite the fact that Guattari was analyzed by Lacan and neither abandoned his seminar nor renounced l’Ecole freudienne – well, except to the extent that he came to see Lacan’s brand of structuralized psychoanalysis as as religion devoted to the cultivation and initiation of followers – the “duo of Oury-Guattari” never required, we are told, the same degree of blind followership. Not everyone shares this opinion. Lacan’s breakway school had many connections with the GTPSI (Groupe de travail de psychothérapie institutionnelle), founded at St. Alban in 1960, and a fixture at La Borde. Guattari mentions in passing the “Caro affair” in his review of several books by R. D. Laing in “Laing divisé.” He keeps his distance from this affair by using it as an example of the French public’s sensitivity to the problems of madness after the events of 1968, and as an instance of the need to scrutinize every event which considers itself to be in some way exemplary, an operation which he does not perform. Guy Caro was the medical director of the Clinique Burloud in Rennes. In September 1971, he was fired from his post after initiating liberal reforms that had the support of the community, the patients (primarily students) and staff. Sherry Turkle implicates Guattari in the “Lacanian anti-psychiatric clique” whose denigration of Caro’s reforms, on the grounds that they were under-theorized and insufficiently politicized, led to his firing. She likens the weekend seminars at La Borde (Saturday at 6 p.m.) to Lacan’s Wednesday seminars in Paris as places for star-gazing. She quotes Robert
Castel’s sarcastic remarks to the effect that: “Poor Dr. Caro who is only a progressive psychiatrist and a political militant from the provinces and who had frequented neither Lacan’s Wednesdays nor Cour-Cheverny weekends.” Of course, for every bone Turkle has to pick with the dynamic duo of Oury-Guattari and their followers, there is a positive counterexample.

For his part, Oury was, according to Pollack, “often perceived [by l’Ecole freudienne] as an irregular of a dangerous heterodoxy”. Even so, Pollack thinks that Oury’s seminar at La Borde was “probably the most often followed exegesis, and the most ‘pedagogic’ of the work on Lacan.” Guattari considered Pollack and Sabourin’s book to be much more than a work on La Borde: it was written from La Borde and belonged there. La Borde was a “black hole: the result of a semiotic collapse which rises again, you don’t know when! Sometimes fluxes of sign-particles are released, some of which settle in the form of texts, like this one”.28

It was the treatment of psychotics that set La Borde apart from most public hospitals in France; it was also at first a private clinic, until la sécurité sociale stepped in. Guattari and Oury wrote La Borde’s constitution called “Constitution de l’An 1” the year the clinic opened in 1953. While Guattari was there at the beginning, his involvement increased after 1955. The myth of La Borde was propagated, Oury laments, not by those who worked there, but by the intellectuals who for a time spent their winter vacations there, at the place – a chateau, after all – that became known as the “St. Trop de la Sologne!”. For Oury, there were too many people full of their own degrees visiting the hospital in order to admire the spectacle of les Labordiens; worst of all, these intellectual hordes were impossible to “civilize”. It seemed that one of the elementary accomplishments of the first wave of psychiatric reform – that physicians speak to their patients – had been forgotten. The mythmaking continues unabated, even by those who have worked there for decades, like Marie Depussé: “the mad cried when Oury told them of Félix’s death, the following day in the great hall. ‘Thank you for telling us in this way,’ they responded. In exchange, despite a great deal of wandering during the night, for lack of sleep, they were polite, tender, making no noise”. It was the private status of La Borde, Oury laments, that helped to propagate its mysteries and myths. While he regrets that it was not a public institution, primarily for economic reasons (an opinion that Guattari did not share), he also wants to discount the myth that its private status gave the doctors the freedom to experiment in ways that would not have been permitted in a hospital setting. The mythic dimension of St. Alban is much the same. During the Second World War, with Paris occupied, the director Lucien Bonnafe would provide “asylum” for the
poet Paul Eluard in the fall of 1943; much has been written about this episode. Still, this much of the myth is true: the rescue of Tosquelles from a French refugee camp, after the latter had fled the war in Spain, and passed through the Pyrénées on foot. First Eluard, then, the Dadaist Tzara, the “red psychiatrist” Tosquelles, the arrival of the new director Bonnafé, refugees of all sorts, resistance fighters, a hiding place for many doctors, all nestled away at a 1,000 metres altitude deep in Lozère.

In general, the politics of the sector turned the attention of psychiatrists away from the hospital and its structures into the community. But the community at issue was difficult to define, for it was not only geographic and demographic in nature, but had juridical, economic, theoretical, sociological, and organizational features and consequences. The extra-hospital focus of the sector served the interests of a variant of anti-psychiatry as a geo-psychiatry of an active, peripatetic sectorial type. As Bonnafé and Tosquelles explain, géo-psychiatrie is a “species of migrant work”, of the sort that was common at St. Alban with its outside consultations, medico-pedagogical relations, and even its intra-hospital therapeutic groups; that is, with its deterritorializations.

Psychiatry is embedded in geography, le cru. Local human geography is the milieu of géo-psychiatrie. And to the extent that it may be called geophilosophical, this psychiatry “affirms the power of a milieu.”

As recently as June 1992, two months before his death, Guattari was still referring to the lessons in human, particularly, workers’ “understanding of human relations” in the film Fous à délier. Although the “heroic époque” of anti-psychiatry may have ended, Guattari did not refer to such examples with cynicism, but in the context of his theorization of the formation of new alliances between the worker’s movement, feminist and ecological movements. The formation of a “new progressive axis” must, Guattari believed, be substituted for the old left-right split.

The thinkers of the second wave of anti-psychiatry – that infelicitous label coined by David Cooper – have mostly passed away: Laing, Cooper, Basaglia; Guattari and, most recently, Tosquelles. Gentis is still writing, and Oury remains at La Borde. Szasz, from the first wave, soldiers on. Developments in the delivery of mental health services during the 1980s in France did not encourage Guattari. Although he did not predict the privatization of psychiatry, he found a sort of “collusion between a certain corporatism (psychiatrists, health care groups) and the cumbersome state structures which administer French psychiatry” With little room for social innovation and collective experimentation to provide examples, Guattari witnessed a tendency towards a “generalized colourlessness”. Even the most “lively and interesting” experiments of the sector cannot correct the “institutional conditions that make life, social life, impossible.” For Guattari, “the true scandal is the existence of
incarcerative structures which literally exterminate the mentally ill and the personnel who work there, in the place of creating living systems.”

III  A Therapeutic Bestiary

Of the many sophisticated critical insights into psychoanalysis made by Guattari in his own writings as well as in his collaborations with Deleuze, the idea of becoming-animal presents a particularly rewarding way into the concept of the assemblage and how one connects with it through unnatural participation.

Does psychoanalysis have a zoological vision? In a brilliant essay written with Deleuze, “1914: One Or Several Wolves?” in A Thousand Plateaus, Guattari answers in the negative and shifts his loyalty behind the Wolf-Man who, it is said, took revenge upon Freud in a letter to Muriel Gardiner in 1945, by pointing out Herr Doktor’s irreversible blindness to animals. Deleuze and Guattari fail to mention that the letter in question was directed at Gardiner’s daughter, whose interest in animals the Wolf-Man wanted to encourage, perhaps even cultivate: “Nothing can be of greater value to a young person than a love of nature and understanding of natural science, particularly of animals.” Deleuze and Guattari end their essay on this note, but omit the tail end of the quote: “Animals played a large part in my childhood also. In my case they were wolves.” Despite what Freud thought, I know a few things about animals, the Wolf-Man seems to be saying. In “One Or Several Wolves?” the Wolf-Man gets off the couch and runs with his pack. The only kind of animals that psychoanalysis understands are “individuated animals, family pets, sentimental, Oedpial animals each with its own petty history, ‘my’ cat, ‘my’ dog.” Freud would not allow his patient to become wolf, to join the pack with which he was already in communication. In becoming-animal one neither imagines taking on the features of a given creature nor actually becomes one. Instead, and thus becoming is neither totemic nor biological (hence, unnatural), one connects up with some elements of a wolf, or something closely related, to compose a molecular wolf, perhaps even by bumping against your friends as you run for together for the bus. Becoming is always molecular. Assemblages are composed, and decomposed, and recomposed without a molar unity informing them. This is what Freud abandoned for the sake of his fable of phobic animals, thus blinkering his zoological vision. And such a vision for Deleuze and Guattari enables one to see that “every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack” Psychoanalysis couldn’t see that what was real was the becoming, because it always pointed elsewhere.
There are many reasons for this restricted field of vision. Until Anna’s dog entered the scene circa 1925, Freud had little or no close contact with animals. Indeed, the socio-semiotic significance of Anna’s German shepherd named Wolfi was never acknowledged by Freud; that is, it came to be one of the many visible vehicles of the persecution of Jews and a potent sign of National Socialism. Martha Freud knew better. The status of dogs in the culture of the shetl also pointed in the direction of the brutish guard dog patrolling its borders. Strangely enough, Freud’s dogs would patrol his office. Freud’s emotional investment in his dogs overrode these cultural codes as well as his wife’s annoyance at his habit of feeding Wolfi and his succession of chows from the table. Freud’s vision was further limited by his sociocultural milieu: horses, dogs, cats, certain birds (pigeons), even the animals of the medical establishment, would have been commonplace. Freud was familiar with animal hallucinations and a small selection of domesticates, pets and otherwise. Freud may even have learned a few lessons about animals from the “sexual research” carried out at the zoo at Schönbrunn on the outskirts of Vienna by his young patient Little Hans. Most important, however, was Freud’s love of dogs. Elsewhere I have shown that the psychoanalytic bestiary is rife with dogs. Suffice to say that it is no mere rhetorical taunt to say that every time Freud heard wolf he thought dog. The “analyst’s bow-wow” circulated around Freud’s theory, practice, and personal relations.

As far as large animals and male children are concerned, phobic animals, thought Freud, are substitutes for the father. Sandor Ferenczi’s young patient Little Arpad, as well as Little Hans, were trapped in Freud’s bestiary by the single apologue under which their becomings-animal were subsumed. Chickens, horses, even wolves: it doesn’t matter, it’s really daddy. There is more. As Deleuze and Guattari show, Freud was quite incapable of seeing wolves. They were quickly transformed into sheep dogs or goats. Moreover, Freud would not let the Wolf-Man look into the riveting gazes of his dream wolves. He preferred the more reassuring reversal that they were looked at as if they were unseeing objects for our inspection, tortured zoo animals in a bad dream of the domination of the wild. Freud didn’t even admit that the Wolf-Man had the same name as his daughter’s dog!

Deleuze and Guattari do not substitute something for Freud’s substitution. Daddy is not replaced by a molecular assemblage. A molar Daddy could deterritorialize himself and take a place on the body-without-organs of the pack. But he will take a different position with new and varying interrelations with other changing elements every time he joins an organless body in composition. As Deleuze and Guattari specify, multiplicity “was created precisely in order to escape the abstract
opposition between the multiple and the one...

In the history of philosophy one finds many different kinds of multiplicities: some macro-, some micro-. Opposition, interpenetration, overlapping, provocative extensions, mutually modifying disturbances: there is no dualism at work here! Just “multiplicities of multiplicitites forming a single assemblage, operating in the same assemblage” in which we are caught up at one time or another. Or so they say, despite the occasional slip back – which they don’t deny – into hierarchized abstract distinctions favoring the wild multiplicity over the domesticated individual. Christopher L. Miller has catalogued an impressive array of elements foreign to Deleuze and Guattari’s project; there are sanitizations for the sake of their rhizomorph and nomadic “happy talk”, a few corpses stuffed into the footnotes, too strong a claim of immunity from factual error, exoticism, uncritical citations, stereotypes, elements of colonization (rhizome in its botanical sense).

If Freud tried to reduce the Wolf-Man’s pack to his father, and Deleuze and Guattari, in spite of themselves, privilege the wild pack-multiplicity, we should pay special attention to those packs trained to hunt together (wolfhounds), not so much to level the dualism, but to provide an occasion for the combination of wild and domesticated packs. The Wolf-Man, it needs to be recognized, had a long standing interest in wolves because of his experiences on his father’s estate in White Russia. This was wolf country. Wolf-hunts were commonplace. This memory is both evidence of the Wolf-Man’s experience of the pack, and Freud’s lack of interest in his patient’s origins, but also an instance of the meeting of wild and domesticated packs (wolfhounds preparing for the wolf hunt). Sheep dogs, it might be mentioned, often have to fight off wolves when flock-and pack-multiplicities collide. In addition, Deleuze and Guattari set up a straw-dog as a sign of all of Freud’s canine bestiary (his chows and pekineses, Anna’s German Shepherd, Marie Bonaparte’s chows, Dorothy Burlingham’s dogs, etc.), further debasing the domesticated side of the dualism. Surely they would appreciate a mixed pack, a loose assemblage of wolves banished from their packs, lone hunters and solitary pairs becoming pack-like during the mating season, de-domesticated “feral” dogs, lost bow-wows, wolves, diamond dogs, Kristeva packs, and the rest.

Every therapeutics has its bestiary. These considerations on becoming-animal make it abundantly clear that the psychoanalytic bestiary is one of the critical objects of schizoanalysis. Schizoanalysis does not simply throw open the cages of the psychoanalytic zoo! The thematic of the bestiary is a way into the schizoanalytic project. Consider a classic like Guattari’s essay “Transversalité” Transversality does nothing less than schizophrenize the transference. The transference is the libidinal tie
between the analyst and the analysand that is subject to analysis. At first Freud thought it could be enlisted as a therapeutic ally, but later realized it could be a form of resistance, a powerfully seductive, even dangerous, bond. The transference, then, must be dismantled piece by piece and completely resolved in order for an analysis to be considered successful. With Guattari, the transference becomes vehicular, it gets away from the analyst and analysand into group relations. Transference is no longer a dual relation; it is at least triangular, but that isn’t saying much. The analyst is no longer the mirror; rather, it’s the group. This places the group in the position of the analyst, thus making it an analyzer.

Transversality is the transference become vehicular. Even so, Guattari specifies that among the power relations between the groups in a typical psychiatric hospital – i.e., between nurses and patients and doctors – the transference may be “fixed obligatory, predetermined, ‘territorialized’ on a role, a certain stereotype”\(^5\) For Guattari, this is “a form of the interiorization of bourgeois repression by the repetitive, archaic and artificial resurgence of the phenomena of caste, with their procession of fascinating and reactionary group phantasms”.\(^6\) Just as the transference is the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, transversality in the group – rather than the more ambiguous institutional transference, Guattari notes – is the object of institutional analysis. And institutional analysis eventually becomes, under the pressure to avoid its normalizations and professionalization as a therapy, schizoanalysis. Guattari writes: “Imagine a fenced field in which there are horses wearing adjustable blinkers, and let’s say that the ‘coefficient of transversality’ will be precisely the adjustment of the blinkers. If the horses are completely blind, a certain kind of traumatic encounter will be produced. As soon as the blinkers are opened, one can imagine that they will move about in a more harmonious way. Let’s try to represent the manner in which people comport themselves in relation to one another from the affective point of view”\(^7\) Guattari then jumps from horses to porcupines: “According to Schopenhauer’s famous parable of the freezing porcupines, nobody can stand being too close to one’s fellows”\(^8\) Guattari slips back into the psychoanalytic bestiary, echoing Freud’s use of the same idea in his “Group Psychology.” The group is characterized, Freud says, by its libidinal ties. Both Guattari and Freud quote Schopenhauer:

One cold winter’s day, a company of porcupines huddled together to protect themselves against the cold by means of one another’s warmth. But they were pricked by each other’s quills, and it was not long before they drew apart again. The persistent cold drew them back together, but once again they felt the painful pricks. They alternately drew together and apart for some time until they
discovered an acceptable distance at which they would be free of both evils.\textsuperscript{54}

Presumably, the degree of blindness (the coefficient of transversality) of the horses is related to the degree of blindness of the persons in the hospital; or, Freud’s blinkers, like those of the horses, need to be adjusted. Official adjustments by the trainer, or by the hospital bureaucracy, come from on high, while pressure from below, from the horses and the patients, often have little effect in traditional settings. Transversality is opposed to and attempts to overcome vertical hierarchies and horizontal intra-ward relations (the hospital is one fence, the ward another) by maximizing (that is, bringing to light through analysis the latent coefficients of transversality in the group, its desires) inter-level communication, and enabling meanings to proliferate and pass between the levels, the personnel, and the patients. There is a certain harmony in the movement of the porcupines that illustrates the relations subsequent to the removal of the horses’ blinkers in Guattari’s mixed bestiary. But the degree of discomfort explodes the myth of group togetherness; the achievement of balance is a sign of hope that the de-rationalization of the group model, through reference to its instinctual, unconscious desires, is conducive to the actualization and analysis of the hitherto repressed or distorted desires of its members.

What should we say about these porcupines? Recall that the phrase “to find one’s porcupine” was a saying that circulated in psychoanalytic circles after Freud’s visit to America in 1909.\textsuperscript{55} The idea of seeing a porcupine was for Freud “a lightning conductor” for drawing off anxiousness about his main task of lecturing at Clark University. Freud did, in fact, see a porcupine; he literally found one. Guattari finds his porcupine in Schopenhauer, which really means he was able to let Freud serve as a lighting conductor for his task of elaborating the concept of transversality. The porcupine is just another animal in the psychoanalytic bestiary which facilitates the siphoning of excess affect; after all, that is precisely the role played by animals in children’s animal phobias according to Freud. Let psychoanalysis be struck by lightning, Guattari slyly suggests.

IV Schizoanalysis

“‘Do it’: this could be the watchword of a micropolitical schizoanalysis”, Guattari wrote in \textit{L’Inconscient machinique}.\textsuperscript{56} This is the sort of watchword that we need to watch out for: a yippie deterritorialization of money at the stock exchange too easily reterritorialized by the new information
technologies of late capitalism. But Guattari adds: “A schizoanalytic ‘watchword’ will not attempt to interpret, to reorganize the significations, to compromise with them; it will postulate that beyond their system of redundancy, it is always possible to transform the semiotic assemblage which corresponds to them.” Despite its compromises, there’s still hope for “do it”. Schizoanalysis neither legitimates the significations of the dominant codes nor accepts the impositions resulting from their overcoding. The schizoanalyst won’t, in other words, open a technical consultancy in pragmatics. Still, even schizoanalysts have to make a living at a social pragmatics aimed at detecting micropolitical orientations, freeing them up, and making connections between them. “Do it” means that the schizoanalyst is not sunk in a theoretical funk; pragmatics is not held in third place, as it were, behind syntactics and semantics. As Therese Grisham explains in linguistic terms: “‘Pragmatics’ has historically designated all that is outside linguistic study. Using a reterritorialized term in a subversive mode is typical of Deleuze and Guattari, for they insist that pragmatics is immanent to a consideration of language. The meaning of ‘pragmatic’ lies in its position in a power relation, and not in representation or signification. To introduce a pragmatics into language is to analyze language politically”. A further example of this pragmaticization may be seen in Guattari’s use of the diagram.

In *La Révolution moléculaire*, Guattari attempted to recast Peirce’s inclusion of diagrams under the rubric of icons by means of his own distinction between signifying and a-signifying semiotics. For Peirce, diagrammatic reasoning is iconic: “A Diagram is mainly an Icon, and an icon of intelligible relations in the constitution of its Object” (CP 4.531). A diagram is, then, mainly but not exclusively an icon. It is, as Guattari admits, for Peirce a “simplified image of things”, representational, and even “naturally analogous to the thing represented” (CP 4.368). Guattari first interrogates the relationship between the image and the diagram: the image is both more and less than the diagram: an image reproduces certain things a diagram does not, while a diagram captures better than an image functional articulations. Guattari then situates images in the category of symbolic semiotics, that is, among substitutes for and representations of intensities and real multiplicites. Diagrammatism is, Guattari thinks, a category of a-signifying semiotics; diagrammatics is, however, another name for a-signifying semiotics, as is post-signifying semiotics. Diagrammatics produces machinic rather than significative redundancies. Guattari writes: “Peirce gives graphic representations as examples of diagrams, temperature curves, for example or, at the most complex level, algebraic equations. Signs function for and on behalf of objects to which they refer, and they do so independently of the
effects of significations which may exist laterally. It is as if machines of diagrammatic signs had for an ideal the loss of all of their own inertia; it is as if they renounced all the polysemy which can exist in symbolic systems or signifying systems: the sign is refined, there are no longer thirty-six possible interpretations but a denotation and an extremely precise and strict syntax.\textsuperscript{61}

In Guattari’s terminology, a-signifying signs are more deterritorialized than those of symbolic and signifying semiotics. They blaze their own trails across dominant significations without the authority of a signifying semiology into which they can be translated and coded. While a Peircean could rightly claim that Guattari has engaged in acts of interpretive violence by playing favorites with iconic phenomena, his approach to Peirce is, I think, uncannily Peircean. To be sure, diagrams incorporate certain habits involved in the creation of graphic abstractions (in geometry and syllogistics); they also have the indexical feature of pointing “There!” (CP 3.361) without, however, describing or providing any insight into their objects. Since a diagram displays in itself the formal features of its object, it may be said to take the place of its object: “the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream” (CP 3.362). This simulation defies, Guattari specifies, the territorializing effects of representation and denotation. In Peirce’s work, too, diagrams can be deterritorializing because they are iconic – icons do not lead one away from themselves to their objects, rather, they exhibit their object’s characteristics in themselves. Icons can be indifferent to the demands of dominant semiotic formalizations. Guattari adopts a Peircean attitude towards Peirce by extending interpretation beyond his conventional definitions. And this is what Peirce called critical-philosophical thinking since it requires that one observe an author’s line of thought, from which one then extrapolates imaginatively. In his discussion of theorematic reasoning (CP 4.233), Peirce wrote: “It is necessary that something be DONE” Guattari responds with “do it”: an a-signifying abstract machine is diagrammatic. So too is theorematic reasoning. What was a necessary question for Peirce, was a question of necessity for Guattari, a question understood well by Lenin and revisited by Jerry Rubin.

Schizoanalysis will avoid the pitfalls of personological and developmental psychologies, as well as all glotto-centric semiotics, by establishing, on a case to case basis, “a map of the unconscious” (including its strata, lines of deterritorialization, black holes, blockages, etc.). Ever attentive to the details of semiotic production, as well as to the “principle micro-political lines of assemblages of enunciation and formations of power”, this cartographer will not, like a psychoanalyst, close and reduce, but rather, open and produce. Such mapping opens onto experimentation.
Disparate elements make connections and achieve various consistencies of which there are different types (biological, ethical, etc); and all this without being dependent upon or beholden to a super-stratum or structure. These consistencies are neither totalizing, nor imposed from the outside. Connections are made along proliferating internal networks. Keep in mind that such connective rhizomes are formed from truly disparate elements, the partial objects of the unconscious.

A schizoanalytic pragmatics has at its disposal rhizomes that are irreducible to linguistic signifiers and systems of representation. The distinction between the rhizome and the tree is not absolute. Guattari writes of two preparations: first, “the preparation of a schizoanalytic rhizome will not have for its goal the description of a state of fact, the rebalancing of intersubjective relations, or the exploration of the mysteries of an unconscious lurking in the obscure nooks of memory”.62 This preparation doesn’t capture static unconscious arrangements; it doesn’t decipher what was already arranged, but remains open to experimentation in its construction of intersecting semiotics. “Maps themselves are like laboratories where tracing experiments are made to interact”.63 Tracings are “essential elements of diagrammatic semiotization”, but they are, as one finds in “Introduction: Rhizome”, in A Thousand Plateaus, part of the tree logic of reproduction, unless, of course, they are put back on the map (which is not, incidentally, to deny or erase them).64 When writing with Deleuze on this matter, Guattari seems more severe in separating tracings (aligned with competence) from maps (related to performance). For Guattari, however, maps of competence, for example, remain irreducible to “competence” as such; in the same vein, there is no universal cartography of all the pragmatic maps. Guattari does note, however, that “it is only with the signifying semioologies that a hierarchichal relation of double segmentarity installs itself between maps and tracings, fixing in a narrow margin possibilities of semiotic innovation”.65 This is because signifying semioologies are only relatively autonomous from the sort of formalization which makes them dependent upon a system of universal signification. Segmentation occurs in terms of a semiotic restriction of the modes of connection – too many rigid dualist segments.

The second “preparation of a tree of the generative type will not be, therefore, independent from that of a rhizome of the transformational type”.66 Before we examine in more detail these two kinds of schizoanalysis, generative and transformational, take note that rhizomes can branch out from the heart of generative trees. That is, idiolects and vernaculars are particular performances for which no dominant language or general competence may serve as a “totalizing reference”. Many readers of Anti-Oedipus, Guattari notes, made the mistake of making Manichean principles out of the distinction between generative and
transformational pragmatics. But “a schizoanalytic pragmatics of collective assemblages of enunciation will constantly oscillate between these two types of micro-political semiotics”. Still, together they call into question dominant encodings.

*Anti-Oedpius* required its authors to produce much secondary commentary and correct misunderstandings, for example, the “balance sheet” on machines published in the second French edition. “Do it” with your own example. What about the deaf-dumb-and-blind-boy and his pinball machine? *Tommy* may be read against the grain of the normalizing motif of the “cure” Tommy’s cure is a kind of psychical normalization for his reinsertion into the institution of the family. The first thing to be noticed is that Tommy is the story of a boy and his machine: a “pinball wizard” The relationship between Tommy and the pinball machine does not need to lead us into a game of identifying correspondences between them; nor must we be led down the blind alley of treating the machine as a kind of phantasy. What good is it to point out, as almost every critic feels they must, that pinball is a metaphor for rock n’ roll: it’s the electric guitar. What makes such a displacement and substitution necessary? Gadgets only pile up: pinball, electric guitar.

Anything, it seems, will do to reroute this kid’s desire. This adds nothing to the way Tommy communicates with the machine to the amazement of the reiging “table king”, whom he defeats. Tommy’s ability to connect with the machine is extraordinary because he cannot connect with anything or anyone else, at least in a way that would convince his parents and doctors, that his trauma is not narcissistic. Haven’t we heard enough about mirrors and psychology? His mother neither tolerates the libidinal dynamism of his pinball playing nor his fascination with his own reflection. Oh little blind and deaf narcissus, listen to and look at your mommy! Over here little oedipus! When she can’t stand it anymore, she smashes the mirror, and Tommy becomes a sensation: “Pinball Wizard in a miracle cure!” the papers read. It’s the beginning of his end.

The gesture of smashing the mirror is, however, bold, both as a fabulous cure, and as a double anti-mirror stage. Strictly speaking, Tommy is already too old for the child who, between six and eighteen months, perceives and delights in his/her own mirror image, anticipating and identifying with the bodily integrity it presents but s/he presently lacks due to his/her physical immaturity. To the extent that the mirror stage is fundamental to the constitution of the ego, even when it is smashed it gives back to Tommy, perhaps even counterintuitively against the expectations of fragmentation or cracking, a unity he apparently lacked before then. But it wrecked his pinball game.
The “table king” thinks Tommy is part of the machine: “He stands like a statue/ Becomes part of the machine”. He thinks Tommy looks like the machine – “he’s got crazy flipper fingers” – and represents him as one. No wonder he has to give up the crown, he is no better than the doctor at the research laboratory who tries to “cure” Tommy with several ridiculous little noisemakers that he is supposed to cathect onto because they makes sounds when struck. Only a shrink would believe in such things! Indeed, Tommy – who is not bothered by pinball sounds – is unimpressed. There is nothing more ridiculous than the doctor’s claim that “No machine can give the kind of stimulation/Needed to remove his inner block”. On every occasion that Tommy plays pinball, affective intensities pass between him and the machine, to and fro. Where is the block? Let it be said that Tommy’s libido withdraws into himself, except when he is playing pinball. With this auto-erotism, his ego is his sole love object, it is worth repeating, with the exception of pinball. Here we find his lines of escape. But Tommy and the pinball machine are completely independent; they are not extensions or projections of one another. They are becomings of one another. This is what allows these disparate elements to form a machinic assemblage on the basis of desire, to separate, and reform. Tommy is “unblocked” at the table, any table, even that of the local champ who has played them all “from Soho down to Brighton” – and even if he is deaf, dumb and blind. The teenager-pinball ensemble lets desire flow. The lights, buzzers, bells, and representational iconography of the machine draw the table king into the ensemble, but do not distract Tommy since, already deterritorializing on the sensory level, “he plays by sense of smell”. These “distractions” are also operational in relation to the reigning table king and his “Bally table”, that is, in relation to a second structure, a tilt machine, and, of course, to followers of the game, groupies, hangers-on, capitalists, his abusive parents, cousin and uncle, shrinks, and the rest.

Schizoanalysis doesn’t play the pretend mirror games dear to psychoanalysis. It “makes micro-political choices in opting, for example, for the acceleration or the slackening of an internal mutation of assemblages, for the facilitation or braking of an inter-assemblage transition .” It distinguishes between intra-mutations and inter-passages, and then makes decisions about them. Schizoanalysis “will explore and will experiment with an unconscious in actuality [en acte]”. Diachronic outcomes and synchronic states will both figure in its questioning of the inclusions, exclusions, confusions and refusions of assemblages. A generative schizoanalytic pragmatics will concern itself with “a pre-existing assemblage”, while a transformational pragmatics will “create new [assemblages]”; they are distinguished, then, on the basis of their objects, in a way Guattari considered to have been somewhat artificial but
nonetheless prudent. Guattari adds: “Schizoanalysis isn’t dependent upon holding up or forcing events. It never loses sight of the compromises, the regressions, the progressions, the ruptures, the revolutions exposing processes that it is not at all a question of pretending to control, or of overcoming, but only of attending to semiotically and machinically”.  

In a generative schizoanalysis, “the role of the components of passage will be here limited to putting into play only weak interactions between the assemblages, with the goal of loosening, untangling if possible, their alienating mechanisms, their stratifications and their oppressive redundancies, their black hole-effects, indeed, even of averting or deferring the threats of catastrophe which hang over them”  

Components of passage connect the mutant fluxes of desire. This weak approach will not lead, Guattari specifies, to a “systematic deterritorialization” of assemblages. It is not passive, however, even though it “will accommodate stases of long-lasting reterritorialization”, while it takes, at its own less than frantic pace, whatever opportunities present themselves for deterritorializing and re-assembling. Its motto would be, Guattari adds, “no watchword, only passwords”, as it “updates new machinic senses in situations in which everything seemed played out in advance”.

A transformational pragmatics will involve itself in “the radical modification of intrinsic mechanisms in the nuclei of assemblages and thus the creation of new assemblages”. The nuclei [nayaux] which specify assemblages exist at the points of crossing of two types of machinic consistencies: molecular consistencies that are strongly resonant (across the semantic and poetic fields) and interactive (among the components of passage); these are “the actualized face of abstract machinisms” or the formation of unformed matter; and intrinsically abstract consistency, whose sign-particles may be manifested in different ways (as capitalist abstractions) while also remaining “undecidable” and holding a “possible potential” in reserve. The machinic nucleus is where transformational schizoanalysis will work. The difference between generative and transformational lies in, then, the shift from the putting into play of “molar relations of subjection” to “molecular vectors of machinic subservience”. The strong interactions of the components of passage may be distinguished on the basis of their points of departure: i) “assemblages and inter-assemblage relations already constituted”; ii) “or of molecular populations, of matters of expression, in a nascent state” Still, Guattari immediately adds “it matters little, in effect, that these molecular populations and matters of expression are extracted from ‘previous assemblages’ or are put together for the occasion!” The critical issue here is the implementation of micro-political choices which led to new assemblages; this will involve an analysis of the transformations which elevate compo-
ments “to the rank of components of passage”, of which Guattari distinguishes three functions: i) discernibilization (borrowing magnification, colorization and semiotic crossing from Proust, and acceleration, slowing down, becoming heavy, and the deformation of spatio-temporal coordinates from Kafka); ii) proliferation ("a component gets to work on its own account and unfastens itself from the assemblage within which it was stratified"); iii) diagrammatization ("a component unleashes a mutational machinism capable of crossing heterogeneous domains from the point of view of their matters of expression"). All of the deterritorializations are, Guattari specifies, controlled. In general, the two pragmatics Guattari describes involve the extraction of existing components (generative) and the creation ex nihilo of new components (transformational). And the latter, Guattari writes, "harbours no particular mystery", because a cartographic diagram of its passages would reveal that it does not stray far from matter of expression, that is, to use Brian Massumi's language, not far from a complex with neither substance nor form, but just "a bundle of potential [non-actualized] functions".

Schizoanalysis is not a science, a technique, a type of cure, or a new analytic practice. It is "inseparable from a personal trajectory in specific social, political and cultural domains". This means that Massumi's schizoanalysis (with its references to: baby, marriage, high school, and the rest) will differ from Eugene Holland's schizoanalysis, because in both cases their trajectories will have been determined by their specifics: experiences, contexts, and socio-political circumstances, etc. Freud thought the same of psychoanalysis, even though the degree of followership he would come to require from his colleagues defied his initial recognition of methodological plurality.

Machinism is at once threatening and potentially liberatory; the former due to "the microscopic means of disciplinarization of thought and affect and the militarization of human relations", the latter to the extent that it remains open to "singularization and creative initiatives". Revolutionary machines have two specific goals: to destroy the relations of capitalism and "to establish themselves at odds with every value founded on a certain micro-politics of muscle, the phallus, territorialized power, etc". Perhaps a little reluctantly, but in order to avoid once more the charge that schizoanalysis is a cult of the machine, Guattari elaborated eight principles or "simple rules" in the form of aphorisms which would give direction to the analysis of the machinic unconscious: 1. "Do no harm", act without prejudice, "remain just until the end"; 2. "When something's happening, this proves that something's happening". This tautology dispenses with the mystifications of the psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious and its secrets: the shrink says: "when nothing is happening, this proves that something is happening, in reality, something
unconscious”; 3. “The best position to place oneself in order to listen to the unconscious is not necessarily behind a couch”. Who needs a cigar, a dog, a room full of statues, a scorecard .?; 4. “The unconscious compromises [mouille] those who come near it” Those who encounter it are carried in its wake; they are soaked by it, as it were, making the taking of a neutral position impossible; 5. “Important things never happen where one expects them” Or, “the entrance doesn’t coincide with the exit” What initiates a change isn’t what effects this change; 6. Transferences made by “subjective resonance, by personological identification” need to be distinguished from those made machinically producing new assemblages by means of “a-signifying diagrammatic interactions”; 7. “Take nothing for granted” There is no fixity of identity, and no situation is guaranteed; unlike the “guaranteed symbolic consistencies” of psychoanalysis (castration), which Guattari calls “dishonest and dangerous”; 8. “Every principle must be considered suspect”

V IWC

Guattari developed a theory of post-industrial capitalism, which he referred to as integrated world capitalism (IWC), through a series of remarkable collaborations with Deleuze, Eric Alliez, and Antonio Negri. Before considering how Guattari posed in a myriad of ways the question of how to resist and defeat IWC, let’s revisit the analysis of capitalism in Anti-Oedipus in order to better understand the relationship between desire and his theory of capitalism.

Using a tool of structuralist analysis, despite the anti-structuralism of Anti-Oedipus, the synchronic time of the despotic State is distinguished from the diachronic time of capitalism. Capitalism develops over time on the basis of a series of decodings and deterritorializations including the sale of accumulated property, and the circulation of money and workers. Capitalism comes into existence “in a space that takes time”, then, with the conjunction of these and other contingent factors, a conjunction that “constitutes a desire” and “actually produces a desiring-machine that is at the same time social and technical”. It is not that these decoded flows had yet to exist. Rather, it is the conjunction of them, some of which existed for a long time in different social formations that were not so marked by decodings but, instead, consisted of codings and overcodings, upon which capitalism establishes itself. Capitalism channels, however, the flows into the guiding principle of “production for production’s sake” Keep in mind that the priority of production is not peculiar to IWC. In the meantime, Deleuze and Guattari analyze in particular the encounter or conjunction of two contingent factors: deterritorialized
workers and decoded money. The worker-producer was deterritorialized on the basis of the: i) privatization of the soil; ii) appropriation of the instruments of production; iii) loss of the means of consumption through the dissolution of the family and corporation; and iv) the favoring of work itself over the worker. Money was decoded on the basis of: i) monetary abstraction; ii) merchant capital’s influence on the flows of production; iii) public debt and financial capital’s influence on the State; and iv) industrial capital’s control of the means of production. Numerous contingent factors made conditions favorable for the encounter of these decoded and deterritorialized flows. Under such favorable conditions, capitalism appropriates production and becomes “the new social full body”, characterized by a generalized decoding and becoming-immanent. The capitalist machine enters into relationships with itself or becomes filiative as it reproduces its immanent limits and the crises upon which it depends in ever widening extensions.

Deleuze and Guattari specify that diachronic technical machines are created by the synchronic capitalist machine and thus do not revolutionize the latter; that is, the latter revolutionizes itself through the breaks and cleavages it introduces into the former technical machines of production. Technical machines are parts of social machines. The generalized theory of flows that constitutes this theory of capitalism reveals the schizophrenic process at the center of capitalist desire. The desire for strength and impotence go hand in hand with capitalism’s reproduction of its immanent limits. Anti-production exists, then, at the heart of production; flows of stupidity effect the absorption of the surplus-value of analysis and information, just as the absorption of surplus-value is regulated by the introduction of lack in the face of abundance.

While there are important affinities between capitalism and schizophrenia, the two are not identical. While it may be that “our society produces schizos the same way it produces Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that the schizos are not salable”, capitalist production both sets in motion and arrests the schizophrenic process. Deleuze and Guattari contrast capitalism, as the relative limit of all societies, with schizophrenia, as the absolute limit of capitalism. While capitalism’s relative limits are immanent, those of schizophrenia constitute the exterior limit of capitalism that the latter wants to fill with its own immanent limits. This desire to fill by means of the reproduction of capitalism’s interior limits smothers the revolutionary potential of schizophrenia’s decoded flows by means of apparatuses of domination and regulations enforced by the State. The relationship between the capitalist and the schizophrenic is antagonistic. The decoding of flows that is the mark of capitalism is accompanied by their immanent axiomatization. This immanent axiomatic of capitalism has three
features: i) its differential relations are filled by surplus-value; ii) the absence of an exterior limit is filled by interior limits; and iii) the anti-productive aspect of production is filled by the absorption of surplus-value. The social axiomatic of capitalism is never completely filled or saturated because it constantly expands its own limits and introduces new axioms. On the one hand, capitalism’s energy for deterritorialization seems boundless; but, on the other hand, it constantly confronts its own limits that it allows to be overcome. Capitalism vacillates between precapitalist or archaic-despotic overcoding and post-capitalist or schizo decoding; between, then, reaction (paranoia) and revolution. It is thoroughly mad. And it is constantly threatened by the external limit of the schizophrenic process, which it meets with the addition of new axioms. But Deleuze and Guattari are hopeful that as the decoded flows continue to overflow, the holes in the mesh of the axiomatic will be exploited, and the libidinal breaks and breaches will appear suddenly and unexpectedly here and there, at this or perhaps that precise moment, without an “order of causes”, thus, escapes from the axiomatic of capital will occur, because it is exhausted from playing a catch-up game of sealing breaches, and outwitted in a game of guessing where the next renegade flow (not an individual libidinal disposition, but a multiplex desiring-machine) will emerge. While there is much more that could and perhaps needs to be said about the theory of capitalism developed in *Anti-Oedipus*, this much will suffice to get us on our way.

Let’s try and place this theory within the non-general typological description of the multiple forms of capitalist modes of valorization that Guattari developed with the French philosopher Alliez. Understood as a “general function of semiotization”, capitalism exercises an integrative and transformative semiotic power over a diverse domain of machines (technical, economic, social, desiring). It is, moreover, as we have seen, a deterritorializing power whose processual nature relies upon its avoidance of despotism for the sake of the marginal freedoms it permits around certain key power arrangements (production, for instance). From the most diverse machinic operations (material and non-material) capitalism extracts and exploits a surplus value, having drawn them into its exchangist “framework of equivalence”. The double articulation of formal economic and machinic content, that is, of a contradictory arrangement rendering equivalent diverse forces in a closed territory divided by legal and social rules, is imperfect and unequal, despite capital’s happy facade of symmetry and egalitarianism. The semiotic (i.e. economic) and the machinic (i.e. libidinal) are not in opposition, but produce opportunities of renewal for one another.

Guattari and Alliez propose a minimal model consisting of three evaluative terms: processes of machinic *production*, which they do not fur-
other develop; structures of social segmentation, considered in terms of the state; dominant economic semiotic systems, considered in terms of the market. Each historic mode of capitalistic valorization is described on the basis of the priority given to one the these terms: The order of priority for IWC is: production – market – state. Colonial monopoly capitalism is also ordered by production: production – state – market. This is not exhaustive, nor is it meant to be. It reveals, however, certain tendencies and emphases which, in this case, involve rapacious imperialist powers bleeding peripheral countries by holding commercial monopolies over resources extracted for the home and world markets, with no regard for the disorganization of the colony in question, nor the disintegration and degradation of the people and the land. The state (the distant imperialist power and its feudal outposts) poses for Guattari and Alliez an interesting question in light of its collapse and reconstruction in a “highly artificial” form under certain post-colonial conditions.

What makes IWC “new” is its innovative means of semiotization and increased capacity for the “machinic integration” of molecular diversity. Here, production reterritorializes and capitalizes all of the segments of social reproduction, the latter having the axioms of racism, sexism, and conservatisms of all sorts. For this social-machinic capital, as Guattari and Alliez refer to it, circulation takes the form of crisis and process becomes that of permanent restructuration. Production integrates circulation, information, and resegments society, giving to capital a “maximal synergetic fluidity” (a proliferation of fluid and mobile productive networks, of temporary labour, etc.). The state becomes the trader (and even a speculator) in trans-national flows, free-trade zones, minimizing and liberalizing (or rather decentralizing and privatizing) its national responsibilities.

IWC may present itself as the “highest stage of capitalism”, but for Guattari and Alliez it is only one among other modes. Given its unprecedented integrative capacity and fluidity, what are its limits? Whatever the limits actually turn out to be, Guattari and Alliez think that IWC can be brought down by “the development of new collective responses” and molecular valorizations. In short, the theory of IWC is the background against which Guattari’s valorization of molecular, revolutionary practices needs to be understood in order to be fully appreciated.

Guattari’s analysis of IWC is further developed in his work on generalized ecology, as well as in the project for the renewal of communism that he wrote with Negri. In “The Three Ecologies”, Guattari outlines the semiotic regimes upon which IWC is founded: economic, juridical, technico-scientific, and subjectification. These are not causally related since “IWC has to be regarded as all of a piece: it is simultaneously productive, economic, and subjective”. IWC produces certain forms of
subjectivity by semiotic means and keeps them distinct by affording one legitimation while cultivating resignation in the other. Guattari specifies the two types of subjectivity produced and employed by capitalistic societies: serial subjectivity (wage-earners and the “insecure” or “non-guaranteed”); and elitist subjectivity (ruling social strata). The main goal of Guattari’s generalized ecology is to allow for the resingularization of individuals and collectivities through the radical questioning of the limited subjective formations of capitalism. Ecological praxis in its broadest psychical, social and environmental senses must identify “dissident vectors of subjectification” and work towards their emancipation and maximization by opening up a-signifying ruptures and creating conditions conductive to the formation of new subject-groups.

One of the goals of the ecological praxis of resingularization is to shift capitalism from the era of mass media to that of post-media. Guattari and Alliez have argued that with IWC information becomes a factor of production. Capital becomes cybernetic and seeks a global informatization of society which goes hand in hand with global mass-mediaization. IWC can then expand and exercise social control through its networks and information technologies. Guattari repeatedly asked with regard to this transnational computerization: “why have the immense processual potentials brought forth by the revolutions in information processing, telematics, robotics, office automation, biotechnology and so on up to now led only to a monstrous reinforcement of earlier systems of alienation, an oppressive mass-mediated culture and an infantilizing politics of consensus?” Emancipatory social struggles must insist on and protect the fundamental right to singularity. This is precisely the goal of Guattari and Negri’s communism: the continuous reaffirmation and maximization of singularization in all its processual unevenness, creativity, multiplicity and contextual variability.

With Negri, however, Guattari adds a new layer to the theory of IWC. Intergrated World Capitalism remains a flexible semio-social science of exploitation, but has at its centre the nuclear state. Computerization is inseparable from mechanization and militarization. Outbreaks of singularization in the liberation movements of the 1970s, including the disastrous “terrorist interlude” – challenge the translation of life time into the “time of capital”, that is, into exchangist terms. Nuclear terror “became the only way to secure the resumption to capitalistic and socialistic accumulation in the 1970s”. It has long been a central thesis in peace studies that the mass media, science and technology are the means for the production of militarism, especially in non-material forms. Nuclear terror is for Guattari and Negri at "the root of every kind of oppression and overdetermines the relationships of exploitation between
social groups at both political and micro-political levels”, including the North/South axis of domination, and the West/East (especially former socialist countries) axis of capitalistic integration.

In Negri’s “Lettre archéologique” written to Guattari, the programmatic nature of their renewal of communism still leaves unanswered the question of social practice. But the answer will not be as immediately forthcoming in Negri’s mind as were the practices (i.e., wildcat strikes, absenteeism, sabotage, as part of the refusal of work) that realized and justified the program in the sixties. It is worth mentioning here Negri’s moving refrain: “We [the struggles of the sixties] have been defeated” If such defeats were strewn across the seventies, then in the eighties they were consolidated for capitalism’s sake. Negri wants us to fully appreciate the gravity of this defeat in order to avoid both reminiscence and repetition, but also to grasp the enormity of the critical task ahead. Negri sees in this defeat, however, a premature cause of the enemy’s modernization. Automation, he suggests, “is freely invented by the knowledge that springs from the rejection of work but is, on the other hand, applied in order to break and mystify the generality of this proletarian and labouring need”. The matter of the exercise of generalized social control through information technology remains, for Negri, unresolved. The production and reproduction of cybernetic subjectivity and the dislocation and mystification of the knowledge possessed by the counter-hegemonic forces have been used by IWC to break the desire for social transformation and reinvention. Today, then, transversal and alternative struggles need to expand the little room they have to maneuver and rest desire, the material and technical transformations of modernization, and knowledge from the impositions of capitalism. There are many traps and obstacles along the way.

Guattari’s commitment to a politics informed by an ecosophical perspective in its most general sense had to rise above the sectarianism that marked French Green politics in the early 1990s. Although Guattari was at times active in both Les Verts, led by Antoine Waechter, and Génération Ecologie, led by the [then] Minister of the Environment, Brice Lalonde, he joined the latter group at the national level, which is perhaps not surprising given that they were the so-called “leftist” minority of the movement that threatened what Waechter saw as the sacrosanct principle of “neither left nor right” of green politics. Guattari wanted to play a moderating role and openly lamented the split, while still reserving his praise for Lalonde. Guattari’s statement “Une autre vision du futur” played the savvy political card of separating the quarrel from the plurality of the ecological movement as a vehicle of reinvention in social, political and personal life. Many of Guattari’s political lessons delivered in Part I, “The Vicissitudes of Therapy”, may be applied here in the context of
the Green movement: reformism and utopianism must be resisted. The Green equivalents of these are, respectively, the competing models of so-called “shallow, short-term” ecology and mystical variants of “deep, long-term” ecology. The very notion of ecology as both subversive and scientific needs to be called into question. Whether there can be an “ecology” that is closely tied to the potentializations of subjective singularities rather than a bio-social interrelation must remain a deeply troubling question for all those concerned with a green politics inspired by Guattari’s thought.

On another political front, Guattari did not live to see that his work for peace in the former Yugoslavia, initiated together with Edgar Morin and other members of the French committee of the Assemblée européenne des citoyens, as well as those engaged in “transmediterranean dialogue” cultivated by the French through the “Citoyens de la Méditerranée” conference in Paris in early 1992, would be repeatedly frustrated by the virulent interethnic hatred and nationalist ambitions that had moved him to action on this issue in the first instance.106

The struggles continue.

Gary Genosko, Kingston, Ontario, April 1995

Notes

3 See Roger Gentis, Traité de psychiatrie provisoire, Paris: Maspero, 1977, pp. 7-27. The politics of the sector provoked the members of CERFI (Centre d’études, de recherches et de formations institutionnelles) to publish a 600-odd page issue devoted to it and related questions entitled: “histoire de la psychiatrie de secteur, ou le secteur impossible?” Recherches 17 (1975). Recherches is the journal of CERFI.
4 Guattari, RM, p. 147.
8 Guattari, RM, p. 158.
9 Ibid., p. 159.
10 See Guattari, “Le ‘voyage’ de Mary Barnes”, Le Nouvel observateur (28 mai 1973): 82-4, 87, 93, 96, 101, 104, 109-10. It should perhaps be noted that David Cooper, in his review of Guattari’s L’Inconscient machinique, praised his “calling into fundamental question classical conceptions . of the unconscious, and communication models based on systems theory in the attempt to understand human and above all familial interactions”. If, for Cooper, this was Guattari’s greatest accomplishment, he also considered, for example, Laing’s “paradigmatic utilization of fragments of dialogues . to illustrate the ways in which people, little by little, articulate (or undo) their life in relation to the life of others’ as more powerfully concrete than Guattari’s analysis of the characters in Proust’s La Recherche du temps perdu”, although Cooper
understood that Guattari used Proust as an example of "how to understand the assemblages and machinic territorialities in the act of untangling a certain micro-social reality". Cooper was, in the end, unhappy with this turn to Proust as a political and practical expression of Guattari's theory. Still, he looked for "zones of mutual enrichment" between Guattari and so-called "Anglo-Saxon" thinkers such as Goffman and Laing, as well as between theory and praxis (See Cooper, "Guattari, et notre implication dans les luttes quotidiennes", La Quinzaine littéraire 319 (fév 1980): 23.

15 Ibid.
16 Guattari, RM, p. 152.
17 Ibid., p. 153.
18 Ibid., p. 154.
19 Guattari, "La contestation", p. 25.
27 Guattari, RM, p. 166.
28 Ibid., p. 162.
29 In Oury, et al p. 21. See also Marie Depussé, Dieu git dans les détails, Paris: POL, 1993, p. 102. She "quotes" Oury: "Mais, c'est une clinique, ici, on est à la campagne. C'est mauvais, tous ces intellectuels, pour les fous".
30 Depussé, p. 145.
34 Ibid., p. 88.
38 Ibid., p. 21.

Ibid., p. 275.

Ibid., p. 239.


"Wolves", ATP, p. 32.

Ibid., p. 34.


Gardiner, p. 12.

Guattari, "Transversalité", in psychanalyse et transversalité, p. 79.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 80; Sigmund Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" [1921], in The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 12, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985, p. 130. It needs to be said that these few remarks on the bestiary of Guattari are merely the tip of a long tale which includes his writings on ethology in L'Inconscient machinique, pp. 117–53, as well as, of course, his work on Little Hans, especially the animal phobia (more horses) as a child's libidinal pragmatic in face of the familialism of psychoanalysis, pp. 181–82. See also his sense of the analysis of the institutional object in extreme cases in which the imaginary of a group (miners) is suddenly destroyed (the mine is closed), and the work involved in "guiding the imaginary from one structure to another, a little like what happens in the animal world during moulting" ("Le groupe et la personne", psychanalyse et transversalité, p. 168). This sort of reading will not be everyone's cup of tea. It is merely one among many other ways of reading.


Guattari, IM, p. 182.

Ibid.

Therese Grisham, "Linguistics as an Indiscipline: Deleuze and Guattari's Pragmatics", Sub stance 66 (1991): 45; see my Baudrillard and Signs, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 57–71. This Reader emphasizes Guattari's creative elaboration of concepts borrowed from Louis Hjelmslev's glossematics in the section on "Polysemiosis". Deleuze and Guattari refer to Hjelmslev as "the Danish Spinozist geologist that dark prince descended from Hamlet" (ATP, 43). In spite of its reputation as an agent of linguistic imperialism, Guattari has made glossematics serve the pragmatic ends of schizoaanalysis. Guattari makes an arid algebra of language serve a pragmatics of the unconscious. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari combined a critique of a linguistics of the signifier with praise for Hjelmslev: "We believe that, from all points of view and despite certain appearances, Hjelmslev's linguistics stands in profound opposition to the Saussurean and post-Saussurean undertaking" (242). Hjelmslev's theory "is the only linguistics adapted to the nature of both the capitalist and the schizophrenic flows: until now, the only modern (and not archaic) theory of language" (243). Glossematics may
be "schizo", but was Hjelmslev schizophrenic? That is, did Hjelmslev not only think like a schizo-analyst and theorize the schizo-process in order to free the flows of language, but also suffer from something called schizophrenia? Was he another Artaud, Van Gogh, Mary Barnes – a Judge Schreber whose breakthroughs enlightened us all? *Anti-Oedipus* does not answer these questions. On the floors of conferences, in obituaries, in diagnostic speculations, Hjelmslev's "depression", his "long and tragic illness", are made reference to not as breakthroughs, but as breakdowns. For all the care Deleuze and Guattari take in recognizing the dangers of turning clinical issues into metaphors, and to the extent that Guattari bases his extrapolations on decades of clinical experience, they have said nothing about Hjelmslev's "case".


60 Guattari, *RM*, p. 310.
61 Ibid., pp. 310–11.
63 Ibid.
65 Guattari, *IM*, p. 179.
66 Ibid., p. 187.
67 Ibid.
69 Guattari, *IM*, p. 190.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 191.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 192.
74 Ibid., pp. 192–3.
75 Ibid., p. 193.
76 Ibid., pp. 47–8.
77 Ibid., p. 193.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 194.
84 Ibid., p. 201.
85 Ibid., pp. 201–3.
87 Ibid., p. 225.
88 Ibid., p. 233.
89 Ibid., p. 245.
90 Ibid., p. 246.
91 Ibid., p. 250.
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102 Ibid., pp. 259–60.

At issue here is Guattari’s long-standing, non-absolute distinction between subjugated groups and subject-groups. The former follow a path of reference received passively from the outside; their cause is heard but by whom? The latter follow a path of self-reference (they have the ability to assume an internal law), that is, of interpreting their own position, with regard to their elaboration of projects and tools, and vocation in general. At first glance, this distinction, while non-absolute, may not be as dialectical as the Sartrean concepts to which it is indebted. The subjugated group is very similar to serial being, with its exterior focus on an object in which a prior praxis is embodied and its passive internal structure of mutual Otherness. The subject-group is a kind of group in fusion, a genuine group, that has achieved fusion, having liquidated its seriality and accomplished an active restructuration. But this would take us beyond Sartre, because for him the group in fusion is still, even if it is united in “the flash of a common praxis”, united, that is, in mutual determination by reciprocity, through a common object (a danger, an enemy) like serial being. See Sartre, *The Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol. I, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith, London: NLB, 1976, p. 253 ff.

On Guattari’s hopes for the transition from the consensual mass-media era to the dissensual post-media era see, “Pour une éthique des médias”, *Le Monde* (6 nov. 1991): 2. Guattari envisages this transition on the basis of four factors: i) foreseeable technological developments; ii) the necessary redefinition of the relations between producers and consumers; iii) the institution of new social practices and their interference with the development of media; iv) the development of information technologies. But for many communication theorists, “post-mass media” culture merely provides yet another opportunity to demonstrate that the transition has not been decisive, and to drag out and dust off old models. These theorists should be, as Umberto Eco once put it, “pensioned off”.


101 Ibid., p. 54.
102 Ibid., pp. 53–4.
104 Ibid., p. 157.